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TRANSPARENCY DESERTS
Christina Koningisor
ABSTRACT—Few contest the importance of a robust transparency regime
in a democratic system of government. In the United States, the “crown
jewel” of this regime is the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Yet
despite widespread agreement about the importance of transparency in
government, few are satisfied with FOIA. Since its enactment, the statute
has engendered criticism from transparency advocates and critics alike for
insufficiently serving the needs of both the public and the government.
Legal scholars have widely documented these flaws in the federal public
records law.
In contrast, scholars have paid comparatively little attention to
transparency laws at the state and local level. This is surprising. The role of
state and local government in the everyday lives of citizens has increased in
recent decades, and many critical government functions are fulfilled by
state and local entities today. Moreover, crucial sectors of the public—
namely, media and advocacy organizations—rely as heavily on state public
records laws as they do on FOIA to hold the government to account. Yet
these state laws and their effects remain largely overlooked, creating gaps
in both local government law and transparency law scholarship.
This Article attempts to fill these gaps by surveying the state and local
transparency regime, focusing on public records laws in particular.
Drawing on hundreds of public records datasets, along with qualitative
interviews, the Article demonstrates that in contrast with federal law, state
transparency law introduces comparatively greater barriers to disclosure
and comparatively higher burdens upon government. Further, the Article
highlights the existence of “transparency deserts,” or localities in which a
combination of poorly drafted transparency laws, hostile government
actors, and weak local media and civil society impedes effective public
oversight of government.
The Article serves as a corrective to the scholarship’s current, myopic
focus on federal transparency law. In doing so, it makes three central
contributions. First, it provides a much-needed descriptive account of the
state and local transparency regime. Second, it makes a normative
contribution. It mines empirical and qualitative public records data to
evaluate the costs and benefits of the current transparency regime and then
applies those insights to contemporary academic and policy-oriented
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debates. In the process, the Article reveals that unique features of state and
local government both heighten the salience of statutory transparency
mechanisms and challenge dominant strands of thought in the
contemporary transparency scholarship. Third, the Article has implications
for ongoing public law debates, demonstrating that failures in the local
transparency regime undermine certain theories of federalism.
AUTHOR—Fellow, U.C. Berkeley School of Law. Many thanks to Mark
Goldberg, Kathryn Hashimoto, Jessica Koningisor, Margaret Kwoka, John
Langford, Jonathan Manes, David McCraw, David Pozen, Ricardo
Brandon Rios, and David Schulz, as well as to the participants at Yale Law
School’s Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference and Berkeley Law
School’s Fellows Workshop. I am especially grateful to Jim Dempsey and
the Center for Law and Technology at U.C. Berkeley School of Law for
supporting this research.
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2018, Sheri Fink, a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter
for the New York Times, was finishing up a months-long investigation into
the local government’s response to Hurricane Harvey. 1 Her report focused
on civilian fatalities during the hurricane and the extent to which
communication and coordination failures among emergency response
providers may have contributed to these deaths. 2 As part of the
newsgathering process, Fink submitted multiple public records requests
under the Texas public records law to state and local agencies involved
with emergency response efforts. 3 She requested 9-1-1 call logs, afteraction reports, emergency dispatches, officials’ e-mails, and an array of
other government records. Some government entities handed over the
requested records quickly and with little or no objection. 4 Others invoked
tenuous legal arguments to avoid disclosing records or simply failed to
respond at all. 5
The City of Houston issued a particularly illogical response. Fink had
submitted a request for the city’s Hurricane Harvey after-action report, a
type of document routinely produced in the aftermath of natural disasters
that analyzes the government’s response to the event and outlines areas for
improvement. 6 But Houston refused to release the results of its
investigation. 7 Texas’s public records law—like virtually every public
records law in the country—is structured with a presumption of openness,8
1
E-mail from Sheri Fink, Correspondent, The N.Y. Times Co., to author (Oct. 25, 2019, 01:25
PST) (on file with author). The author previously served as an attorney at the New York Times and
assisted Fink with some of these public records requests and appeals.
2
Sheri
Fink,
Lost
in
the
Storm,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
30,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/08/30/magazine/hurricane-harvey-houston-floods-texasemergency.html [https://perma.cc/J3RC-T6TU].
3
E-mail from Sheri Fink, supra note 1.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
For example, Harris County—which encompasses the City of Houston, as well as the surrounding
areas—voluntarily released its after-action report to the public. See HARRIS CTY. OFFICE OF HOMELAND
SEC. AND EMERGENCY MGMT., HURRICANE HARVEY AFTER-ACTION REPORT 1 (2018),
https://www.readyharris.org/Portals/43/PDFs/Hurricane%20Harvery%20AAR_Final.pdf?ver=2018-0514-144548-187 [https://perma.cc/DM8H-AA28]; see also Press Release, Harris Cty., Harris County
Releases
Hurricane
Harvey
After
Action
Report
(May
21,
2018),
https://web.archive.org/web/20180617175635/https:/www.readyharris.org/News-Information/ReadyHarris-News/Post/32479 [https://perma.cc/53MV-ZPN7] (announcing the county’s release of the report
to the public).
7
E-mail from Sheri Fink, supra note 1.
8
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.302 (West 2005) (“[I]nformation requested in writing is presumed
to be subject to required public disclosure.”).
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requiring that every record held by a covered government entity be turned
over to the public unless it falls within a specific statutory exemption. 9 In
this case, the city argued that the report was protected from disclosure by a
statute permitting the government to withhold records relating to “an act of
terrorism or related criminal activity.” 10
Fink pointed out that a natural disaster like a hurricane cannot
plausibly be categorized as either “an act of terrorism” or “related criminal
activity.” She argued that the city was stretching the bounds of this
exemption to the point of absurdity. 11 But the city’s attorneys held firm.
This left the Times in a bind. It would most likely cost $20,000–$30,000 to
hire local counsel in Texas and contest the decision in court.12
Newspapers—even the largest in the country—are rarely able to afford that
type of legal challenge given the substantial uncertainty involved. 13 Such
cases often linger for years, and even when the newspaper does prevail in
court, the records at issue are often no longer newsworthy by the time they
are disclosed. The costs become difficult to justify.
Fink’s experience touches upon a number of critical and interrelated
threads raised by public records laws, including the willingness of a local
agency to stretch the plain meaning of a statute intended to facilitate
government oversight; the motivations and capabilities of the government
officials responding to public records requests; the peculiarities of each
state’s public records law; and the ability of Fink and the Times to appeal
the city’s decision and enforce the requirements of the Texas statute. These
are not necessarily new issues or concerns. What is unique is that they
surfaced in the context of a local government public records request.
There has been a proliferation of scholarship in recent years focused
on federal transparency laws in general, 14 and on the Freedom of
See id. §§ 552.101–552.160 (listing exemptions).
Letter from James M. Graham, Assistant Att’y Gen., Att’y Gen. of Tex. Open Records Div., to
Rahat Huq, Assistant City Att’y (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/
openrecords/51paxton/orl/2018/pdf/or201827608.pdf [https://perma.cc/JX4K-E8TS].
11
Letter from David McCraw, Vice President and Deputy Gen. Counsel, The N.Y. Times Co., to
Ken Paxton, Att’y Gen. of Tex. (Sept. 7, 2018) (on file with author).
12
E-mail from David McCraw, Senior Vice President and Deputy Gen. Counsel, The N.Y. Times
Co., to author (Oct. 24, 2019, 06:13 PST) (on file with author). This amount generally doubles if the
newspaper follows up with an appeal. Id. In this specific instance, the Times ended up pursuing an
interim step and contesting the withholding through an appeal process with the state attorney general’s
office. The newspaper achieved a partial legal victory and ultimately obtained a redacted version of the
report. See Letter from James M. Graham, supra note 10.
13
See discussion infra Section III.D.3.a.
14
See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885 (2006) (outlining the
ways in which excessive transparency can undermine effective governance); David E. Pozen,
9

10
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Information Act (FOIA) in particular. 15 The scholarship on this topic is
both deep and diverse, but many articles are concerned, in one way or
another, with the same central questions: whether the benefits of
transparency laws such as FOIA outweigh the costs and whether these laws
can be successfully amended to better serve the underlying goals of
transparency advocates while minimizing the burdens to government. 16
Despite this profusion of legal scholarship examining federal transparency
laws, scholars have been curiously silent on transparency law issues at the
subfederal level. There have been a handful of articles addressing particular
slices of state-level transparency statutes. 17 But scholars have not yet taken
Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100 (2018) [hereinafter Pozen, Transparency’s
Ideological Drift] (demonstrating that many federal transparency requirements serve more neoliberal
goals today such as reduced regulation and smaller government); Cass R. Sunstein, Output
Transparency vs. Input Transparency, in TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY 187 (David E. Pozen & Michael
Schudson eds., 2018) (arguing that input transparency is often less beneficial and more costly than
output transparency); Andrew Keane Woods, The Transparency Tax, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2018)
(arguing that transparency’s real cost “is the loss of expressive ambiguity”).
15
See, e.g., Margaret B. Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, 127 YALE L.J. 2204 (2018) [hereinafter
Kwoka, First-Person FOIA] (examining the extent to which FOIA is used to fulfill the personal
interests of individual requesters); Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361 (2016)
[hereinafter Kwoka, FOIA, Inc.] (examining the extent to which FOIA serves commercial interests);
Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 217 (2011) (criticizing
procedural irregularities in FOIA lawsuits); David E. McCraw, The “Freedom from Information” Act:
A Look Back at Nader, FOIA, and What Went Wrong, 126 YALE L.J. F. 232 (2016) (chronicling the
flaws of FOIA and describing how these flaws have changed over time); David E. Pozen, Freedom of
Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (2017) [hereinafter
Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act] (describing the failures of
FOIA and arguing for a more radical revision of the law).
16
One strand of this scholarship argues that the harms imposed upon the government by the law
warrant a significant reevaluation of the law’s continuing viability. See, e.g., Pozen, Freedom of
Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at 1156 (arguing in favor of
“displacing FOIA requests as the lynchpin of transparency policy and shoring up alternative
strategies”); Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, 6 REGULATION 14, 15
(1982) (characterizing FOIA as “the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis Ignored”). Another strand
argues that the law is flawed but necessary, and proposes reforms. See, e.g., Erin C. Carroll, Protecting
the Watchdog: Using the Freedom of Information Act to Preference the Press, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 193,
195 (proposing reforms to FOIA that would privilege the press); Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of
Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1071–79 (2008) (using
the example of FOIA requests during the “Global War on Terror” to argue that many of the perceived
shortcomings of FOIA in fact have beneficial effects); Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information
Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J.
649, 664–83 (1984) (describing the costs of the law and proposing reforms).
17
See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Informational Ombudsman: Fixing Open Government by
Institutional Design, 2 INT’L J. OPEN GOV’T 275 (2015) (examining the role of ombudsman in state
public records laws); Katherine Fink, State FOI Laws: More Journalist-Friendly, or Less?, in
TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY, supra note 14, at 100–09 (examining the percentage of media requests
sent to state environmental agencies across the country); Sarah Geraghty & Melanie Velez, Bringing
Transparency and Accountability to Criminal Justice Institutions in the South, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y
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a more comprehensive look at how these statutes impact state government.
And there has been virtually no scholarship at all examining transparency
issues at the local level. 18
This Article attempts to remedy this gap. It does so by focusing
attention on one category of state transparency laws: public records laws.19
It surveys the costs and benefits of these laws, concluding that these
transparency statutes are both less effective and more critical to democratic
governance at the state level than they are at the federal level. Based on this
analysis, the Article then maps out the three central features that comprise a
local transparency ecosystem: the substance of these transparency statutes;
the attitudes of the government officials that implement them; and the
strength of the media and civil society actors who monitor the government
externally. It argues that when all three prongs of this transparency
ecosystem fail—when the statutes themselves are poorly written,
implemented by government actors hostile to transparency efforts, and
enforced by weak or nonexistent civil society organizations—this creates a
downward spiral of reduced government disclosure and public oversight,
what I refer to as a “transparency desert.”20
The lack of scholarly attention to such transparency failures at the
state and local level is surprising. The power and influence of state and
local governments have expanded in recent years, and these entities now
fulfill a myriad of critical government functions. The size of state and local
government dwarfs that of the federal government today. 21 And these state
REV. 455, 456–70 (2011) (examining the persistent violation of public records laws by criminal justice
institutions in southern states); Michele Bush Kimball, Law Enforcement Records Custodians’
Decision-Making Behaviors in Response to Florida’s Public Records Law, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 313,
326–50 (2003) (examining the behavior and attitudes of law enforcement records’ custodians in
Florida); Claudia Polsky, Open Records, Shuttered Labs: Ending Political Harassment of Public
University Researchers, 66 UCLA L. REV. 208, 212 (2019) (examining the impact of public records
laws on academic research and speech).
18
There is, however, a thoughtful but relatively small body of literature examining transparency
issues in the context of local policing. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Secret Policing, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 99 (arguing in favor of greater transparency in domestic policing).
19
This Article uses the terms “public records laws,” “open records laws,” and “freedom of
information laws” interchangeably.
20
This term borrows from the concept of “news deserts,” or geographic areas that lack local news
outlets. See PENELOPE MUSE ABERNATHY, THE EXPANDING NEWS DESERT 8 (2018),
https://www.cislm.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/The-Expanding-News-Desert-10_14-Web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UN4Z-BJJ3].
21
“In 2014, the federal government civilian workforce was [roughly 2.7 million, while] . . . . the
combined state and local workforce in 2013 [was] more than 16 million . . . .” RICHARD BRIFFAULT &
LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 4 (8th ed.
2016).
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and local entities also exert greater political sway. State and local
governments are now responsible for implementing large swaths of federal
policy. 22 Conversely, they also play a central role in resisting federal
policies and actions. 23 These state transparency laws take on increased
importance as the governments they monitor assume a greater role in
citizens’ lives.
Moreover, an animating concern of the federal transparency
scholarship is the extent to which the media is able to utilize FOIA to
support its role as government watchdog. 24 While FOIA was enacted to
provide records access to the public at large, the law’s drafters were
especially attuned to the needs of the news media. The law was designed
largely to serve journalists, with the assumption that these journalists, in
turn, would inform the general citizenry. 25 Under this view of FOIA, the
media serves as a kind of “surrogate” for the public. 26 The media’s ability
to use the statute becomes especially critical from this perspective. Legal
scholars, in turn, have devoted outsized attention to the issue. 27
In contrast, there has been comparatively little scholarly focus on the
media’s ability to effectively use these state-level transparency laws, even
though many reporters themselves view state public records statutes as
deeply integral to the reporting process. Certainly, local news outlets must
turn to state laws to cover local government issues. But even at national
media outlets, reporters rely heavily on state transparency laws—arguably
as heavily as they rely on FOIA and other federal statutes. 28 We cannot
understand the ways in which transparency laws facilitate the media’s
ability to perform its watchdog role without considering the role of these
subfederal laws.
See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1853 (2015).
See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism,
118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) (demonstrating the ways in which states use powers conferred by the federal
government to resist federal policy).
24
See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 16, at 211–15; Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, supra note 15, at 2212–
15; Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1369–71.
25
See Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1367–71.
26
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (noting that the public
learns about legal proceedings primarily through the press, “validat[ing] the media claim of functioning
as surrogates for the public”).
27
See supra note 24.
28
See, e.g., Interview with Steve Eder, Reporter, The N.Y. Times Co., in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Aug. 28,
2018) (stating that he often submits requests through both FOIA and state public records logs but finds
that he is better off “focusing energies on state” requests given the advantages they provide over FOIA,
such as improved processing times). For further discussion of the specific advantages state public
records laws provide over FOIA, see infra Section III.B.
22
23
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This Article attempts to remedy this gap in the literature by exploring
the example of state public records laws. The term “transparency” is broad
and nebulous and can be interpreted to encompass a wide array of state
statutes, including open meeting laws, open data laws, budgetary
transparency requirements, and more.29 By focusing on one class of
transparency laws, this Article sidesteps these definitional questions and
narrows its analytical lens. This approach forecloses a more comprehensive
examination of the ways in which various transparency laws interact with
state and local governments. But homing in on one category of
transparency law also offers considerable benefits. Much of the current
transparency scholarship is focused on FOIA rather than on the array of
other federal transparency statutes.30 As a result, an analysis of state-level
public records laws, as well as the effects they have on state and local
government, serves as a natural place to both push back on and fill the gaps
within the existing literature. A robust theoretical and analytical framework
already exists within which to plug an analysis of subfederal transparency
laws.
Moreover, a common obstacle facing local government scholars is the
sheer number of government entities that exist in the United States. There
are roughly 90,000 local governments in the country. 31 And public records
laws generally apply to multiple entities even within a single local
government, such as local zoning boards or police departments. Each state
also has dozens—sometimes hundreds—of state-level agencies or other
state-level bodies that are covered by the public records law. The result is a
profusion of state and local government entities subject to state open
records laws. 32 This multitude of state and local governments nationwide,
29
Cf. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, supra note 14, at 123–44 (examining various
transparency measures in the federal context, including open records laws, open meetings laws,
legislative transparency requirements, campaign finance transparency, and open data requirements).
30
See, e.g., Pozen & Schudson, Introduction, in TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY, supra note 14, at 2
(explaining that the transparency anthology focuses on FOIA “both to contain what might otherwise be
an unwieldy inquiry and because FOIA is an especially canonical transparency instrument, one of the
ur-texts of the field”).
31
Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Reports There Are 89,004 Local
Governments in the United States (Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/
releases/archives/governments/cb12-161.html [https://perma.cc/F5SG-T5RN] [hereinafter U.S. Census
Bureau Press Release].
32
The executive director of New York’s Committee on Open Government estimates that there are
10,000 government entities subject to the public records statute in New York State alone. Interview
with Robert J. Freeman, Exec. Dir., N.Y. State Comm. on Open Gov’t, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Aug. 9, 2018).
And in Washington State, there are roughly 2,300 state and local government entities subject to the state
public records law. See Joint Legis. Audit and Rev. Comm., Public Records Data Collection System,
2017 Data Set (Oct. 9, 2018) (on file with author) [hereinafter Washington State Dataset 2017].
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combined with the complexities of evaluating fifty separate and unique
state laws, poses a research challenge. Focusing on one category of
transparency laws allows for a more bounded area of inquiry as well as a
deeper analysis of the laws’ effects than would be possible with a fifty-state
survey of multiple transparency-related statutes.
Elucidating this tangle of state public records laws and their effects—
both good and bad—serves as a corrective to the legal scholarship’s
current, narrowed focus on federal law. In doing so, this Article makes
three central contributions. First, it offers a descriptive account of a critical
aspect of state and local governance. It examines the substance and
application of state public records laws, as well as the extent to which
distinctions in government structure at the federal, state, and local level
complicate existing assumptions and theories about transparency law. One
of the most significant obstacles to studying subfederal transparency
issues—and state-level public records laws in particular—is lack of data.
Few states track their public records laws at the state level, and no state
tracks public records requests at the local level.33 This Article helps remedy
this informational gap by drawing upon public records datasets from
various state and local governments, as well as conversations with public
records officers, to better understand the public records process at the
subfederal level.
Second, this Article makes a normative contribution. It mines this
quantitative and qualitative data to evaluate the costs and benefits of the
current public records regime. It then applies these insights to
contemporary academic and policy-oriented debates. In doing so, it serves
as a corrective to current scholarly and legislative discussions surrounding
transparency laws. It undermines assumptions about transparency writ large
that are embedded within the contemporary literature, revealing that certain
claims that commonly surface in the transparency literature—such as the
availability of traditional checks and balances as an alternative source of
government transparency and accountability—do not necessarily hold up in
the context of state and local government. And it shows that features
unique to state and local government heighten the salience of statutory
transparency mechanisms.
Finally, this analysis has implications for ongoing public law debates.
Local government scholars have paid little attention to transparency laws,
despite their relevance to such questions as the costs and benefits of
decentralization and the potential for local governments to enhance
33

See discussion infra Section III.A.
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democratic participation. 34 This Article helps bridge this divide. It
highlights the formation of transparency deserts—or localities in which a
combination of poorly drafted transparency laws, hostile government
actors, and weak local media and civil society organizations combine to
shield the government from public scrutiny. In doing so, it demonstrates
that these transparency deserts challenge certain assumptions underpinning
theories of federalism—for example, that smaller governments are more
closely monitored by their citizens or that state and local governments
serve as effective democratic laboratories.
The Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I establishes a point of
comparison by surveying the structure and application of FOIA, as well as
the themes and preoccupations of the current transparency law scholarship.
Part II addresses the history, structure, and application of state public
records laws. Part III outlines the concept of state and local transparency
ecosystems and evaluates the costs, benefits, and barriers to disclosure that
exist at the state and local level. Part IV highlights the problem of
transparency deserts and examines how these transparency deserts
challenge certain theories of federalism. Finally, Part V addresses the
ongoing viability of state transparency laws and outlines potential areas for
reform.
I. IN THE SHADOW OF FEDERAL LAW:
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
When legal scholars talk about government transparency, invariably
they are referring to the web of federal statutes that comprise the federal
transparency regime. Those statutes include the Government in Sunshine
Act, 35 the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 36 and the Digital
Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014, 37 among others. But the

34
See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 574, 625–29
(2017) (describing the “missing focus on the institutions of administration in local-government legal
scholarship”); discussion infra Section IV.B (discussing the ways in which transparency failures in state
and local government have implications for federalism scholarship). Professor Miriam Seifter has begun
to address the role of transparency in state-level governance, although further work still needs to be
done in this arena. See Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration,
93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 107 (2018) [hereinafter Seifter, Further from the People?].
35
Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.
and 39 U.S.C.).
36
Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3.
37
Pub. L. No. 113-101, 128 Stat. 1146.

1470

114:1461 (2020)

Transparency Deserts

“crown jewel of transparency” is the Freedom of Information Act. 38 FOIA
casts a long shadow on transparency discussions in law and policy
contexts. Indeed, as Professor David Pozen has written, the statute is
“arguably the canonical piece of transparency legislation in the modern
world.” 39
Yet this is not the only area where FOIA looms large. The federal
statute has also bled into state transparency laws. State legislatures often
incorporate the statutory language of FOIA directly into state law. And
judges interpreting state public records laws routinely look to federal
judicial interpretations of FOIA for guidance. 40 Even though some state
public records laws predate FOIA, 41 virtually every state law must now be
considered in light of its federal counterpart. Moreover, the federal statute
dominates the transparency scholarship, at least within the legal literature.42
As a result, in order to understand what is distinctive and important about
state transparency laws in general—and state freedom of information laws
in particular—it is helpful to look to FOIA as a point of reference.
The basic outline of the law is most likely familiar to readers. The
radical innovation of FOIA is that it establishes a private right of action:
anyone can request a record under the law, and anyone may sue when their
request is ignored or denied. The statute requires that all records held by
federal government agencies are disclosed to the public upon request unless
they fall within one of nine enumerated exemptions, the most significant of
which offer protections for classified documents; interagency and other
privileged communications; documents containing private information; and
law enforcement records.43 Critically, the law applies only to federal
agencies. The statute does not apply to the legislative and judicial branches,
nor does it apply to the President and his immediate staff. 44

Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, supra note 14, at 124 (quoting TED GUP, NATION OF
SECRETS: THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 119 (2007)); see 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (2012).
39
Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, supra note 14, at 118.
40
See discussion infra Section II.A.
41
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1888, 1892 (Deering 1937); WIS. STAT. § 10.137 (1849).
42
See sources cited supra note 15.
43
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (3), (5)–(7). FOIA also protects records related to the internal rules and
process of an agency, id. § 552(b)(2); trade secrets, id. § 552(b)(4); records relating to agency
regulation of a financial institution, id. § 552(b)(8); and geological and geophysical data, id.
§ 552(b)(9).
44
Id. § 551(1). By its terms, the FOIA applies to “the Executive Office of the President,” id.
§ 552(f), but this term does not include either “the President’s immediate personal staff” or any
38
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These federal agencies receive a large and growing number of
requests each year. In 2017, they received more than 800,000 FOIA
requests. 45 The identities and motivations of these requesters is a question
that has preoccupied legal scholars in recent years. Professor Margaret
Kwoka, in particular, has conducted extensive research on FOIA requesters
in an effort to understand whether the law is serving the original intent of
its drafters. She has found that certain federal agencies are flooded with
requests from commercial entities, 46 while others receive an overwhelming
percentage of requests from “first-person” requesters—individuals seeking
information about themselves. 47 In both studies, Professor Kwoka raises the
concern that even if there is some public benefit conferred by these
requests, much of this commercial and first-person use of the statute is not
necessarily consistent with the public oversight function that the drafters of
the law envisioned. 48 These requests also raise the costs of the Act. In 2017,
the federal government employed roughly 4,500 full-time FOIA officers
and spent more than half a billion dollars responding to record requests. 49
Despite years of criticism and multiple revisions to the law, few agree
that FOIA adequately serves the needs of either requesters or the public.
The Executive Branch argues that the number and scope of requests has
ballooned and that agencies lack sufficient resources to adequately respond

person of the Executive Office of the President “whose sole function is to advise and assist the
President.” Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1291 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1380, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974)).
45
OFFICE OF INFO. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 2 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/oip/page/file/1069396/download
[https://perma.cc/H9PK-3L9R] [hereinafter SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS].
46
Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1379–81 (evaluating the FOIA logs of six federal agencies
and finding that all six received far more requests from commercial entities than they did from the
media).
47
Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, supra note 15, at 2210, 2221 (evaluating FOIA logs from nine
federal agencies and determining that significant percentages were submitted by individuals for their
own use in immigration proceedings, criminal proceedings, social security benefit proceedings, and
genealogical research).
48
See id. at 2208 (noting that many first-person requests fail to “advance Congress’s primary goal
in enacting FOIA: to promote public democratic oversight of government activities”); Kwoka, FOIA,
Inc., supra note 15, at 1414–15 (noting that much of the commercial use of FOIA she uncovers “neither
enhance[s] agency oversight nor promote[s] democratic participation in governance”); see also
discussion supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text (noting that the drafters of FOIA were primarily
concerned with ensuring an informed citizenry, and they envisioned that the media would play a central
role in this process).
49
SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS, supra note 45, at 20. The government collected less than
1% of these costs back from requesters. Id.
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to requests. 50 Members of Congress routinely accuse executive officials of
creating obtuse procedures deliberately designed to confuse requesters.51
And members of the media argue that enumerated exemptions have been
construed so broadly that they swallow vast categories of records and that
excessive time delays make the statute nearly unusable. 52 Increasingly,
scholars have taken up the question of whether the statute can be
adequately reformed to better fulfill the needs of the government or the
public. 53 Yet despite these persistent critiques, the statute continues to loom
large in the public imagination. Scholars have even characterized the law as
a “super-statute,” one that has assumed a “quasi-constitutional valence”
over time. 54
II. THE CENTERPIECE OF THE STATE TRANSPARENCY REGIME: STATE
PUBLIC RECORDS LAWS
Much like the federal transparency landscape, the local transparency
regime consists of an overlapping network of state statutes. This Article
homes in on the impact and efficacy of the most significant of these
transparency requirements: state public records laws. Similar to the
Freedom of Information Act’s role in the federal context, these state law
equivalents serve as the foremost transparency mechanism for monitoring
state and local government.
A. The History of State Public Records Laws
While legal scholars have explored the origins of the “right to know”
in the American legal tradition, these historical inquiries are generally
confined to the federal context. 55 Despite scholars’ near-exclusive historical
focus on federal law, the origin of the public access movement in the
United States is in fact inextricably intertwined with state public records
laws, which served as a precursor to FOIA.
50
See, e.g., MEGHAN M. STUESSY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41933, THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT (FOIA): BACKGROUND, LEGISLATION, AND POLICY ISSUES 16 (2015) (noting that
Department of Homeland Security officials had pointed to a “lack of funding” as one of the reasons the
FOIA backlog had increased at the agency); see also Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the
Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at 1123–31 (discussing the democratic costs of FOIA).
51
See, e.g., STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 114TH CONG.,
FOIA IS BROKEN: A REPORT, at iii–iv (2016), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=789831
[https://perma.cc/8WTV-T7LW].
52
See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 16, at 213–15 (chronicling the media’s frustration with FOIA).
53
See discussion supra note 15.
54
David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 314 n.204 (2010).
55
See discussion supra notes 14–15.
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At common law, members of the public were entitled to inspect
certain categories of public records, including the records of municipal
corporations. 56 State legislatures began to codify this common law right in
the mid-nineteenth century. Wisconsin passed what was likely the nation’s
first public records law in 1849, 57 requiring that “[e]very sheriff, clerk of
the circuit court, register of deeds, county treasurer, and clerk of the board
of supervisors” keep “all books and papers . . . in their offices . . . open for
the examination of any person.” 58 The law’s enforcement mechanisms were
robust: for each day that an officer neglected to comply with this open
records requirement, he was required to pay a fee of $5—roughly the
equivalent of $160 per day today. 59
Other states soon followed suit. In 1872, California enacted a limited
statutory right of public access to the “written acts or records of the acts of
the sovereign authority, of official bodies and tribunals, and of public
officers, legislative, judicial, and executive.” 60 By the turn of the century,
Montana, Utah, Idaho, and Oregon had enacted similar provisions. 61 And
by 1940, at least twelve states had codified access rights to public records.62
These laws were usually concise—often just a few sentences long—and
lacked a clear definition as to their scope of coverage. Still, they served as
an important precursor to FOIA. 63
The origins of the federal public records law are usually traced back to
Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 64 but no further. 65 Yet the
See, e.g., Mushet v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv., 170 P. 653, 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1917); State ex rel.
Colescott v. King, 57 N.E. 535, 537, 538 (Ind. 1900); State ex rel. Wellford v. Williams, 75 S.W. 948,
958–59 (Tenn. 1903); Clement v. Graham, 63 A. 146, 153–54 (Vt. 1906).
57
John A. Kidwell, Open Records Laws and Copyright, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1021, 1027.
58
WIS. STAT. § 10.137 (1849).
59
Id.
60
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1888, 1892 (Deering 1937).
61
See IDAHO C.C.P. §§ 902, 903 (1881), repealed by S.L. 1990; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 10541,
3170–82 (1895), repealed by L. 2015, ch. 348, § 59; HILL’S ANN. LAWS OF OREGON §§ 717–18 (Hill
1892); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-26-1–78-26-3 (1953); see also City of Kenai v. Kenai Peninsula
Newspapers, Inc., 642 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Alaska 1982) (noting that the common law right of access was
codified in 1900 in Alaska, and that the language of this provision was similar to existing laws in Idaho,
Montana, Oregon, and Utah).
62
William Randolph Henrick, Comment, Public Inspection of State and Municipal Executive
Documents: “Everybody, Practically Everything, Anytime, Except . . . .”, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1105,
1107 (1977).
63
See HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW: LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS
AND PROCEEDINGS 39 (1953).
64
Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
65
See, e.g., STUESSY, supra note 50, at 1 (referring to FOIA “as the embodiment of ‘the people’s
right to know’” and citing the APA as its precursor).
56
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drafters of FOIA were strongly influenced by these state public access
laws. They drew heavily on the work of Harold Cross, a former counsel for
the New York Herald Tribune, who wrote a book that surveyed these state
public records laws and argued in favor of a federal law that would offer
similar rights of access. 66 Cross himself served as a legal advisor to the
congressional committee charged with drafting FOIA. 67 Through Cross’s
contributions, these existing state statutes influenced the structure and
substance of the new federal public records law.
The borders between these state and federal laws soon became
permeable. FOIA began to influence the makeup of many state public
records laws, even those that had been enacted prior to 1966. 68 New state
public records laws were enacted, some of which were patterned on
FOIA. 69 Amendments to existing state public records laws began to contain
exemptions and provisions adopted from the federal law. And state court
judges began to look to federal interpretations of analogous provisions of
FOIA to guide their own interpretations of the state public records law. 70 In
this way, the federal and state statutory transparency regimes have become
intertwined over time.
B. The Substance and Application of State Public Records Laws
The structure of state public records laws broadly mirrors that of
FOIA: these state statutes generally begin with a presumption of openness,
and they carve out specific categories of records that are protected from

66
See CROSS, supra note 63, at 7–9, 189, 201–202 (outlining state public records laws and arguing
in favor of a federal equivalent); H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, pt. 2, at 23 (1966) (noting in a committee
report on the bill to amend the Administrative Procedure Act that “[t]he broad outlines for legislative
action to guarantee public access to Government information were laid out by Dr. Harold L. Cross in
1953” in his book The People’s Right to Know).
67
MARK FENSTER, THE TRANSPARENCY FIX 32 (2017).
68
See, e.g., Linda de la Mora, Comment, The Wisconsin Public Records Law, 67 MARQ. L. REV.
65, 66, 89–92 (1983) (noting that Wisconsin’s original public records law, enacted in 1917, was
amended in 1983 to create a new deliberative process exemption similar to FOIA’s Exemption 5);
Katherine Fink, State FOI Laws: More Journalist-Friendly, or Less?, in TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY,
supra note 14, at 92 (noting that after FOIA was enacted, “new [state] FOI laws were passed and old
laws were updated”).
69
See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. District of Columbia, 52 A.3d 822, 829 (D.C. 2012)
(“Passed ten years after the federal FOIA, and two years after the federal FOIA was amended, the D.C.
FOIA was inspired by and modeled on the federal legislation.”); Korner v. Madigan, 69 N.E.3d 892,
895 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (noting that the Illinois public records law is “patterned” on FOIA).
70
See, e.g., Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. Rogers, 815 P.2d 900, 910 (Ariz. 1991);
Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 813 P.2d 240, 247 (Cal. 1991); Police Patrol Sec. Sys., Inc. v.
Prince George’s Cty., 838 A.2d 1191, 1203 n.8 (Md. 2003).
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disclosure. 71 Yet there are also important distinctions between state and
federal public records laws, as well as among the various state statutes.
One of the primary distinctions is in the size and scope of public
records’ coverage. In contrast with FOIA, many state public records laws
apply to state legislative and judicial bodies, as well as to state executive
agencies. 72 Further, at the local level, the sheer number of local
governments affects how these public records laws are both constructed
and applied. The roughly 90,000 local governments that exist today range
from general-purpose governments, which supervise cities, towns, and
counties, to special purpose districts that serve a very limited number of
functions, such as providing educational, fire protection, water supply, or
sewerage services. 73 The size of a city or town will often dictate the number
of local agencies—zoning boards, police commissions, education
departments, etc.—that exist apart from the central governing unit. 74 These
various local legislative and executive bodies, as well as local agencies, are
all subject to public records laws.
This creates a diffuse and variegated public records system. It also
makes it exceptionally difficult to gather public records data. State
governments do not collect even basic statistics, such as the aggregate
number of requests submitted in a year to state and local government
entities. 75 This has important research implications. The absence of data
regarding the public records requests submitted in each state makes it
difficult to reach broad-sweeping conclusions about the statutes
themselves—how well they function, and whether they are worth the costs
they impose.

71
See Eumi K. Lee, Monetizing Shame: Mugshots, Privacy, and the Right to Access, 70 RUTGERS
U. L. REV. 557, 591–92 (2018) (“As with the FOIA, the state statutes begin with a broad presumption of
openness, then provide specific statutory exceptions that are narrowly construed.”).
72
See infra notes 123–125 and accompanying text.
73
BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 13–16; U.S. Census Bureau Press Release, supra
note 31.
74
The structure of government in large cities like New York, for example, resembles the complex
structures found at the state level: a strong executive who oversees multiple executive agencies, an
elected city council that exercises legislative authority, and a web of city courts that serve as an
independent judicial branch. NYCdata: New York City (NYC) Governmental Structure, BARUCH COLL.,
https://www.baruch.cuny.edu/nycdata/nyc-government/index.html [https://perma.cc/6BZ3-RBG4]. In
smaller cities, however, power is often much more centralized. In the council–manager organizational
structure, for example, voters elect a city council, which in turn selects an executive—generally a city
manager—who is then responsible for appointing department heads. ICMA, FORMS OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 1 (2008), https://icma.org/documents/forms-local-government-structure/
[https://perma.cc/UZH2-SXZX].
75
See discussion infra Section III.A.
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That being said, various states collect different slices of data. A few
states tally the aggregate number of requests submitted to state agencies,
and this data allow for cautious insights. 76 Texas, for example, reported that
state agencies received nearly 650,000 public records requests in 2017, a
surprisingly high figure that does not include requests to local government
officials. 77 This limited data also suggests that smaller states may receive
more requests than might be expected given their population size,
suggesting that the burden of responding to public records requests may be
disproportionately higher for less populated states. 78
Further, this evidence reveals similarities in the types of state agencies
that receive large numbers of requests. States organize their state agencies
and state administrative responsibilities differently, making it difficult to
draw direct comparisons between requests submitted to various agencies
across different states. But patterns do emerge. For example, law
enforcement agencies appear to consistently receive some of the highest
numbers of requests, 79 as do state public health agencies 80 and corrections
For example, a nonprofit group that monitors public records in New York estimates that around
200,000 public records requests are filed in that state each year. See Editorial Board, Opening Up New
York’s Public Records, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/12/10/opinion/new-york-public-records.html [https://perma.cc/3URP-UDSW]. Washington State
reported that the state and local governments received 285,000 requests in 2015. WASH. STATE
AUDITOR’S OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AUDIT: THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC RECORDS REQUESTS ON STATE AND
LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
3
(2016),
http://mrsc.org/getmedia/d3dbec02-f6f2-4aa7-b1dd94cd71a5fb4a/w3saoPRA.aspx [https://perma.cc/C74B-9VKD] [hereinafter WASH. STATE AUDITOR’S
REPORT].
77
Search for the number of open records requests for 2017 in Open Records Reports, ATT’Y GEN.
OF TEX., https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/pia/reports/requests_tally.php?fy=2017&ag=all
[https://perma.cc/7CKH-VB33] (reporting 642,945 requests in 2017) [hereinafter Texas State Dataset
2017]; Open Records Reports, ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opengovernment/governmental-bodies/open-records-reports [https://perma.cc/7RPM-RAMU] (noting that
data are based on monthly reports from state agencies).
78
The population of Massachusetts was roughly eleven times the population of Vermont in 2017,
but Massachusetts state agencies received only five times the number of requests as those received by
Vermont agencies. Compare Sec’y of the Commonwealth of Mass., 2017 Agency Public Records
Request Data as of 1/29/18, https://www.sec.state.ma.us/pre/prepra/prapdf/2017-Agency-PublicRecords-Request-Data-as-of-Jan-29-2018.xlsx
[https://perma.cc/9B8L-7FVJ]
[hereinafter
Massachusetts State Dataset 2017] (showing that Massachusetts state agencies received 22,646 public
records requests in 2017), with Agency of Admin., State of Vt., 2017 Statewide Public Records
Requests Database (on file with author) [hereinafter Vermont State Dataset 2017] (showing that
Vermont state agencies received 4,226 public records requests in 2017); compare Massachusetts
Population, WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/massachusettspopulation [https://perma.cc/R6Z2-DYRS] (2017 population of 6,863,246), with Vermont Population,
WORLD
POPULATION
REV.,
http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/vermont-population
[https://perma.cc/9VXA-HC6H] (2017 population of 624,525).
79
See, e.g., Massachusetts State Dataset 2017, supra note 78 (the Department of State Police
received the second highest number of requests); Texas State Dataset 2017, supra note 77 (the
76
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departments. 81 Yet even agencies that perform similar administrative
functions across states often receive disparate numbers of requests. 82 The
number and type of requests submitted to various government entities
varies substantially at the local level as well.83
Very few requests are appealed administratively at the state and local
level. Fewer than half of the states provide requesters the option of an
administrative appeal. 84 But even in states that do offer an administrative
appeals process, few requesters take advantage 85—with the exception of
members of the media, who appear to submit a disproportionate number of
appeals. 86 Public records litigation is also curtailed at the state and local
level. While litigation data are difficult to obtain, 87 the limited evidence that
is available suggests that very few requests proceed to litigation. In 2018,
for example, only twelve public records lawsuits were filed in

Department of Public Safety received the second highest number of requests); Vermont State Dataset
2017, supra note 78 (the Department of Public Safety received more than half of all public records
requests submitted that year, the highest of any state agency).
80
See, e.g., Massachusetts State Dataset 2017, supra note 78 (the Department of Public Health
received the highest number of requests); Washington State Dataset 2017, supra note 32 (of the state
agencies that reported data, the Department of Health received the second highest number of requests).
81
See, e.g., Texas State Dataset 2017, supra note 77 (the Department of Criminal Justice received
the fourth highest number of requests); Vermont State Dataset 2017, supra note 78 (the Department of
Corrections received the third highest number of requests).
82
Compare, e.g., Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, Jan. 1–Nov. 14, 2016 Public Records Log (on file with
author) (the agency received 3,888 requests), with Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health and Env’t, Jan 1–Nov. 16,
2016 Public Records Log (on file with author) (the agency received 687 public records requests).
83
For example, the cities of Pleasant Grove, Alabama and Emeryville, California both have
populations of roughly 10,000, and yet Pleasant Grove has received just two public records requests in
the past sixteen years, while Emeryville received sixty-six public records requests in 2016 alone.
Telephone Interview, City Clerk, City of Pleasant Grove, Ala. (Sept. 17, 2018) (specifying that these
were requests submitted through the Clerk’s office, and this does not include requests submitted
through the police department); City of Emeryville, Cal., Feb. 2016–Jan. 2018 Public Records Logs (on
file with author) [hereinafter Emeryville Public Records Log].
84
State Public Records Law Database (on file with author).
85
See, e.g., Massachusetts State Dataset 2017, supra note 78 (174 out of a total of 22,646
requests—0.8%—submitted to state agencies in 2017 were appealed administratively).
86
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF ILL., PUBLIC ACCESS COUNSELOR ANNUAL
REPORT 2 (2018), https://foia.ilattorneygeneral.net/pdf/2018_PAC_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ULQLTCV] (noting that 16% of administrative appeals originated from members of the media in 2017).
87
Few states keep track of public records lawsuits filed statewide. See, e.g., e-mail from Katie
Conner, Spokesperson, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Ariz., to author (Feb. 20, 2019) (on file with author)
(stating that the office does not track the number of statewide public records lawsuits); e-mail from
Lauren Shipley, Constituent Servs., Office of the Att’y Gen. of Ark., to author (Mar. 5, 2019) (on file
with author) (same); e-mail from Nicholas Weilhammer, Dir., Office of Pub. Records., Office of the
Att’y Gen. of Fla., to author (Feb. 21, 2019) (on file with author) (same).
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Connecticut, 88 seven in Hawaii, 89 and two against state agencies in
Vermont. 90
III. TRANSPARENCY ECOSYSTEMS
The state and local transparency regime is comprised of a complex
web of statutory requirements and state constitutional provisions. Statutory
requirements at the state and local level include public records laws, open
meetings laws, laws governing budget disclosures, open data requirements,
and laws governing transparency in campaign finance, among others. 91
State constitutional transparency provisions include, for example, those
requiring public hearings prior to legislative reapportionment and
mandating the publication of reports documenting the fiscal health of the
state’s educational system. 92 At least one state even provides an explicit
constitutional right of access to government information. 93
These statutory and constitutional requirements combine with other
features of a local transparency environment—such as local media outlets
and civil society organizations—to form a broader transparency
ecosystem. 94 Some of these state and local requirements mirror federal law;
88
E-mail from Thomas A. Hennick, Pub. Educ. Officer, Conn. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, to author
(Feb. 20, 2019) (on file with author).
89
OFFICE OF INFO. PRACTICES, STATE OF HAW., ANNUAL REPORT 2018, at 61 (2018),
https://oip.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ANNUAL-REPORT-2018-OIP.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KX6F-8XNS]. In contrast, according to a nonprofit research center at Syracuse
University, 651 FOIA lawsuits were filed in 2017. FOIA Project Staff, FOIA Lawsuits Surge in Trump
Administration’s First Year, FOIA PROJECT (Jan. 16, 2018), http://foiaproject.org/2018/01/16/lawsuitstrump-first-year [https://perma.cc/BES6-XAU9].
90
E-mail from Jessica Mishaan, Paralegal, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Vt., to author (Feb. 25, 2019)
(on file with author).
91
See, e.g., Yue Qiu et al., How Does Your State Rank for Integrity?, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY
(published Nov. 9, 2015; updated Feb. 2, 2018), https://publicintegrity.org/accountability/how-doesyour-state-rank-for-integrity/ [https://perma.cc/629S-BHHK] (ranking states on various accountability
measures including public access to information, electoral oversight, lobbying disclosures, and state
budget processes).
92
See, e.g., ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. III, § 1-A (requiring hearings prior to apportionment); OR.
CONST. art. VIII, § 8 (requiring publication of fiscal health of state educational system).
93
See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 24.
94
The concept of a transparency ecosystem is borrowed from Professor Seth Kreimer, who has
argued that at the federal level, FOIA plays a central role in a broader “ecology of transparency that
includes the permanent infrastructure of federal civil servants with integrity, internal watchdogs,
reasonably open opportunities to publish and share information, and a set of civil society actors capable
of pursuing prolonged campaigns for disclosure.” Kreimer, supra note 16, at 1017. This concept also
borrows from the idea of a “news ecosystem.” See PEN AM., LOSING THE NEWS: THE DECIMATION OF
LOCAL JOURNALISM AND THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 7 (2019), https://pen.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/Losing-the-News-The-Decimation-of-Local-Journalism-and-the-Search-forSolutions-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9EH-MESK].

1479

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

others are less robust. Yet all fifty states have enacted a public records
statute. Just as FOIA operates as the “crown jewel” of the federal
transparency regime, the most significant transparency mechanism in state
and local government are these public records statutes. This Section
explores the formation of these local transparency ecosystems by
examining the value and efficacy of these state public records laws.
A. Methodology
The public records process at the state and local level is profoundly
disaggregated. It is also vast: there are most likely hundreds of thousands of
government entities—if not more—subject to these state public records
statutes. Thousands of these requests are likely submitted each day to
government entities around the country. This creates an enormous potential
universe of public records data. At the same time, few governments keep
track of these requests.
As a consequence, I have allowed the availability of data—and
specifically, the availability of government-generated datasets cataloguing
these public records requests—to drive my research agenda. In September
and October of 2018, I called every state attorney general’s office in the
country to ask whether they collected data on all state and local public
records requests. At the time, only two states aggregated and published
information about individual requests—Massachusetts and Vermont—and
they did so only for state-level government agencies. 95 Vermont was the
only state in the country to also publish the requesters’ identities—a crucial
piece of information for understanding who submits requests to the
government, and for what purpose. 96
A handful of other states tracked these requests in more limited form.
Texas provided the total numbers of requests, fees recouped, and hours
spent redacting records at the state level. 97 Washington collected data for a
small group of state and local government entities—around 8% of total
agencies in the state. 98 And Hawaii collected data for a subset of
“nonroutine” requests, or those for which no fee schedule has been

95
See generally Massachusetts State Dataset 2017, supra note 78; Vermont State Dataset 2017,
supra note 78.
96
Vermont State Dataset 2017, supra note 78.
97
Texas State Dataset 2017, supra note 77.
98
Washington State Dataset 2017, supra note 32.
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established. 99 The remaining states either did not track public records data
or the attorney’s general offices failed to respond to my queries. 100 No state
gathered aggregate data on public records requests submitted to local
governments.
To supplement these statewide datasets, I submitted a handful of
additional requests for public records logs that were especially relevant to
my analysis. 101 I also gathered every publicly available dataset that I could
find. The richest source of these public records logs was MuckRock, a
nonprofit organization that allows journalists and researchers to manage
their public records requests and make their records available online. 102
Many of the datasets analyzed here were downloaded from that website.
I concentrated my efforts on gathering public records logs that
contained both the names and affiliations of requesters. I then coded these
logs by type of requester: commercial, media, first-person, government,
and so on. I occasionally subdivided these broad categories further—for
example, by coding the number of commercial requests that were submitted
by insurance companies, or the number of first-person requests submitted
by inmates. When a requester provided only their name but not their
institutional affiliation, I searched online to identify an organizational link.
This effort was often only partially successful: for many logs, I was unable
to code a substantial percentage of requests. 103
In some instances, I supplemented this quantitative material by
speaking with individuals involved in the public records process—
including public records officers, journalists, media lawyers, and public
defenders—to better understand the various dimensions of the public
records process. Further, I relied on a variety of other primary and
secondary sources, including the text of these public records statutes, case
law interpreting these laws, newspaper articles, and government and
nonprofit advocacy reports. I did not limit this search to any single subject
or state, but I did make an effort to obtain publicly available materials in
states that were otherwise underrepresented in my analysis.
99
OFFICE OF INFO. PRACTICES, STATE OF HAW., OIP’S REPORT OF STATE AGENCIES’ UIPA
RECORD REQUEST YEAR-END LOGS FOR FY 2018, at 2 (2018) [hereinafter HAWAII PUBLIC RECORDS
REPORT 2018].
100
The attorney general’s office in twelve states failed to respond to my queries.
101
For example, I obtained hundreds of public records logs from state and local agencies in Hawaii
through a formal public records request.
102
About Us, MUCKROCK, https://www.muckrock.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/A3MA-KL2E].
103
This research approach was both inspired by and modeled on Professor Kwoka’s analysis of
FOIA logs. See Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, supra note 15, at 2221–23 (discussing the methodology
used in an analogous study); Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1379–80 (same).
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The advantage of this research approach is that it allowed me to
concentrate my research efforts where usable data already existed. The
disadvantage is that my analysis is, by necessity, spotty and incomplete.
The acute lack of data at the state and local level makes it nearly
impossible to conduct comprehensive comparative surveys. 104 This is true
across the fifty states, and it is especially true across the hundreds of
thousands of local government entities subject to state public records laws.
Even so, the limited data that I have collected helps begin to shed light on
an opaque and underexamined area of the law.
B. The Benefits of State Public Records Laws
Statutory transparency requirements, such as state public records laws,
comprise an important part of the informational ecosystem that sustains a
liberal democracy. Effective transparency measures allow citizens to hold
elected officials accountable, make informed democratic decisions, and
understand the limits and confines of the exercise of government power. 105
Many of the benefits that flow from these state public records statutes are
distinct from those provided by federal law, and yet they have been largely
ignored by scholars. This Section explores some examples.
1. Informing the Public
The primary goal of these public records laws is to enhance
democratic governance. As the Supreme Court has said in the context of
FOIA, the “basic purpose” of the law “is to ensure an informed citizenry,
vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against
corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.” 106 Yet
these statutes also perform an important secondary function in informing
the public: they allow citizens to obtain records about themselves. This
104
One scholar who attempted to compare public records logs of state environmental agencies
received usable data from fewer than half of the states. See Fink, supra note 17, at 109–11. Further,
states often define their public records datasets differently. Some states may exclude certain types of
routine requests from their tally. See, e.g., HAWAII PUBLIC RECORDS REPORT 2018, supra note 99, at 2.
Others may exclude requests submitted in certain forms. See, e.g., Interview with Chris Voss, Dir. of
Admin. Servs. and Interim Records Access Officer, Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., in Boston, Mass. (Dec.
19, 2018) (noting that walk-in requests for records are not always included in the public records
database).
105
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) (“[T]ransparency enables the electorate to
make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”); NLRB v.
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (“The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an
informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption
and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.” (citations omitted)); see also Fenster, supra
note 14, at 895–99 (describing the democratic benefits of transparency).
106
Robbins Tire & Rubber, 437 U.S. at 242.
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Section explores the ways that these two key categories of requests—media
and first-person requests—facilitate the flow of information from the
government to the public.
a. Media Requests
The media is arguably the public’s most important tool of government
accountability, especially at the state and local level, where government
checks and balances are weaker. 107 When uncovering government
malfeasance or misconduct, journalists generally have two options:
convince someone with knowledge to come forward or obtain documents
through public records requests. Often, these two paths are intertwined—a
source will reveal government misconduct in an off-the-record interview
and then direct the reporter to submit a public records request that
substantiates the story. 108
This dual-track sourcing provides confidential sources an added layer
of anonymity and protection. A common critique in the transparency
literature is that the media relies on FOIA to “find[]” a government
scandal. 109 But the mechanics of this claim do not hold up: the statute is too
unwieldy a tool to blindly search for government wrongdoing. 110 In reality,
journalists generally rely on the law to substantiate a story that has come to
their attention in some other way. In this way, FOIA facilitates the media’s
role as government watchdog.
These state statutes serve as an equally important investigative tool at
the state and local level. State public records requests have informed
dozens of Pulitzer Prize-winning stories, 111 including the Boston Globe’s
See discussion infra notes 452–467 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, WORKING WITH WHISTLEBLOWERS: A GUIDE FOR
JOURNALISTS 22 (2019), http://wordpress-350926-1087337.cloudwaysapps.com/wp-content/uploads/
2019/07/GovAcctProj_JournalistsWhistleblowing-Guide_2019_single-pages.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2FT8-JQ5B] (advising reporters that “[i]f your source has access to information that
could show wrongdoing by the government, tutoring you for the right Freedom of Information Act
requests can gain access to those materials”).
109
See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 14, at 926.
110
See, e.g., Jake Lucas, How Times Reporters Use the Freedom of Information Act, N.Y. TIMES
(July
21,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/21/insider/information-freedom-reporterspruitt.html [https://perma.cc/UW45-W34L] (quoting a reporter’s finding that reporters use FOIA to “fill
in details that are hard to find other ways”).
111
See, e.g., The 2005 Pulitzer Prize Winner in Public Service: L.A. Times, PULITZER PRIZES,
https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/los-angeles-times-3 [https://perma.cc/8Y45-UHMY] (relying on
public records requests in One Doctor’s Long Trail of Dangerous Mistakes); The 2006 Pulitzer Prize
Winner in Public Service: The Times-Picayune, New Orleans, PULITZER PRIZES
https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/times-picayune [https://perma.cc/28WC-QTF2] (relying on public
records in From Blue Tarps to Debris Removal, Many Layers of Contractors Drive Up the Cost of
Recovery, Critics Say).
107
108
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groundbreaking reporting on the sexual abuse crisis in the Catholic Church
in 2004 112 and the Editor of the Storm Lake Times’s 2017 editorial exposé
of the role powerful agribusinesses have played in covering up river
pollution in Iowa. 113 One study of submissions to the Investigative
Reporters and Editors annual prizes found that a quarter of the stories about
government misconduct relied on a federal or state public records
request. 114
Of course, not every request yields national awards for investigative
reporting. These laws also support hundreds of more rote investigations
across the country each day. Yet the benefits of these laws can be difficult
to quantify. In the federal context, a familiar debate plays out among
transparency advocates and opponents: advocates point to groundbreaking
media reports that elicited broader government reform, while opponents
point to the law’s rising toll and ask whether these scattered victories by the
news media can really justify FOIA’s costs 115—financial and otherwise. 116
This debate is not easily resolved. But it is worth emphasizing here that
these state public records laws—like FOIA—play a critical role in allowing
the media to report on government action and unearth government
misconduct and abuse.
Further, state public records laws offer media requesters specific
advantages over FOIA. Most notably, state and local governments turn
requests around more quickly than federal agencies. In 2016, the average
processing time for FOIA requests was 28 days for simple requests and 128
days for complex requests. 117 In contrast, MuckRock tracked more than
The 2003 Pulitzer Prize Winner in Public Service: Bos. Globe, PULITZER PRIZES,
https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/boston-globe-1 [https://perma.cc/J5MV-G8Y7] (relying on public
records for Scores of Priests Involved in Sex Abuse Cases: Settlements Kept Scope of Issue Out of
Public).
113
Kelly McGowan, Iowa Newspaper Editor Wins Pulitzer Prize, DES MOINES REG. (Apr. 10,
2017),
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2017/04/10/iowa-newspaper-editor-winspulitzer/100299258/ [https://perma.cc/WP9E-AM7M]; see also The 2017 Pulitzer Prize Winner in
Editorial Writing: Art Cullen of the Storm Lake Times, PULITZER PRIZES,
https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/art-cullen [https://perma.cc/SA2J-8P7Y].
114
JAMES T. HAMILTON, DEMOCRACY’S DETECTIVES 158 (2016).
115
See discussion supra note 16.
116
Some scholars have looked beyond the financial costs of the law. Professor Pozen, in particular,
has focused on the democratic costs of the law—the ways that FOIA not only fails to advance but in
fact actively impedes democratic governance. See, e.g., Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the
Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at 1123–35 (describing the democratic costs of FOIA);
Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, supra note 14, at 154–59 (same).
117
OFFICE OF INFO. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR
FISCAL
YEAR
2016,
at
12–13
(2017),
https://www.justice.gov/oip/reports/
fy_2016_annual_report_summary.pdf/download [https://perma.cc/LA2U-BLJ3].
112
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50,000 requests submitted through its streamlined requesting service and
found that the federal government took longer to process requests on
average than all fifty states and the District of Columbia. 118 Data reported
directly by the states shows even more rapid processing timelines. In
Hawaii, for example, the average turnaround time for requests submitted to
state agencies in 2018 was just 8.5 days. 119
From the outside, the timeframe within which requested records are
provided may seem a minor point. But for many requesters—and especially
for the media—these time barriers are the single most significant obstacle
to the effective use of public records laws. Reporters often work on tight
deadlines and cannot afford to engage in protracted negotiations with the
government over the release of records. 120 The shortened timeframe for
state transparency requests substantially increases the practical utility of
these statutes. 121
State laws also offer an expanded scope of coverage in comparison
with FOIA. While federal transparency law is limited to federal agencies,
many state laws cover a wider array of government offices, officials, and
activity. Massachusetts is the only state that has curtailed its public records
coverage to the boundaries of FOIA. 122 Every other state extends public
records coverage to a broader set of government officials. The majority of
state public records laws apply to both the governor’s office and the
legislative branch. 123 And many state statutes also require at least some
disclosure of judicial records. 124 Moreover, these state laws apply not
118
How Open Is Your Government? Find Out, MUCKROCK, https://www.muckrock.com/place/
[https://perma.cc/89PV-CUMG]. On the low end, Rhode Island took an average of nineteen days to
process MuckRock requests, and on the high end, New Mexico took 140 days to process requests. Id.
119
HAWAII PUBLIC RECORDS REPORT 2018, supra note 99, at 6.
120
See, e.g., STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, supra note 51, at ii
(“Members of the media described their complete abandonment of the FOIA request as a tool because
delays and redactions made the request process wholly useless for reporting to the public.”).
121
These state and local governments process requests more quickly even in the face of significant
financial and other resource constraints. See discussion infra note 176 and accompanying text. It is
unclear why this is so. It is possible that these requests are less complex than the average FOIA request,
or that state and local governments are more likely to deny requests outright.
122
Todd Wallack, State Lawmakers Fail to Reach Consensus on Whether to Expand Public Record
Law, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/01/10/state-lawmakersfail-reach-consensus-whether-expand-public-record-law/XvwfD04o2TtQ4HWqmxi0BO/story.html
[https://perma.cc/974M-XQZF].
123
State Public Records Law Database, supra note 84.
124
Id. Some of these states’ coverage is only partial, requiring administrative or financial court
records to be made public but exempting substantive judicial documents from disclosure. See, e.g.,
38 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(T) (2019) (“Judicial bodies are included . . . only in respect to their
administrative function.”).
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merely to general purpose governments, such as cities and towns, but to
special purpose institutions as well, which often receive even less public
scrutiny despite wielding significant authority and power. 125 This expanded
coverage allows the public to monitor a much broader range of government
actors than FOIA allows. And it permits the media, especially, to
investigate a broader swath of government activity.
Finally, state and local government entities often possess overlapping
records. Administrative law scholars have detailed the extent to which
duplication among federal agencies can be advantageous, noting that
redundancy can prevent agency capture, produce healthy competition, and
reduce the chances of system failure.126 Given the fluid and overlapping
nature of local government borders, 127 neighboring governments or special
purpose governments extending across multiple jurisdictions often possess
the same or similar records. Such redundancy allows the media multiple
opportunities to request records, increasing the chance that they will be
able to secure access. It most likely has a deterrent effect as well. The risk
that a separate government entity will release a duplicate copy of a
requested record can discourage government officials from withholding
records unlawfully in an effort to avoid unfavorable media coverage.128 In
short, these state public records laws permit the media certain advantages
when performing its watchdog role.
b. First-Person Requests
State public records laws also perform a secondary function in
informing the public: they allow individuals to obtain records about
themselves. 129 Professor Kwoka has documented the scope and impact of
125
See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 34, at 603–04 (noting that special purpose districts often lack a
direct electoral accountability mechanism); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22 (2010) (noting that federalism scholars have tended to ignore special
purpose institutions).
126
See, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1676–78 (2006).
127
Various general purpose and special purpose local governments often overlap. Counties may
encompass cities and towns, and special purpose governments may be coterminous with city or town
boundaries or may encircle multiple municipal or town units. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note
21, at 15.
128
See Albert Breton et al., Introduction, in THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSPARENCY IN POLITICS 1
(Albert Breton et al. eds., 2007) (noting that it is “easier for an organization (or an individual) to
obfuscate—to be less transparent—when it is the only agency in possession or in control of particular
pieces of information”); O’Connell, supra note 126, at 1722 (noting that when multiple federal agencies
possess information, “it may be more likely to come out through a” FOIA request or leak).
129
First-person requests arguably fall somewhere in between the “benefits” and “costs” distinction
that this Article draws. They are less aligned with the democracy-enhancing goals of the statutes’
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these first-person requests at the federal level, demonstrating that certain
federal agencies receive up to 98% of their requests from individuals
seeking copies of their own records. 130 Yet scholars have not yet examined
the extent to which first-person requests make up the public records logs of
state and local governments.
Lack of data at the state and local level, combined with the
overwhelming number of state and local governments covered by the law,
prevents any rigorous empirical analysis. Scattered empirical data,
however, along with anecdotal evidence gleaned from interviews with
public records officials, suggest that first-person requests comprise a
significant percentage of requests to state and local agencies as well. State
corrections departments, for example, seem to receive a large number of
first-person requests from inmates. 131 These requesters are often seeking
sections of their prison file that contain disciplinary reports against them or
complaints that they have lodged against specific corrections officers. Such
records may be used to help substantiate a grievance or support a lawsuit
that the inmate plans to file against the state or county.132
State and local law enforcement agencies also seem to receive a
substantial number of first-person requests. While insurance companies and
commercial requesters generally dominate the public records dockets of

drafters, so they are less publicly beneficial than, say, requests submitted by journalists. At the same
time, they provide greater public benefit than commercial requests, which I have categorized as a “cost”
of these laws. See discussion infra Section III.C.4. I ultimately included first-person requests here, in
the “benefits” Section, because these requests arm citizens with the information they need to advance
their interests before government entities (for example, by obtaining records for use in social security or
disability proceedings) and because such requests often end up having broader spillover effects (for
example, requests filed by inmates about their own disciplinary record may inform a lawsuit that
remedies broader civil rights abuses). Even so, the proper placement of these first-person requests lays
bare some of the complexities that arise from the dichotomous cost/benefit structure of this Article.
These first-person requests do have costs: they require significant public resources to advance the
interests of one individual rather than society as a whole. Cf. Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, supra note 15,
at 2208 (noting that first-person FOIA requests, while “frequently vital to the requestor’s interests,” fail
to “advance Congress’s primary goal in enacting FOIA: to promote public democratic oversight of
government activities”). Similarly, commercial requests can have broader benefits. See infra note 204
(discussing the benefits of commercial requests, in spite of their categorization as a “cost” of state
public records laws).
130
Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, supra note 15, at 2225.
131
See, e.g., Penn. Dep’t of Corrections, 2016 Public Records Log (on file with author) (roughly
three-quarters of requests appear to have originated from prisoners); State of Vt., Public Records
Request Database 2013–2018 (downloaded Sept. 13, 2018) (on file with author) [hereinafter Vermont
State Dataset 2013–2018] (roughly 35% of requests originated from current or former inmates).
132
Telephone Interview with David Turner, Dir. of Offender Due Process and Grievances & Pub.
Records Officer, Vt. Dep’t of Corrections (Nov. 21, 2018).
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these agencies, 133 individuals will seek police or accident reports for a
myriad of other, non-insurance-related reasons. They may need a police
report to file a complaint with the landlord against a neighbor, to use as
evidence in a custody dispute, or to obtain information about the death of a
loved one. 134 Lawyers representing criminal defendants also rely on public
records requests to obtain law enforcement records that may not be
available in discovery, such as documents demonstrating systemic issues
within a particular department or information relating to a prosecution’s
witness. 135 Some states do not provide automatic discovery rights for those
pursuing post-conviction relief, but instead require that the defendant seek
permission from the court. 136 When that request is denied, attorneys must
rely exclusively on public records requests. 137
Individuals submit a wide variety of first-person requests to other state
and local agencies as well. 138 Parents submit requests for copies of their
children’s individualized education plans to state and local educational
agencies; 139 family members submit requests to state treasury departments
seeking records about the estate of a deceased relative; 140 homeowners seek
records showing any unpaid utility charges prior to purchasing or selling a
property; 141 and individuals engaged in genealogical research submit
requests for family records to city clerks’ offices. 142
Professor Kwoka has raised concerns about such first-person use of
public records laws in the federal context. She has argued that in some
instances, FOIA has been converted into a rudimentary tool for discovery,
See discussion infra Section III.C.4.
See, e.g., Kings Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Wash., 2018 Public Records Log (on file with author).
135
See Ion Meyn, The Criminal Defense Attorney’s Burden, 31 AM. BAR ASS’N 36, 36, 38 (2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gp_solo/2014/septemberoctober/the_criminal_defense_attorneys_burden/ [https://perma.cc/86TF-K4ZL].
136
See, e.g., MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(c)(4).
137
See Telephone Interview with Ira Gant, Staff Counsel, Innocence Program, Mass. Comm. for
Pub. Counsel Servs. (Apr. 3, 2019).
138
See, e.g., Penn. Dep’t of State, Sept.–Dec. 2016 Public Records Log (on file with author)
(around 20% of requests originated from inmates and roughly 50% from lawyers, many of whom were
seeking information about a specific client).
139
See, e.g., Wis. Dep’t for Pub. Instruction, 2015 Public Records Log, at 5 (on file with author)
(requesting “[r]ecord of changes to son’s IEP”).
140
See, e.g., N.J. Dep’t of Treasury, 2013 Public Records Log, at 187 (on file with author).
141
See, e.g., S.F. Pub. Recs. Requests, Filtered by “Unpaid,” NextRequest
https://sanfrancisco.nextrequest.com/requests?filter=unpaid [https://perma.cc/9Z6Z-N38F] (showing list
of requests for unpaid utility bills).
142
See, e.g., City of L.A., Public Records Request #18–990 (May 2, 2018),
https://recordsrequest.lacity.org/requests/18-990 [https://perma.cc/5KJR-ZB85] (showing requests
seeking information regarding grandfather’s home ownership for family genealogy records).
133
134
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and she has questioned whether such first-person use advances the
underlying transparency goals of the statute. 143 Similar concerns apply at
the state and local level. These state and local requests do not always
effectively serve first-person requesters’ needs. Some statutes exclude
certain categories of individuals from accessing government records, 144 and
virtually every state statute is plagued by time delays and other procedural
barriers to release. Such obstacles can make these requesting channels an
ineffective method of information gathering. 145
Even so, these first-person requests have substantial value. They are
often critical to advancing the requester’s interests. And actions taken
against the government by individual requesters—for example, inmates
suing for civil rights violations—can elicit more systemic reform as well as
enhanced government oversight by the public at large.
Further, such first-person requests may have broader democratic
benefits, especially at the state and local level. It is generally easier to
engage directly with a public records officer in state and local government,
and smaller governments, in particular, are often more willing to negotiate
with requesters. 146 Records access officers often serve as the public face of
state agencies or local governments, assisting citizens with their queries
and pointing them in the right direction if their needs do not fit squarely
within the scope of the law. In this way, such first-person requests can
serve to strengthen democratic participation by allowing citizens a lower
barrier of entry into the governmental process. 147
2. Informing the Government
Public records laws are generally thought of as a tool for citizens to
obtain information about their government. Information flow is
traditionally conceived as unidirectional, held by the government and
transmitted to the public. 148 A review of public records logs at various
government levels, however, reveals a critical yet overlooked function of
these statutes: facilitating information exchange between governments.
Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, supra note 15, at 2244.
For example, some states bar inmates from accessing public records at all, making it difficult for
pro se inmates to take action against the government. See infra notes 281–284 and accompanying text.
145
See, e.g., Geraghty & Velez, supra note 17, at 458–63 (describing criminal justice institutions’
efforts to delay or block the release of public records about inmates); Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, supra
note 15, at 2253.
146
See, e.g., Interview with Steve Eder, supra note 28 (noting that there is often “more of a
dialogue” with government officials in the context of state and local public requests).
147
See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 389–90 (1997) (arguing that a
benefit of federalism is that more citizens can and do participate in smaller levels of government).
148
See Fenster, supra note 14, at 914.
143
144
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This occurs at all levels. Foreign governments submit requests to state
agencies; county officials submit requests to towns; and towns submit
requests to the federal government. Different agencies within the same
executive structure even submit public records requests to one another.
These inter- and intragovernmental requests appeared in virtually
every state and local public records log that I reviewed. Fee waivers for
certain government entities are even written into the text of some state
public records laws. 149 And the proportion of these governmental requests
can be substantial. 150 The request log of the Vermont Department of
Corrections offers a useful case study. Between January 2013 and July
2018, the agency received around 170 requests from government entities,
or roughly 10% of its total requests. 151 Foreign consulates submitted fiftyfive of these requests, 152 often asking for a list of inmates claiming to be
citizens of their country. 153 The agency also received more than three dozen
requests from the federal government. The largest number of requests came
from the Department of Veterans Affairs, generally for specific inmate
records to establish benefits eligibility for individual veterans. But other
federal agencies, including the Social Security Agency and the Department
of Justice, submitted multiple requests as well. 154 Requests also originated
from federal legislators, often for statistics to be used as part of a
nationwide legislative survey. 155 And the agency received a number of
intrastate requests from Vermont legislators, from other state agencies, and
from local police departments, fire departments, and high schools. 156
By facilitating intergovernmental cooperation and information
exchange, public records laws perform an important yet overlooked
function. These requests offer officials at all levels of government a process
by which to obtain and exchange a variety of information, ranging from
prison population levels to environmental pollution data to budgetary
See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-212(d)(4)–(5) (2019).
See, e.g., Washington State Dataset 2017, supra note 32 (a selection of thirty-seven state
agencies collectively received around 2,200 government-to-government requests in 2017); Brian
Duggan, Reno Police Report Copies Used to Cost $9. Now They’re $45—The Most Expensive in
GAZETTE
J.
(Sept.
10,
2018,
6:00
AM),
Nevada,
RENO
https://www.rgj.com/story/news/2018/09/10/reno-expensive-police-report-cost/1058349002/
[https://perma.cc/R7PM-KHD2] (noting that roughly 25% of the 10,000 requests received in 2017 by
the Reno City Police Department were from other police departments and law enforcement agencies).
151
Vermont State Dataset 2013–2018, supra note 131.
152
Id.
153
Telephone Interview with David Turner, supra note 132.
154
Vermont State Dataset 2013–2018, supra note 131.
155
Id.; Telephone Interview with David Turner, supra note 132.
156
Vermont State Dataset 2013–2018, supra note 131.
149
150
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statistics. This horizontal information exchange also weakens a central
argument of transparency critics: that statutory transparency requirements
are unnecessary because sufficient transparency mechanisms are built into
the structure of government itself. 157 This widespread governmental
reliance on state public records laws underscores the extent to which these
laws can foster cooperation between and among different levels of
government.
Further, public records laws also allow information to flow in the
reverse, from members of the public to the government. Again, this is not
how we traditionally conceive of the movement of information in the
public records context. But elected officials also rely on public records logs
and individual public records requests to identify trouble spots and gain
insight into the issues that preoccupy the public. The requests themselves—
not just the media stories or the public outcry that may follow their
disclosure—can help alert government officials to governance problems. 158
This is particularly true at lower levels of government, where established
feedback mechanisms that we take for granted at the federal level, such as
periodic elections and sustained media coverage, are often lacking. In these
instances, monitoring public records requests allows officials to better
understand and respond to the public’s concerns.
3. Innovation and Experimentation
This profusion of state public records laws has allowed for state and
local experimentation in the structure and management of the public
records process. As local government scholar Nestor Davidson has noted:
“If the fifty laboratories of democracy are beneficial in federalism, the
argument goes, surely ninety thousand must provide even more fertile
ground for variation, tinkering, and policy diffusion.” 159 Examples of this
variation and experimentation are plentiful. One fertile area of innovation
has occurred in the administrative process for appealing public records
denials. While FOIA requires that requesters appeal an adverse
determination to the head of the agency prior to filing a lawsuit, 160 states
have experimented with a wide array of appellate administrative remedies.
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 16, at 19.
See, e.g., Interview with Chris Voss, supra note 104 (noting that “[t]here is benefit to seeing
what people are asking in that particular types of records are sought after,” such as helping the agency
determine which types of records to affirmatively post online).
159
Davidson, supra note 34, at 625. For a discussion of how entrenched flaws in these state public
records laws undermine the concept of democratic laboratories more broadly, see infra notes 417–423
and accompanying text.
160
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012).
157
158
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In Connecticut, for example, a centralized appellate commission is
responsible for resolving administrative appeals for all state and local
agencies across the state. 161 While there are disadvantages to this structure,
including lengthier response times, 162 there are also benefits. This approach
removes the decision on appeal from the agency that made the initial public
records determination. 163 To ensure political independence, appointment
power is divided between the governor and the legislative branch, 164 and no
more than five of the nine commission members may belong to the same
political party. 165 Further, the commission is granted broad investigatory
powers, including the authority to subpoena witnesses, 166 and it serves as a
transparency liaison for both government agencies and for the public. This
administrative appeals system is often held up as a model of appellate
enforcement of public records laws. 167
Another area in which states have widely experimented is the scope of
public records laws’ coverage. This experimentation reaches beyond
extending coverage to the legislative and judicial branches. For example,
states have also taken widely divergent approaches to determining when
private or semiprivate entities should be subject to open records laws.
While FOIA generally does not extend coverage to private contractors, 168
states have pursued various ways of determining whether and when private
entities performing traditional government functions should be subject to
open records laws. 169 Many of these more flexible approaches have yielded
161
See About Us, CONN. FREEDOM OF INFO. COMM’N, https://portal.ct.gov/FOI/CommonElements/Top-Menu/About-Us [https://perma.cc/8FML-66ZK].
162
See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
163
Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6).
164
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-205 (2019).
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
See, e.g., Laura Danielson, Giving Teeth to the Watchdog: Optimizing Open Records Appeals
Processes to Facilitate the Media’s Use of FOIA Laws, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 981, 1010 (describing
Connecticut’s commission as “exemplary” in handling open records disputes); Robert G. Vaughn,
Administrative Alternatives and the Federal Freedom of Information Act, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 210
(1984) (citing the Connecticut commission as an example of a successful alternative model to insure
agency compliance).
168
See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 178 (1980).
169
Some states consider whether the entity is performing a traditional government function. See,
e.g., Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 78–79 (Tenn.
2002) (extending public records coverage to private prison that served “as the functional equivalent of a
government[] agency”). Others consider whether the nature of the records mandate public disclosure.
See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 68 v. Denver Metro. Major League Baseball Stadium Dist.,
880 P.2d 160, 164 (Colo. App. 1994) (documents generated by private company qualified as public
records because a government entity relied on them in the exercise of its official duties). These are not
the only approaches for determining whether private information should be considered public. See
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expanded coverage that reaches crucial private entities, such as private
police and firefighters. 170 Such varied approaches can serve as a model for
neighboring states and local governments. 171
C. The Costs of State Public Records Laws to the Government
Critics of the federal transparency regime often home in on the costs
these statutes impose, arguing that the benefits these laws provide are
outweighed by the burdens—both financial and otherwise—that they place
on government. This is a well-worn debate in the federal context. Widening
the scope of the inquiry to include state and local governments, however,
breathes new life into this discussion and invites a reexamination of these
laws’ comparative value.
1. Financial Costs
Information about the financial costs that public records laws impose
upon state and local government is difficult to obtain. While the federal
government tracks the costs of administering FOIA, the financial picture at
the state level is far murkier. Many state and local agencies lack a
dedicated public records employee, making it difficult to tally the salary
costs incurred by public records laws. More importantly, the lack of public
records data at the subfederal level makes it nearly impossible to determine
the financial toll that public records laws impose across even a single
state. 172 As a consequence, states routinely enact and amend state public
records laws in the dark, without any concrete understanding of the actual
costs involved.
The limited data that is collected by states often fails to provide
meaningful insight into the financial burdens imposed by these laws. 173 But
scattered empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that these costs are

generally Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public’s Right to Know: The Debate over Privatization and
Access to Government Information Under State Law, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 836–60 (2000)
(describing and categorizing the various approaches to determining when the records of private entities
are subject to disclosure under public records laws).
170
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-1-102 (2019) (applying public records law to university
police); State ex rel. Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Elida Cmty. Fire Co., 697 N.E.2d 210, 212 (1998)
(applying public records law to private firefighters).
171
See, e.g., WASH. STATE AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 76, at 28–30 (reviewing public records
laws in other states for solutions to public records obstacles in Washington State).
172
See discussion supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
173
See, e.g., Massachusetts State Dataset 2017, supra note 78 (tally of employee hours spent
responding to requests does not include labor costs of requests to local agencies).
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substantial. 174 Further, it suggests that local governments, in particular, may
be disproportionately affected by these financial burdens. 175 Given the
personnel and budgetary restraints faced by many local governments, 176
these entities are especially vulnerable to sudden spikes in the number of
requests—for example, repeat requests intended to harass government
officials, or large numbers of requests submitted in the wake of a highprofile event. 177 One recent, infamous example is the town of Newtown,
Connecticut, which has been flooded with public records requests
submitted by employees of conspiracy theorist Alex Jones about the Sandy
Hook massacre. 178 But there are countless other such examples. A single or
a handful of requesters can overwhelm a small government entity by
submitting dozens or even hundreds of requests. 179
This financial burden on local governments is often compounded by a
lack of state funding. Local governments are usually required to pay the
costs associated with public records laws out of their general budget. Many
local government officials oppose legislative efforts to improve the public’s
access to government records on these grounds. They argue that public
records laws essentially operate as an unfunded mandate, and that the costs
of improving these laws for the public at large—by shortening response

For example, Texas received nearly 650,000 public records requests in 2017, see Texas State
Dataset 2017, supra note 77, but recouped only around $800,000. Open Records Reports, 2017 Monies
Collected, ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/pia/reports/
money_collected.php [https://perma.cc/7JNW-6ZK6].
175
See, e.g., WASH. STATE AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 76, at 4 (stating that state agencies
spent around $22 million responding to requests in 2015 while local governments spent roughly $37
million); February 2018 Parish Attorney’s Office Public Records Request Hours Report, Parish County,
LA (on file with author) (stating that in a single month, the Parish County Attorney’s Office spent
nearly $12,000 on public records requests).
176
See State and Local Fiscal Facts: 2018, NAT’L GOVERNOR’S ASS’N (2018),
https://www.nasra.org/files/Fiscal%20Facts%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJ84-QFSS].
177
See, e.g., Kimball, supra note 17, at 343 (noting that an “inundation” of twenty requests in a
single week was “overwhelming” to sheriff’s office).
178
See, e.g., Elizabeth Williamson, Sandy Hook Families Gain in Defamation Suits Against Alex
Jones, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/us/politics/alex-jones-sandyhook.html [https://perma.cc/B37Y-8KYY] (describing a contributor to Alex Jones’s company who
“deluged Newtown officials with open records requests”).
179
See, e.g., Susan Spencer, Freedom of Information vs. Harassment: Towns Fight ‘Excessive’
DAILY
NEWS
(Oct.
29,
2017),
Requests,
METROWEST
https://www.metrowestdailynews.com/news/20171029/freedom-of-information-vs-harassment-townsfight-excessive-requests [https://perma.cc/V3HF-3ZFU] (a single, repeat requester in a small
Massachusetts town submitted one-third of all requests that year, forcing the town to spend 50% more
than it had budgeted that year for legal costs); Plattsburgh City Sch. Dist., N.Y., 2012–2014 Public
Records Log (on file with author) (between March 2012 and August 2014, two requesters submitted
roughly 90% of all requests to the school district).
174
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times, for example—will be borne by local governments alone. 180 These
governments routinely report funding difficulties when faced with changes
to these statutes, such as new reporting requirements or limitations on what
costs may be passed on to the requester. 181
2. Opportunity Costs
Last year, the federal government employed 4,500 FOIA officers who
worked full-time responding to public records requests. 182 In contrast, few
state and local agencies can afford to employ a full-time agency employee
dedicated to the public records process. And even when agencies are able
to hire a dedicated public records employee, that individual’s salary often
has a significant impact on the agency’s total budget. 183 Many state and
local government employees tasked with responding to public records
requests are required to wear multiple hats: they must fulfill their regular
agency duties while also overseeing and administering responses to public
records requests. 184 The opportunity costs of responding to these requests
can be significant. To provide just one illustration, the state employee
responsible for enforcing water safety requirements in Vermont spends
months at a time responding to public records requests, leaving her unable
to engage in oversight of water quality in the state during these periods. 185

180
See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON LOCAL GOV’T CONSOLIDATION & UNFUNDED MANDATES, STATE OF
ILL., DELIVERING EFFICIENT, EFFECTIVE, AND STREAMLINED GOVERNMENT TO ILLINOIS TAXPAYERS
72, 74 (2015) (listing Freedom Information Act requirements among the burdensome unfunded
mandates faced by local government) [hereinafter ILLINOIS TASK FORCE REPORT]; Legislature Plans
Vote on Public Records Bill That Would Impose New Unfunded Mandates, MASS. MUN. ASS’N (July
17, 2015), https://www.mma.org/legislature-plans-vote-on-public-records-bill-that-would-impose-newunfunded-mandates/ [https://perma.cc/XG53-XKFV] (noting proposed amendments would “tax
municipal capacity to administer and manage daily municipal operations and impose new unfunded
mandates”).
181
See, e.g., Public Records Bill Must Remain Balanced and Affordable, MASS. MUN. ASS’N (Dec.
1, 2015), https://www.mma.org/advocacy/public-records-bill-must-remain-balanced-and-affordable/
[https://perma.cc/93GJ-RJ2U] (describing the financial burdens that proposed amendments to the public
records law would impose on local governments).
182
SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS, supra note 45, at 20.
183
See, e.g., ILLINOIS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 180, at 244 (noting the high salary costs
required to employ full-time public records officers).
184
See, e.g., WASH. STATE AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 76, at 20 (noting that “[i]t is not
uncommon for small organizations to depend on the same employee for providing critical services
while also handling public records requests,” especially at smaller agencies); Interview with Chris Voss,
supra note 104 (noting that every records response coordinator in the state environmental agency must
juggle public records responses with other duties).
185
Interview with Wendy Houston Anderson, Enf’t Coordinator, and Scott Waterman, Policy and
Commc’n Dir., Water Quality Div., Vt. Agency of Agric., Food, and Mkts., in Montpelier, Vt. (Nov.
20, 2018).
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This diversion of state resources undermines the ability of state and local
governments to focus on fulfilling their core government functions. 186
3. Chilling Effects
Legislators, judges, and scholars have long expressed concern over the
potential chilling effects of government transparency requirements. 187 The
deliberative process exemption found in FOIA and in virtually every state
public records law embodies this fear: legislators reason that by protecting
pre-decisional records from disclosure, policymakers will feel free to
engage in free and open communications uninhibited by the threat of public
disclosure of their deliberations. 188 But the chilling effect of government
legislation is notoriously difficult to measure.189 In the context of
transparency legislation, it is impossible to prove that a particular policy
debate would have been more robust had there not been a public records
law in effect. Transparency scholarship often refers obliquely to the
deliberative costs of transparency laws like FOIA, but scholars rarely
attempt to identify concrete evidence of what these deliberative costs
entail. 190
One recent exception is a study by Professor Claudia Polsky
examining the ways that state public records laws can chill academic
speech at public universities. 191 While there are clear transparency benefits
to extending coverage to universities, 192 Professor Polsky demonstrates the
186
For a discussion of such costs in the federal context, see Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond
the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at 1124 (discussing the “diversion costs” that FOIA
imposes upon federal agencies).
187
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (finding “[h]uman experience
teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor . . . to the
detriment of the decisionmaking process”); Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of
Information Act, supra note 15, at 1126–27, 1126 n.170 (summarizing the literature on the potential
deliberation costs of transparency requirements).
188
See, e.g., Greenberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 10 F. Supp. 2d 3, 16 n.19 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting
that FOIA Exemption 5 is designed to prevent the chilling of agency deliberations).
189
See generally Brandice Canes-Wrone & Michael C. Dorf, Measuring the Chilling Effect,
90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1095, 1097 (2015) (arguing that in order to measure the chilling effect of a particular
government law on speech, researchers would have to measure the amount and quality of speech before
and after the law took effect, and that “so far as we could ascertain, such data have not yet been
collected and attempting to do so would raise difficult measurement questions”).
190
See, e.g., Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note
15, at 1126 (“To some unknown but seemingly nontrivial extent, the prospect of ‘being FOIA’d’ deters
candor among executive branch officials and leads them to avoid recordkeeping in favor of oral
exchanges and ‘sub rosa deals.’”).
191
Polsky, supra note 17, at 292.
192
See, e.g., Erica L. Green & Stephanie Saul, What Charles Koch and Other Donors to George
TIMES
(May
5,
2018),
Mason
University
Got
for
Their
Money,
N.Y.
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extent to which public records laws have been used by activists and critics
to target and harass academics who work in politically contentious fields
such as climate change or genetically modified organisms. She writes that
in the most egregious cases, public records requests “have caused
researchers to abandon politically sensitive lines of inquiry . . . , cease
participation in public debate about such matters . . . , or defect from
academia altogether.” 193 Companies are also turning to state public records
laws as a way to obtain information about their academic critics.194
The application of public records laws to public university scholars
has no equivalent in the federal context. 195 The targeted use of public
records laws to harass scholars and researchers at public universities offers
a powerful illustration of the ways in which transparency scholarship’s
myopic focus on FOIA fails to capture the full universe of transparencyrelated issues at play. And to the extent that public records laws do chill
government speech, those concerns are magnified by the extended scope of
coverage of many state laws to reach not only state universities, but state
legislators and judges as well.
There are other chilling effects unique to the state or local context.
While government officials have long complained about the intrusive and
burdensome nature of FOIA requests, few have argued that potential
candidates for federal employment will be deterred from applying or
running for office because of these laws. The chilling effect on government
participation, however, is a concern. Many local government officials serve
as unpaid volunteers, 196 and local administrative agencies often “resemble
community meetings as much as they do public agencies, with the locus of
gravity on locally appointed citizens or residents fulfilling a civic duty.” 197
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/05/us/koch-donors-george-mason.html
[https://perma.cc/SZ2TJUTA] (relying on public records requests to George Mason University to reveal the Koch brothers’
influence over academic appointments at the school).
193
Polsky, supra note 17, at 265–66.
194
See, e.g., Elizabeth Williamson, Industries Turn Freedom of Information Requests on Their
Critics, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/us/politics/freedom-ofinformation-requests.html [https://perma.cc/KG98-LBWQ] (finding public records are being
increasingly used against academic researchers by lobbyists, interest groups, and corporations).
195
The Shelby Amendment allows requesters to access data produced by private entities that
receive federal research grants, including universities, but this is a narrow exception. Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681–495.
196
See Davidson, supra note 34, at 623; Alison Bosma, Public Record Requests, Associated Legal
LOC.
ASHLAND
(Nov.
2,
2017),
Fees
Cost
Ashland
$127,000,
WICKED
https://ashland.wickedlocal.com/news/20171102/public-record-requests-associated-legal-fees-costashland-127000 [https://perma.cc/4EG3-3GAV] (noting most board members are volunteers).
197
Davidson, supra note 34, at 593.
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Given the difficulty of recruiting individuals to donate their time in the first
place, the burdens and privacy harms imposed by public records laws can
have a chilling effect on government participation as well. 198
4. Commercial Requests
Requests from commercial entities dominate the FOIA dockets of
many federal agencies. 199 Critics have long argued that such overwhelming
commercial use of the statute drains public resources while providing little
public benefit. 200 At worst, they argue, the statute operates as a commercial
subsidy, underwriting for-profit information gathering. 201 Professor Kwoka,
in particular, has chronicled the extent to which certain federal agencies are
flooded with commercial requests, as well as the toll that these requests
impose on these agencies’ limited financial and human resources.202 Yet
little comparable effort has been made to determine the impact of
commercial requests on state and local governments. 203
An investigation into the effect of corporate interests on state and
local transparency warrants its own separate paper. But this Section offers a
preliminary look at this issue. Specifically, it argues that the limited data
that are available—namely, select public records datasets, as well as
interviews with public records officers—suggest that state and local
governments confront similarly high volumes of commercial requesters.
And the same concern that animates commercial use of FOIA applies in the
state and local context as well: corporate use of these state statutes drains
government resources without increasing government accountability or
oversight. 204 A closer look at commercial use of these state laws, however,
198
See, e.g., Bosma, supra note 196 (reporting that the chairman of a town committee in Ashland,
Massachusetts said that repetitive and offensive public records requests are “terrible on morale” and
have made it difficult to recruit volunteers to serve on the committee).
199
See Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1382, 1388, 1398, 1401 (showing that in 2013,
commercial entities submitted 69% of SEC requests, 75% of FDA requests, 79% of EPA requests, and
96% of Defense Logistics Agency requests).
200
See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LCD-78-120, GOVERNMENT
FIELD OFFICES SHOULD BETTER IMPLEMENT THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, at ii (1978) (finding
that FOIA “is being used mostly by businesses and law firms—sometimes for purposes not
contemplated by the Congress”).
201
See, e.g., Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1421 (“Rather than subsidizing transparency,
FOIA’s commercial subsidy has the effect of paying for corporate ‘secrets’ discovered using FOIA.”).
202
See id. at 1427.
203
See Fink, supra note 17, at 109–11 (describing the limitations preventing a thorough analysis of
commercial requests and their impact on state and local governments).
204
There are benefits to commercial requests as well. See discussion supra note 129 and
accompanying text. I have categorized these commercial requests as a “cost” because this class of
requests is least closely aligned with the original, democracy-enhancing intent of these transparency
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reveals that the scholarly and legislative approach to these issues in the
context of FOIA does not always track cleanly onto the state and local
context.
Vermont is the only state in the country that both aggregates public
records data for all state agencies and publishes the names and institutional
affiliations of requesters. 205 It therefore serves as a useful case study. Prior
studies examining the role of commercial entities in the public records
regime have focused on a select number of agencies, usually those most
likely to receive large numbers of commercial requests. 206 While this
approach is effective in highlighting the severity of the problem at its most
extreme, it sheds little light on the extent to which commercial use of
public records laws affects the average government agency. Examining the
complete public records logs across an entire state government, in contrast,
allows for a more comprehensive look at public records use and its impact
on government. 207
State agencies in Vermont received 4,226 public records requests in
2017. Of these requests, roughly half originated from identifiable
commercial requesters, including insurance companies, data brokers, law
firms, and farmers. 208 The actual percentage of commercial requests is most
likely higher; roughly a third of these requesters provided no institutional
affiliation and could not be coded, and 50% therefore represents the lowest
possible percentage of requests originating from commercial entities. 209 In
contrast, requests from identifiable academic, media, and nonprofit
statutes. Companies use these laws to generate profits, and these financial rewards, by their nature,
accrue when the information is kept private. Cf. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1421 (noting that
in the FOIA context “[s]ubsidizing records to resellers validates a sort of buy-low, sell-high arbitrage in
federal records at great profit to the reseller, but no public or collective benefit in increased access to
information”).
205
For a discussion of the limited data available at the state level, see supra notes 95–96 and
accompanying text.
206
See, e.g., COAL. OF JOURNALISTS FOR OPEN GOV’T, FREQUENT FILERS: BUSINESSES MAKE
FOIA THEIR BUSINESS (2006), https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/ai/rti/international/
laws_papers/intl/businesses_make_foia_their_business.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JWW-K4V7] (reviewing
logs of seventeen federal agencies and finding that roughly two-thirds of requests originated from
commercial requesters); Fink, supra note 17, at 100–03 (reviewing public records logs of state
environmental agencies); Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1379–80 (reviewing public records logs
of six federal agencies).
207
There are also drawbacks to this approach. The insights derived from the public records logs of a
sparsely populated New England state may not necessarily apply to states in which distinct cultural,
economic, geographic, and social forces are at play. Even so, evaluating requests across one state serves
as a useful starting point for analysis given the absence of alternative sources of data at the state level.
208
Vermont State Dataset 2017, supra note 78.
209
Id.
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organizations collectively accounted for roughly 5% of total requests. 210
Within this category, around 3% of requests originated from the media,
while academics and nonprofit agencies each submitted around 1% of total
requests. 211
A handful of agencies in Vermont received a disproportionate share of
requests. More than half of all requests in 2017 were submitted to the
Department of Public Safety. Of these requests, nearly three-quarters
originated from commercial requesters. 212 Requests from or on behalf of
insurance companies alone accounted for roughly 60% of all requests
submitted to the public safety agency that year. 213 These companies were
generally looking to verify reports of burglaries, vandalism, and traffic and
other accidents. 214 And a single company—LexisNexis—accounted for
more than half of those requests. 215 Put another way, requests from this
single company comprised roughly 30% of all public records requests
received across the entire state of Vermont in 2017. 216
Other state agencies in Vermont are also deeply affected by
commercial requesters. The Agency of Transportation, for example,
receives large numbers of public records requests from construction,
engineering, surveying, and insurance companies, as well as from law
firms. 217 The substance of these requests varies. Many are submitted by
companies that lost a contracting bid and are looking for details about the
winning bid. Surveying companies often seek the details of government
land surveying projects to avoid repeating work that the government has
already completed. And law firms often rely on public records requests as a
210

Id.
Id.
212
Id. Again, the actual number is most likely higher because roughly 25% of total requests to the
Department of Public Safety in 2017 provided no affiliation and could not be identified through internet
searches.
213
Id.
214
Interview with Heidi Storm, Records and Alarm Adm’r, Vt. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, in Waterbury,
Vt. (Nov. 20, 2018).
215
Vermont State Dataset 2017, supra note 78. While these requests are generally straightforward,
the records access officer must secure approval from the relevant police barracks and manually redact
each report before it is released, both of which impose additional time and logistical costs. Interview
with Heidi Storm, supra note 214.
216
Vermont State Dataset 2017, supra note 78. While LexisNexis is not necessarily the dominant
requester in other states, insurance companies and data resellers tend to make up a significant
proportion of requesters to state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the country. See, e.g.,
Massachusetts State Dataset 2017, supra note 78 (showing that roughly two-thirds of requests to the
Massachusetts Department of State Police in 2017 were for police reports, police recordings, and arrest
reports).
217
Vermont State Dataset 2017, supra note 78.
211
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pre-discovery tool to help determine whether to bring a lawsuit against the
state. 218
Such heavy commercial use of the state public records law is
concerning. LexisNexis effectively operates as an information broker, with
the government subsidizing its profit model by providing valuable
information at a low price. Similarly, contractors’ reliance on the public
records law to obtain information about its competitors does little to
advance democratic accountability or the public interest. While these
commercial requests undoubtedly have value—to the companies that profit
from them and to the companies that benefit from the convenience of this
information resale—they offer little benefit to the public at large. 219 As
Professor Kwoka has noted, these information sellers become “the true
brokers of public information, thereby de facto taking over functions
thought to be inherently governmental.” 220 And while this present analysis
is limited in scope, public records logs and interviews with public records
officers in other states suggest that commercial interests play an equally if
not more substantial role across the country. 221
The benefit of surveying request logs across an entire government,
however, is that it provides insight into commercial requests across all
agencies, not just those agencies most affected by commercial interests.
And for some smaller agencies in Vermont, commercial requests are not
nearly so prevalent, while requests from media and other public-facing
entities consume more time and attention. 222 The Agency of Agriculture,
218
Interview with Mark Giguere, Records Officer, Vt. Dep’t of Transp., in Montpelier, Vt. (Nov.
20, 2018).
219
For a discussion of the minimal public benefits that such commercial requests provide in the
federal context, see Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1420–22.
220
See id. at 1415.
221
See, e.g., WASH. STATE AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 76, at 21 (finding that 8% of state and
local requests in 2015 were submitted by insurance agencies, and another 12% were submitted by law
firms). As Professor Katherine Fink’s research suggests, state environmental agencies appear to receive
among the highest number of commercial requests. Fink, supra note 17, at 110–11; see also Colo. Dep’t
of Pub. Health and the Env’t, 2016 Public Records Log, supra note 82 (on file with author) (roughly
90% of requests are commercial and fewer than 1% are from the media); Iowa Dep’t of Nat. Res., 2015
Public Records Log (on file with author) (roughly 80% of requests are commercial while just one
request was received from the media); Interview with Chris Voss, supra note 104 (explaining that the
agency receives high volumes of requests from third-party brokers who resell environmental
information about specific properties, and commenting that these companies “make their money off
this[,] and it’s an irritant to us”). State transportation departments also appear to receive a high number
of commercial requests. See, e.g., Penn. Dep’t of Transp., 2016 Public Records Log (on file with
author) (roughly 60% of requests are commercial and around 5% originated from members of the
media).
222
See, e.g., Vt. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 2013–2015 Public Records Logs (on file with
author) (roughly a quarter of requests from 2013–2015 originated from the media).
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Food and Markets, for example, received more than half of its requests
from journalists, academics, and nonprofit groups in 2017, but less than a
quarter from commercial entities.223 This holds true for other state and local
agencies across the country as well. 224 Such discrepancies underscore the
extent to which commercial requests vary substantially from one agency to
another, suggesting that at least some public records activity is more
closely aligned with the original intent of the statute. While this does not
mitigate the problem of commercial dominance of the public records laws
for other agencies, it does provide an important comparative perspective to
counterbalance the data coming out of those government entities most
affected by commercial interests.
At the local level, requester information is even more difficult to come
by. No state aggregates records request data at the local level. But again,
anecdotal evidence suggests that certain local agencies must likewise
contend with high numbers of commercial requests. 225 Commercial requests
are especially burdensome for local law enforcement agencies. Local police
departments and sheriffs’ offices, like state law enforcement agencies,
receive large numbers of requests for traffic accident, burglary, vandalism
and other police reports. 226 And many of the same commercial actors that
operate at the state level are frequent requesters at the local level as well.
Increasingly, local law enforcement agencies outsource the work of
handling these types of routine police report requests to third-party

223
Vermont State Dataset 2017, supra note 78 (out of twenty-eight requests, fifteen were academic,
media, or nonprofits, while only four were commercial).
224
See, e.g., Mass. Dep’t of State Police, Jan.–July 2018 Public Records Logs (on file with author)
(more than 350 public records requests from media outlets, or roughly 35% of total requests); S.D.
Dep’t of Educ., 2015 Public Records Log (on file with author) (roughly 40% of requests originated
from the media); Nev. Governor’s Office of Econ. Dev., Sept. 2013–July 2015 Public Records Logs (on
file with author) (of nineteen total requests, thirteen originated from either media organizations or think
tanks, while just one request originated from a commercial requester); Vill. of Downers Grove, Ill., Jan.
2015–July 2017 Public Records Logs (on file with author) (roughly 15% of total requests originated
from commercial entities).
225
See, e.g., ILLINOIS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 180, at 72, 133 (respondents to a survey on
unfunded mandates listed “FOIA requests from large commercial companies” as among the most
burdensome).
226
See, e.g., WASH. STATE AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 76, at 20 (noting that police and
sheriff’s departments received twice the number of requests as other departments); Report from Miguel
A. Santana, L.A. City Admin. Officer, to the Mayor and Council of L.A., at 1–2 (Sept. 24, 2015),
https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2015/15-1140_rpt_CAO_09-24-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/49FFV795] (noting that 85% of the 75,000 requests the Los Angeles Police Department receives annually
are for traffic accident reports); Town of Framingham, Mass., Jan. 17–Feb. 17, 2017 Public Records
Logs (on file with author) (roughly 55% of requests in one month were for police/fire department
reports).
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entities. 227 One of the largest vendors of these request-processing services
is—perhaps unsurprisingly—LexisNexis. 228 The company allows law
enforcement agencies to funnel police report requests directly to the
company, 229 and it provides access to its centralized police report database,
allowing members to search the accident reports of 4,500 agencies across
the country. 230 Further, it provides software that allows the public to report
harassment, lost property, vandalism, or other incidents directly to the
company when police presence is not required on the scene. 231
There are undoubtedly benefits to this outsourcing of public records
activity. From the law enforcement agency’s perspective, these third-party
requesting services reduce the amount of time an agency spends responding
to requests and allow police departments to concentrate attention on law
enforcement-related activities. And for the public, submitting a request
electronically through LexisNexis can reduce the time, effort, and cost
spent obtaining a police report. 232 But this privatization of the records
request process also raises concerns. Rather than submitting huge volumes
of requests to state and local agencies, LexisNexis cuts out the middleman
and aggregates and processes requests for police reports directly. This
effectively grants a private company a monopoly on public data and

Some state law enforcement agencies also rely on the company’s services as well. See, e.g.,
LexisNexis eCrash Continues to Improve Automated Crash Reporting Process for Law Enforcement
and Help Agencies Reallocate Resources Through Acquisition of iyeTek, BUSINESSWIRE (May 22,
2014) https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140522006171/en/LexisNexis-eCrash-ContinuesImprove-Automated-Crash-Reporting [https://perma.cc/E52K-SRT6] (noting that New Mexico State
Police rely on LexisNexis to automate their police report process). On the whole, however, state
agencies generally appear to manage the reporting process internally. See, e.g., Colorado State Patrol –
Central Records Unit, COLO. ST. PATROL, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/csp/colorado-state-patrolcentral-records-unit [https://perma.cc/EL82-Y4MF] (showing internal request management system);
DEP’T
OF
PUB.
SAFETY,
https://www.azdps.gov/
Public
Records
Unit,
ARIZ.
services/public/records/public [https://perma.cc/4Z7X-YJGE] (same); Crash Reports, ALA. L.
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, https://www.alabamainteractive.org/dps_crash_report/mainMenu.action;
wsuid=94A00A187DEE3857CDD7D4F213324A2F [https://perma.cc/CWV8-XZBD] (same).
228
See Report from Miguel A. Santana, supra note 226, at 2 (noting that LexisNexis provides
report distribution services “to over 100 California law enforcement agencies including the cities of San
Francisco, San Diego[,] and Sacramento police departments”).
229
LEXISNEXIS,
LEXISNEXIS
POLICE
REPORTS
(2018),
https://risk.lexisnexis.com//media/files/government/police_reports%20solution%20sheet%20rev%20pdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9JX3-GTFK].
230
Id. The company advertises a database of “173 million pieces of data, including 91 million
person and 82 million accident records, more than 35,000 accident reports, and 62,000 VINs added
daily.” Id.
231
Report from Miguel A. Santana, supra note 226, at 1.
232
In some cases, LexisNexis charges less for reports than the government previously charged. See,
e.g., id. at 2–3.
227
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consolidates police data in private hands. 233 If we are concerned that
information brokers at the federal level “de facto take[] over functions
thought to be inherently governmental,” 234 then the wholesale outsourcing
of the records requesting process to a third party vests this power more
fully in a commercial entity. 235
Of course, law enforcement agencies are not the only local
government entities that handle high volumes of commercial requests. A
variety of other commercial interests routinely target data specifically held
by local governments as well. Loan companies submit requests to towns or
cities for lists of residents with unpaid taxes or code violations to target
those individuals for loans. 236 Real estate companies request lists of
homeowners near foreclosure and approach those homeowners with offers
to purchase their property. 237 Recovery companies obtain lists of uncashed
checks issued by the city and then offer to assist individuals with securing a
reissued check in exchange for a percentage of the cash.238 And school
districts receive a large number of requests for purchase orders, contracts,
payroll data, and bid submissions. 239 For cash-strapped local agencies, the
costs these commercial requests impose can be substantial.
233
Some cities and towns require police or crash reports to be obtained through LexisNexis. See,
OF
CHESANING,
e.g.,
Accident
Report
Request,
VILLAGE
http://www.villageofchesaning.org/departments/village_administration/police_department/accident_rep
orts.php [https://perma.cc/63V6-NK4J]; Obtain a Police Report or Traffic Collision Report, FOUNTAIN
VALLEY POLICE DEP’T, https://www.fountainvalley.org/700/Obtain-a-Police-or-Traffic-Collision-Rep
POLICE,
[https://perma.cc/LGU4-RJZH];
Police
Reports,
HAWTHORNE
https://hawthornepolice.com/police-reports/ [https://perma.cc/FR5D-BTT3]. In an e-mail, the company
emphasized that “[w]e keep and maintain reports in our website but it is still owned by police
departments.” E-mail from Jessie, Police Reports Customer Support, LexisNexis, to author (Jan. 7,
2020, 7:27 AM PST).
234
Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1415.
235
There are potential economic drawbacks as well. In Los Angeles, for example, the department
estimated the loss of police report revenue cost roughly $1.8 million. See Report from Miguel A.
Santana, supra note 226, at 2, 3.
236
See, e.g., Shira Schoenberg, Here’s How Businesses Use Public Records to Drum Up Clients,
MASSLIVE (Dec. 30, 2018, updated Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.masslive.com/politics/2018/12/
business_public_records_leads.html [https://perma.cc/E8RL-NXYQ] (describing how businesses use
public records requests for commercial reasons); Request #19-417, in Public Record Requests, CITY OF
MIAMI (Feb. 13, 2009), https://miami.nextrequest.com/requests/19-417 [https://perma.cc/3FHF-TVBX]
(seeking “a list of people who have not paid their taxes in two years or more”).
237
See Schoenberg, supra note 236.
238
See, e.g., Emeryville Public Records Log, supra note 83 (showing five requests for lists of
uncashed checks); Telephone Interview with Adam Loukx, Deputy Dir. of the Toledo Law Dep’t (Sept.
12, 2018) (reporting that Toledo received two to three requests for uncashed checks per month).
239
See, e.g., Mechanicsburg, Penn. Area Sch. Dist., 2010–2016 Public Records Logs (on file with
author) (roughly 45% of requests were for purchase orders, contracts, payroll data, and bid
submissions); Buffalo, N.Y. City Sch. Dist., 2012–2014 Public Records Requests (on file with author)
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D. Barriers to Disclosure at the State and Local Level
Citizens are rarely, if ever, satisfied with public records laws at any
level of government. Discontent with these laws is so widespread that
trading public records horror stories—high price quotes for public records
requests, years-long delays, or nonsensical government responses—has
become a routine pastime among journalists, academics, and nonprofit
advocates. There are Twitter threads dedicated to chronicling these
stories, 240 and news outlets publish lists of their reporters’ most frustrating
public records experiences. 241 The Electronic Frontier Foundation hands out
yearly “Foilie” awards recognizing “the worst responses to records
requests, outrageous efforts to stymie transparency and the most absurd
redactions.” 242
The pitfalls associated with FOIA have been well documented in the
legal literature. 243 And many of the barriers to transparency that afflict
FOIA impede transparency efforts at the state and local level as well.
Excessive redactions, overreliance on certain exemptions, and failure to
comply with statutory time limits: these are all overlapping features of both
the federal and state public records landscape. But because these issues
plague the federal public records law, they have been reviewed at length by
scholars, advocates, and policymakers.
Scholars have paid less attention, however, to the distinct transparency
problems that arise at the state and local level. These problems include
defects in the transparency laws themselves—both in their construction and
in their application—as well as in the broader information systems that
encompass and sustain state and local governments. As this Section will
(roughly 40% of the requests submitted in 2013 were for purchase orders, contracts, payroll data, and
bid submissions); Rochester, N.Y. City Sch. Dist., 2014 Public Records Log (on file with author)
(showing requests for food service bid documents from multinational companies like Aramark).
240
See, e.g., Justin Elliott (@JustinElliott), TWITTER (Mar. 8, 2016, 2:38 PM),
https://twitter.com/JustinElliott/status/707334676130746368
[https://perma.cc/ZO3K-JUKW]
(“REPORTERS: have recent horror stories trying to use FOIA? I want to hear what happened. Please @
me or e-mail justin-at-propublica.org #WTFoia[.]”).
241
See, e.g., Cost-Related Access Challenges, Solutions in 18 States, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 13,
2015),
https://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/2015/cost-related-access-challenges-solutions-in-18-states
[https://perma.cc/5WWH-F75Y] (discussing various states’ impediments to accessing information);
Delayed, Denied, Dismissed: Failures on the FOIA Front, PROPUBLICA (July 21, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/delayed-denied-dismissed-failures-on-the-foia-front
[https://perma.cc/2BK7-9385] (describing the organization’s “reporters’ most frustrating public record
failures”).
242
Dave Maass et al., The Foilies 2018, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 11, 2018),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/foilies-2018 [https://perma.cc/V76L-3ZGQ].
243
See discussion supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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explore, these barriers to disclosure both interact with and reinforce one
another, leading to breakdowns in these broader state and local
transparency ecosystems.
1. Statutory Barriers to Disclosure
While many state public records statutes have adopted certain parts or
features of FOIA, 244 each state law is unique, and each introduces distinct
barriers to disclosure. This Section explores some of the textual distinctions
across state public records laws. Some of these issues do not exist at all at
the federal level. In other cases, the barriers to disclosure are more
formidable at the state and local level than they are in the federal context.
a. Excessive Exemptions
Requesters at the state and local level must contend with large
numbers of exemptions, many of which are vaguely written and reflect the
narrow goals of special interest groups. In contrast to FOIA’s nine
enumerated categories of records protected from public disclosure, 245 these
state laws can contain hundreds of enumerated exemptions, either within
the public records statute itself 246 or scattered throughout the state code. 247
Critics have claimed that FOIA’s exemptions sweep too broadly, placing
large swaths of public records beyond reach. 248 But few have argued that
FOIA has too many exemptions.
This is not the case at the state level. Florida law, for example,
contains 1,000 exemptions to public disclosure. 249 Twelve percent of all
Florida statutes enacted in 2017 were new exemptions to the public records
law. 250 In Tennessee, there were 2 statutory exemptions when the law was
enacted in 1957; 89 exemptions in 1988; and 538 exemptions by 2018. 251
See sources cited supra note 69.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012). There are other protections from disclosure contained throughout the
federal code and incorporated into FOIA through Exemption 3.
246
See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 239.010 (listing 431 exemptions).
247
See, e.g., OR. PUB. RECORDS ADVISORY COUNCIL, BIENNIAL REPORT 10 (2018),
https://digital.osl.state.or.us/islandora/object/osl:579069 [https://perma.cc/7667-9LC9] [hereinafter
BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ADVISORY COUNCIL] (noting that there are at least 550
exemptions to the public records law contained in the Oregon state code).
248
See, e.g., McCraw, supra note 15, at 234, 238 (describing the dramatic expansion of FOIA’s
exemptions).
249
Elizabeth Koh & Emily L. Mahoney, Legislature Adds to the More than 1,000 Exceptions to
MIAMI
HERALD
(Mar.
11,
2018),
Florida’s
Public
Records
Law,
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article204472014.html
[https://perma.cc/3DQW-YJLL].
250
Jarrod Holbrook, Public Records Advocate Opposes Public Records Exemptions Passed by
Legislature, ABC NEWS (May 19, 2017), https://www.abcactionnews.com/news/local-news/i-team244
245
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This explosion in public records exemptions can be traced in part to
the successful lobbying efforts of special interest groups. 252 Lobbying by
the National Rifle Association (NRA), for example, has led to the
enactment of public records exemptions for firearm permits and
registrations around the country. In 2011, an NRA affiliate in Illinois
backed a new public records exemption that protects the identities of gun
owners in the state. 253 And in 2018, NRA lobbying led to the enactment of
an exemption to the Nebraska public records law for information contained
in government firearm permits and licenses. 254 After the law went into
effect, the NRA praised the Nebraska legislature for preventing
“unscrupulous media outlets and others access to” these firearms records. 255
These special interest exemptions are often enacted quietly, without
much publicity or public oversight. 256 Even so, the plain language of these
provisions frequently reveals the special interests involved. Georgia’s state
legislature, for example, enacted a new exemption in 2006 protecting “all
reports, files, records, and papers of whatever kind relative to the
supervision of probationers by a private corporation”—all but ensuring that
the activities of private probation companies would be shielded from public
view. 257 In Vermont, records documenting “the purchase and sale of maple

investigates/public-records-advocate-frustrated-over-exemptions-passed-by-legislature
[https://perma.cc/F7NZ-WGFZ].
251
TENN. COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS TO THE TENNESSEE PUBLIC
RECORDS ACT (2018), https://comptroller.tn.gov/content/dam/cot/orc/documents/oorc/2018-0119_ExceptionstotheTennesseePublicRecordsActFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF3K-6Z4Y].
252
See, e.g., Andrew Geronimo & David Marburger, Ohio Open Government Guide, Exemptions in
the Open Records Statute, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/opengovernment-guide/ohio/#a-exemptions-in-the-open-records-statute
[https://perma.cc/J63F-5SAR]
(noting there are more than 400 statutory provisions of the Ohio public records law, many of them
exemptions); Telephone Interview with Fritz Byers, Att’y, Former Gen. Counsel for the Toledo Blade
and the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Sept. 10, 2018) (stating that in recent years the Ohio legislature began
to take “a balkanized approach” to the law by enacting “all these special interest amendments”).
253
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7.5(v) (2011).
254
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84-712.05(23) (West 2019).
255
Chris Dunker, NRA Praises New Nebraska Law Exempting Gun Records from Disclosure,
LINCOLN J. STAR (Apr. 17, 2018), https://journalstar.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/nra-praises-newnebraska-law-exempting-gun-records-from-disclosure/article_f8a3c08e-681f-57f8-a16ed4700440a80f.html [https://perma.cc/EJ2F-HRRZ].
256
See, e.g., BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 247, at
10 (“New exemptions are being generated each legislative session, presently without a mechanism in
place to directly inform the public and requester community that new exemptions are pending and to
allow for meaningful commentary during the legislative process.”).
257
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-109.2 (West 2017); Geraghty & Velez, supra note 17, at 476 (describing
the nexus between Georgia’s legislature and the lucrative private probation industry).

1507

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

products” are exempt. 258 And in Tennessee, data regarding nursing home
morbidity and mortality are protected. 259
Exemptions are even passed directly in response to reports of
government misconduct. In 2010, for example, reports that Kentucky led
the nation in child deaths due to abuse and neglect prompted local reporters
to submit public records requests to the state child services agency. 260 The
legislature responded by enacting “emergency” amendments that would
exempt child abuse and neglect records from disclosure, which the agency
then relied on to deny the public records request. 261 The reporters
challenged the denial, and a state appeals court ultimately chastised the
agency for “egregious” conduct in withholding the records, as well as a
broader “culture of secrecy” within the department. 262
This large and growing body of public records exemptions imposes
both ex ante and ex post costs upon requesters. Ex ante, it can be difficult if
not impossible for a requester to identify applicable exemptions and tailor a
request accordingly. And ex post, these hundreds of exemptions provide
government agencies with ample ammunition to withhold embarrassing
information or records revealing government misconduct. Moreover, the
growing number of exemptions that reflect powerful special interests raise
questions about the public’s ability to rely on these state public records
laws as a tool for accountability.
b. Requester Fees
Many states have failed to enact meaningful statutory limits on the
amount of money that may be recouped from requesters, requiring only that
the costs imposed are “reasonable.” This grants agencies wide discretion in
determining the fees charged to requesters.263 Such malleable fee
requirements can be difficult for requesters to challenge as excessive, and
they often yield inconsistent charges even within the same state. 264
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 484 (West 2019).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-909 (West 2019).
260
See Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Courier-Journal, Inc., 493 S.W.3d 375, 378 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2016) (explaining the litigation was spurred by denials by the state agency of newspapers’ open
records requests of “child fatalities or near fatalities”).
261
Id. at 379.
262
Id. at 389.
263
Many states limit charges to the “actual cost” of completing the request. See State Public
Records Law Database, supra note 84. But these provisions are often permissive rather than mandatory
and still allow agencies wide discretion in determining which fees to impose. A number of other states
require only that the charges are “reasonable.” Id.
264
See, e.g., Anna Clark, How ‘The Public Is Priced Out of Public Records’ by Michigan
Universities, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/
258
259
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Moreover, while FOIA directs agencies to reduce or waive requester fees
when disclosure “is in the public interest,” 265 few states provide public
interest fee reductions or waivers. 266
Many states also permit government officials to recover the labor
costs of time spent searching for a request and redacting records.267 These
fees can add up quickly, particularly when agencies charge higher hourly
amounts for redaction and review by lawyers or technical specialists. 268
When challenged by requesters, excessive fees are often reduced or
eliminated by the courts. 269 But because litigating a public records request
requires an enormous investment of time, money, and expertise, most
requesters who receive these excessive bills either narrow their request or
abandon their efforts. 270 And even when requesters do prevail in these
actions, offending agencies often continue to charge excessive fees to
future requesters. 271
High public records fees are especially concerning when it comes to
media requesters. These charges are more likely to impede the public’s
ability to engage in effective oversight, and they may give the impression
that the government is intentionally shielding itself from scrutiny. They can
also have a significant impact on the media’s ability to investigate and

how_the_public_is_priced_out_of_public_records_by_michigan_universities.php
[https://perma.cc/7KWC-U4KV] (noting that three Michigan public universities provided president and
governing board expense records at no cost while the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor charged
$2,774 for the president’s expense records alone).
265
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii) (2012).
266
See State Public Records Law Database, supra note 84. Even in states that permit fee waivers,
these waivers are often discretionary rather than mandatory. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19105(d)(3)(A)(iv) (West 2019) (stating records “may be furnished without charge or at a reduced charge”
if “in the public interest”); 65 PA. STAT. ANN. § 67.1307(f) (West 2019) (stating “[a]n agency may
waive the fees” if it is deemed to be “in the public interest” or “the requester duplicates the record”).
267
See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 610.026 (West 2019) (permitting costs for research time required);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503 (West 2018) (imposing reasonable costs and allowing records custodians
to set those costs); METRO. GOV’T OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON CTY., PUBLIC RECORDS POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES 2, 7 (2017) (authorizing agencies to charge for labor costs).
268
See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 72694 (West 2012) (public records request requiring “data
compilation, extraction, or programming” will require the requester to pay “the cost to construct a
record, and the cost of programming and computer services necessary to produce a copy of the record”).
269
See, e.g., Trammell v. Martin, 408 S.E.2d 477, 478–79 (Ga. App. 1991) (requester should not be
billed for legal review and copies must be charged at the rate most economical for copying); Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 815 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Wis. 2012) (public records laws cannot
be construed to permit charges for time spent redacting records).
270
See, e.g., infra note 362 and accompanying text.
271
See, e.g., John Browning, Op. Att’y Gen. of Ky., No. 94-ORD-77 (June 9, 1994) (chastising an
agency for repeatedly ignoring limits on copying charges).
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report stories. 272 While exceptionally high cost estimates are not necessarily
made in bad faith, media and advocacy organizations often claim that
governments use requester fees to silence dissent and prevent meaningful
oversight. 273
To provide just one example, in the wake of the shooting of Michael
Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, the city contracted with a private company to
handle its public records requests. The company charged reporters a base
fee of $500 and a labor fee of $135 per hour to search city employees’ emails 274—nearly ten times the $13.90 hourly salary of an entry-level
position in the clerk’s office. 275 Media organizations like the Associated
Press and St. Louis Public Radio were required to deposit $2,000 before
the requests would be processed, 276 and the city charged Vice News $1,200
for a five-hour e-mail search that turned up just seven responsive records. 277
News organizations widely viewed these charges as an effort to impede
their reporting efforts and prevent public oversight of the city’s police
department. 278
272
In a 2015 survey of reporters and lawyers who represent media organizations, 58% of
respondents reported “unreasonable fees” among the tactics that government officials used to deny
access to information. Q4 2015 NFOIC/MLRC/IRE OPEN GOVERNMENT SURVEY, NAT’L FREEDOM OF
INFO.
COAL.
10
(2016),
https://www.nfoic.org/sites/default/files/pages/201711/2015_NFOICMLRC_Survey_Resp.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZGV-JHR8]; see also Paying for Public
Access, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/journals/news-mediaand-law-spring-2014/paying-public-access/ [https://perma.cc/L52H-P73H] (noting that “even a bill for
several hundreds of dollars can be the equivalent of a denial for a freelancer or someone at a small
publication”).
273
See, e.g., Geraghty & Velez, supra note 17, at 470 (asserting that governments in the south use
excessive fees as a “strategy” to prevent public disclosure); Editorial, State Legal Costs Impede KORA,
TOPEKA CAP.-J. (Dec. 22, 2015), http://kssunshine.us/files/2017/04/cj-editorial-dcf-costs-122215.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W8HJ-9YUZ] (noting a “trend by government insiders to thwart public inquiry and
minimize disclosure of potentially embarrassing information” by “padding” fee estimates with costly
attorney fees).
274
Chris McDaniel, How Ferguson Contracted a High-Priced Company to Search Its E-mails, ST.
LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Oct. 9, 2014), https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/ferguson-charging-thousandspublic-records-st-louis-public-radio-files-complaint [https://perma.cc/6XFS-6PJN].
275
Jack Gillum, Ferguson Demands High Fees to Turn Over City Files, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept.
29, 2014), https://apnews.com/ea801dccbeca4d42a06d4477fdb982a0 [https://perma.cc/4XC4-73H7].
276
Chris McDaniel, Ferguson Charging Thousands for Public Records, St. Louis Public Radio
Files Complaint, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Oct. 7, 2014), https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/fergusoncharging-thousands-public-records-st-louis-public-radio-files-complaint [https://perma.cc/6XFS-6PJN].
277
Jason Leopold, Ferguson Police E-mails Reveal ‘Life is Very Rough’ for Officers, VICE NEWS
(Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pa845k/ferguson-police-e-mails-reveal-life-is-veryrough-for-officers [https://perma.cc/B75H-3V84].
278
See RTDNA Urges Missouri AG to Enforce Open Records Laws, RADIO TELEVISION DIGITAL
NEWS ASS’N (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.rtdna.org/article/rtdna_urges_missouri_ag_to_
enforce_open_records_laws [https://perma.cc/5BMJ-7XR3] (describing complaint submitted by a news
advocacy group to the Missouri Attorney General asserting that the charges to media organizations

1510

114:1461 (2020)

Transparency Deserts

c. Requester Restrictions
Under federal law, any person may submit a public records request,
regardless of citizenship, and agencies may not deny a request based on the
requester’s motivation or purpose. 279 State law, in contrast, imposes a
variety of additional restrictions on who may submit a public records
request, and for what reason. A number of states, for example, limit public
records access to state residents—a restriction that the Supreme Court
upheld as constitutional in 2013. 280
A handful of states also prohibit or curtail the rights of prisoners to
submit public records requests. In Arkansas, incarcerated felons are barred
from accessing any public records. 281 In Louisiana, a convicted felon who
has exhausted his or her appellate remedies may only request public
records related to the grounds upon which the inmate could obtain postconviction relief. 282 And Michigan’s law goes even further, wholly
excluding public records access to individuals incarcerated in county, state,
or federal correctional facilities. 283 Such restrictions are concerning. Pro se
inmates who wish to file a complaint or lawsuit over prison conditions, for
example, may be unable to obtain the records needed to substantiate their
claims, leaving them unable to enforce their constitutional rights. 284

were “an effort by city officials to discourage or even eliminate efforts by the media to continue its
investigation into this incident”).
279
Frequently Asked Questions, FOIA.GOV, https://www.foia.gov/faq.html [https://perma.cc/
MM6Z-25UG] (FOIA provides for a presumption of openness whereby agencies should only withhold
information “if they reasonably foresee that disclosure would harm an interest protected by an
exemption, or if disclosure is prohibited by law”).
280
McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 232 (2013) (“This Court has repeatedly made clear that
there is no constitutional right to obtain all the information provided by FOIA laws.”).
281
ARK. REV. STAT. § 25-19-105(a)(1)(B) (2019); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.025 (2019)
(prohibiting inmate access to correctional department records except those that mention the specific
inmate by name).
282
LA. STAT. ANN. § 44:31.1 (2018).
283
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.232 (2019). In 2001, a Michigan appeals court upheld the
constitutionality of this provision, reasoning that the exclusion of prisoners “rationally relate[s] to the
Legislature’s legitimate interest in conserving the scarce governmental resources squandered
responding to frivolous FOIA requests by incarcerated prisoners.” Proctor v. White Lake Twp. Police
Dep’t, 639 N.W.2d 332, 340 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
284
See OHIO REV. CODE § 149.43(B)(8) (2019) (sentencing judge or their successor must consent
to incarcerated individual’s request for records); State ex rel. Wyant v. Brotherton, 589 S.E.2d 812, 818
(W. Va. 2003) (restricting inmates from filing requests for the “purpose of filing a petition for writ of
habeas corpus”).
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d. Lack of Administrative Appeal
Only eighteen states offer requesters the option of appealing
administratively. 285 And because litigation is not a viable option for the vast
majority of citizens, requesters in most states are left without a practical
remedy for challenging an agency decision. 286 At the federal level, in
contrast, FOIA has a robust administrative appeals process: every federal
requester has the option of appealing an agency’s denial by submitting a
letter to the agency head explaining why the decision was flawed. 287
Even in those states that do provide for administrative appeals, flawed
appeals processes can introduce separate barriers to disclosure. In some
states, the decision-maker on appeal may be the same individual who
denied the request in the first place. 288 And other states either fail to provide
a time limit within which an appeal must be decided or stipulate a very
lengthy appeals deadline. 289 These problems with the administrative appeals
process, as well as the broader unavailability of administrative appeals,
make it difficult for requesters to challenge an agency’s response and
vindicate their right to access public records in many states.
e. Private Contractors and Quasi-Public–Private Governments
Privatization at all levels of government impedes transparency efforts.
At the federal level, FOIA does not extend to private contractors, 290 and
transparency advocates have tracked the ways in which this carve-out
prevents meaningful public oversight in areas ranging from the operation of

State Public Records Law Database, supra note 84.
See Interview with Ellen Gabler, Reporter, The N.Y. Times Co., in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Aug. 31,
2018) (noting that the lack of a viable enforcement remedy other than suing is the most difficult
obstacle to using state public records laws effectively).
287
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (2012).
288
D. John McKay, Alaska Open Government Guide, To Whom Is an Appeal Directed, REPORTERS
COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/alaska/
[https://perma.cc/VX35-NAP7] (noting that in Alaska, “[t]he appeal of a denial of a request for state
agency records must be directed to the head of the agency from which you are requesting the
records . . . . regardless of whether the agency head or subordinate was the one who initially denied
your request”).
289
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-206(b) (2019) (granting appellate body a year to issue a
decision).
290
See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 180 (1980) (requiring substantial control by the
government to be considered a government agency); Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Dep’t of
Health, Educ. & Welfare, 668 F.2d 537, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (concluding that a medical foundation
contracting with an agency to conduct a professional-standards review for Medicare and Medicaid was
not subject to FOIA).
285
286
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the military 291 to the management of federal prisons. 292 Privatization at the
state and local level, however, raises unique transparency concerns.
First, in contrast to the federal government, some state and local
governments outsource the very process of managing public records. Local
agencies have hired private companies to both collect government
information and disperse entire databases of police records.293 Some local
governments have also contracted out the management of court records,
with companies exercising exclusive control over the records for a period
of time before releasing them to the public. 294 This type of privatization
permits the consolidation of public information in private hands. 295
Second, the effects of privatization are often magnified at local levels
of government. This is in part due to the distinct origins and nature of
government at these lower levels. Many local governments originated as
private corporations that blurred the public–private divide, 296 and in early
America, mercantile corporations wielded the power and authority we now

291
See, e.g., Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: Privatizing Military Efforts and the Risks to
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 120–21 (Jody
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (noting that FOIA’s exclusion of private contractors makes it
difficult to hold private military contractors accountable).
292
See, e.g., Nicole B. Cásarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal
Corrections: The Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 303 (1995)
(arguing that private prisons should be subject to public records requirements to protect the safety of
prisoners and preserve the proper expenditure of public funds); see also PAUL R. VERKUIL,
OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 12 (2007) (“[The government’s] desire for secrecy encourages the use of
private contractors, who can do jobs for the federal government exempt from FOIA and FACA
disclosures.”). Scholars have also tracked the ways that such privatization can enhance federal
executive power more broadly. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 717, 719 (2010) (arguing that privatization allows the Executive Branch to exercise greater
discretion to achieve policy goals with reduced interference from the other branches, the public, and
successor administrations).
293
See discussion supra notes 228–231 and accompanying text.
294
See Feiser, supra note 169, at 830 (discussing Illinois press members’ worries about a private
company having exclusive control of court records for its first seventy hours of existence).
295
See supra notes 228–231 and accompanying text. The private companies that hold these records
will often sell them back to the public—or even back to the government that entered into the contract in
the first place—for a fee. See, e.g., Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640,
642–43 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting private contractor’s argument that raw data collected by government
tax assessors were protected by copyright); see also RANI GUPTA, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS, PRIVATIZATION V. THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW 8–11 (2007), https://www.rcfp.org/wpcontent/uploads/imported/PRIVATIZATION.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7N9-EHHC] (describing the access
issues that arise when governments privatize the recordkeeping process).
296
See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING 38–45 (1999); HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND
PRIVATE POWER 14 (1983) (recounting how New York City is regarded today as a typical public
government, but that “an eighteenth-century judge, by contrast, could have looked only to the chartered
foundations of a propertied corporation”).
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associate exclusively with governments, such as eminent domain.297
Moreover, smaller governments confront efficiency and resource concerns
when providing services. And in the wake of the New Federalism policies
of the 1980s, which reduced federal government funding in favor of locally
funded services, local governments engaged in widespread privatization of
their services. 298
As a result, large sections of what we normally consider core
government functions are now routinely operated by private or semiprivate
actors at the local level. 299 In some small cities and towns, core government
functions like policing and firefighting have been wholly privatized. 300 In
others, private forces supplement the public police force by providing
security or other services in certain regions or specified areas.301 And in a
handful of states, certain categories of privatized police—even those vested
with general police powers—are not consistently subject to public records
laws. 302
Further, even when there are overlaps between the types of
privatization occurring at the federal and subfederal levels, there are still
important distinctions in scale. Governments at all levels have increasingly
turned to private actors to operate prisons. These private prisons are not
subject to FOIA, nor are they subject to many state public records laws. 303
But the number of individuals affected is much larger at the state and local
level. In 2017, there were over three times as many state prisoners as
297
See FRUG, supra note 296, at 40–41 (pointing out that mercantile corporations had the power of
eminent domain).
298
Richard W. Pouder, Privatizing Services in Local Government: An Empirical Assessment of
Efficiency and Institutional Explanations, 20 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 103, 103–04 (1996).
299
See Davidson, supra note 34, at 608.
300
Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573, 613–15; Pace
William Rawlins & Sung-Wook Kwon, Walking the Line on Police Privatization: Efficiency,
Accountability, and Court Decisions, 82 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 580, 581, 583–84 (2016).
301
See Rawlins & Kwon, supra note 300, at 585 (discussing Fresno, California’s use of private
security guards for malls, apartments, sporting events, and concerts).
302
See, e.g., ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1197 (Ind. 2016)
(finding that Notre Dame police officers are not covered by the state public records laws even though
they are vested with general police powers); Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard
Coll., 840 N.E.2d 518, 521 (Mass. 2006) (declining to apply the public records law to Harvard
University police officers). Other privatized services, such as private property assessors, are also
beyond the reach of public records laws in some states. See, e.g., WIREdata, Inc. v. Vill. of Sussex,
751 N.W.2d 736, 755 (Wis. 2008) (finding that village property assessments used to determine
residents’ property tax bills are not subject to disclosure when conducted by a private company).
303
See Beryl Lipton, Your Annual Reminder: FOIA Still Doesn’t Apply to Private Prisons,
MUCKROCK (July 24, 2017), https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2017/jul/24/foia-still-doesntapply-private-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/F2HF-8XYL].
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federal prisoners being held in private prisons. 304 And some states have
privatized large swaths of their prison operations. In New Mexico, for
example, half of state prisoners are held in private facilities.305
The transparency perils of these privatized services are clear. Public
oversight of core government functions, such as policing, is critical to
preventing corruption, mismanagement, and abuse. 306 Placing these
government functions beyond the reach of public records laws shields
critical government activity from public view. This is not to say that state
legislators and judges have wholly ignored these aspects of local
government: some states have adopted more flexible tests for determining
when and where to extend public records coverage. 307 But not all states
have pursued this approach. As a consequence, certain private entities that
wield enormous state-backed power, and that have a significant impact on
the lives of citizens, remain insulated from public oversight.
2. Implementation Barriers to Disclosure
A host of separate transparency barriers arise not from the text and
structure of state public records laws, but from defects in their application.
Hostile government actors can subvert the intent of the statute by delaying
the public records process and refusing to release records. Budgetary
constraints may curtail the ability of state and local agents to act quickly
and effectively to comply with requests. And a variety of judicial
barriers—including a lack of meaningful judicial appeal—can prevent the
judicial branch from serving as an effective check on state and local
government discretion.
a. Hostile Government Actors
Government hostility toward public records requirements serves as an
additional barrier to disclosure. In the state and local context—as in the
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2019),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Private-Prisons-in-the-UnitedStates.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZAZ-TDRS].
305
Id. While New Mexico applies a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to whether public
records coverage extends to private companies, see Pacheco v. Hudson, 415 P.3d 505, 511 (N.M. 2018),
the courts do not appear to have resolved whether this coverage extends to private prisons.
306
See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (noting that FOIA was
intended to serve as a “check against corruption”); Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic
Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1848–49 (2015) (describing harms of excessive secrecy in policing).
307
See, e.g., State ex rel. Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Elida Cmty. Fire Co., 697 N.E.2d 210, 213
(1998) (holding that private firefighters are subject to public records law); Whether a Volunteer Fire
Dep’t is Subject to the Open Records Act, Op. Att’y Gen. of Tex., No. JM-821 (Nov. 17, 1987)
(announcing that a volunteer fire department—a nonprofit corporation—is a “governmental body”
subject to the Texas Open Records Act).
304
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federal context—there are often large discrepancies in how government
actors implement transparency laws. The willingness of agency officials to
comply with transparency requirements can have a significant impact on
the transparency effects of state public records laws, particularly requests
from media or advocacy organizations. 308
While this is true at all levels of government, such willful
noncompliance with public records statutes often has an outsized effect at
the state and local level, where barriers to enforcement of state public
records laws often leave requesters with even fewer options for challenging
an unreasonable denial or excessive fee determination. As a consequence,
individual public records officers wield significant power and discretion
over the practical availability of public information. In this way, they
resemble the traditional “street-level bureaucrat” in that they operate
relatively autonomously and the bureaucratic decisions they make can
prove sticky and difficult to overturn. 309
The attitude of individual government officials toward transparency
laws is often influenced by the broader culture within a particular
government unit. Many agencies, of course, take pride in their public
records work and view their compliance with the law as a critical part of
the democratic process. 310 But others foster a culture of secrecy and
noncompliance. 311 The New York City Police Department, for one, has
long been accused of permitting an entrenched culture of secrecy and
willful disregard for state public records law to flourish. 312 Similarly, judges
in some states have likewise proven hostile to transparency laws, imposing
a cramped and narrow view of what these laws require. 313 These judicial
308
One study of law enforcement agencies’ compliance with public records requests in Florida
found that if records “custodians felt some kind of sympathy or affinity for either the requesters or the
people named in the documents, they would grant preferential treatment to the person for whom they
sympathized.” Kimball, supra note 17, at 342.
309
MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 13, 16–18 (2010).
310
See, e.g., CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, MAKING THE GRADE 2 (2015) (describing the federal
Department of Agriculture’s “exceptional performance in processing” and strong disclosure rules).
311
See, e.g., Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Courier-Journal, Inc., 493 S.W.3d 375, 389 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2016) (chastising a state agency for its “culture of secrecy”); Geraghty & Velez, supra note 17,
at 458–62 (describing the “culture of secrecy” that exists at the Alabama Department of Corrections).
312
See, e.g., Bronx Defenders v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 156520/2016 (May 19, 2017) (order
denying cross-motion to dismiss) (chastising the police department for engaging in “‘gotcha’ litigation
tactic[s]”); OFFICE OF BILL DE BLASIO, OFFICE OF PUB. ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF N.Y., BREAKING
THROUGH BUREAUCRACY 13 (2013) (giving NYPD an “F” transparency grade for failing to respond to
31% of FOIL requests).
313
See, e.g., Christian Sheckler & Ken Armstrong, When Public Records Aren’t Public,
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/elkhart-indiana-when-public-recordsarent-public [https://perma.cc/QXA4-VCAW] (describing an Elkhart, Indiana judge’s repeated denial of
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attitudes toward transparency statutes may fluctuate drastically as even a
single member joins or leaves the bench. 314 The behavior of these
individual government officials empowered to act on transparency issues—
as well as the broader cultural attitudes toward transparency requirements
that these government entities foster—can have a significant impact on the
broader transparency ecosystem.
b. Reduced Resources and Expertise
State and local governments often lack sufficient resources to manage
and respond to public records requests, 315 particularly at the local level,
where many town and municipal governments operate on tight budgets. 316
The requirements imposed by public records laws must be balanced against
a multitude of other competing demands, such as funding schools, fixing
roads, and providing adequate police and firefighting services. 317 These
financial pressures can hinder the public records process at the state and
local level, leading to delayed responses or efforts by government officials
to skirt the boundaries of the law in order to conserve government
resources.
These budgetary constraints can also have further effect. Professor
Pozen has argued that the burdens FOIA imposes—financial and
otherwise 318—appear “less sensible . . . when the relevant bureaucracies are
already highly regulated and professionalized.” 319 Many local agencies, in
contrast, are situated at the border between government action and
community engagement. They operate more informally than federal or state
agencies, and the procedural requirements binding these local agencies are
public records requests for even routine court documents such as briefs filed with the court); see also
Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 199–200, 204–11 (2013) (describing
the federal judiciary’s tendency to ignore de novo review requirement of FOIA claims despite
Congress’s decision to override a presidential veto to require de novo review).
314
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Fritz Byers, supra note 252 (explaining that the loss of a
single pro-transparency justice in 2002 significantly shifted the Ohio Supreme Court’s treatment of state
public records law).
315
See William Funk, Rationality Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REV.
147, 172–73 (1991) (describing the funding difficulties confronted by many state agencies); State and
Local Fiscal Facts: 2018, supra note 176 (noting that the state “budget environment remains tight” and
counties “face a constraining fiscal environment”); see also Interview with Chris Voss, supra note 104
(noting that the state environmental agency budget had been cut in half since 2000 and the staff now
struggles to complete public records requests within the statutory timeframe).
316
See discussion supra note 176 and accompanying text.
317
In contrast, FOIA administrative costs represented 0.011% of federal agencies’ total department
budgets between 1975 and 2015. See A.J. Wagner, Essential or Extravagant: Considering FOIA
Budgets, Costs and Fees, 34 GOV’T INFO. Q. 388, 392 (2017).
318
See discussion supra note 116.
319
Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at 1130.
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often unclear. 320 Many local government officials serve in an unpaid,
volunteer capacity, 321 and concerns about a lack of professionalization at
the local level have led courts to refrain from extending deference to local
agencies and to invalidate local agency action based on nondelegation
principles. 322 If we accept the inverse of Professor Pozen’s point—that with
less professionalized bureaucracies, enhanced public oversight becomes
more valuable—then public records laws would seem to be more prudent in
the context of local administration.
Turning to the specific context of public records laws, state and local
government officials sometimes lack sufficient expertise regarding the
requirements of the law. Few agencies can afford dedicated public records
officers, even when the public records caseload would support it. 323 As a
result, government officials responding to requests often lack an underlying
familiarity with the law itself, and they issue responses that either
misconstrue or outright ignore the requirements of the statute. 324 One
journalist at a national news outlet characterized this knowledge deficit as
the single most significant impediment to disclosure at the state and local
level. 325
Some government officials responding to public records requests at
the state and local level also lack the technical expertise required to
respond to requests requiring electronic searches. 326 While federal agencies
Davidson, supra note 34, at 572.
Id. at 623.
322
See, e.g., Marta v. Sullivan, 248 A.2d 608, 610 & n.3 (Del. 1968) (invalidating a local ordinance
in part over concerns that the ordinance would delegate authority to “neighboring residents,” which
would include “transients, boarders, visitors, and summer-time tenants”); see also Davidson, supra note
34, at 623–24 (noting that the continued “vibran[cy]” of the nondelegation doctrine at the local level
could be attributed to the “relative informality of local boards,” and arguing that “[l]egislative standards
that might be acceptable when given to a deeply resourced, professionally staffed traditional agency
may become more troubling when community members are tasked with the decision making”).
323
See, e.g., Interview with Wendy Houston Anderson, supra note 185 (Vermont state agency
employee describing the extent to which employees must divert time from primary duties to respond to
public records requests); see also Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. REV.
483, 521–22 (2017) [hereinafter Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration] (noting that “resource-strapped,
under-staffed agencies may lack sufficient numbers of employees with appropriate qualifications”).
324
See, e.g., Kimball, supra note 17, at 331 (finding that among the records custodians surveyed
“[v]ery few had any structured training in the public records law” and “almost all of them said they
needed help understanding Florida’s Public Records Law”); FOI Audits, Alabama, NAT’L FREEDOM OF
INFO. COAL., https://www.nfoic.org/foi-audits#ALABAMA [https://perma.cc/772L-EZZF] (finding that
52% of sheriffs’ offices in Alabama surveyed rejected public records requests, often in violation of state
law, and attributed this noncompliance in part to a lack of understanding of the law’s requirements).
325
Interview with Steve Eder, supra note 28.
326
See, e.g., WASH. STATE AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 76, at 5 (“Maintaining records today
requires investments in information technology to organize, store, secure, search and inventory records,
320
321
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are often able to adopt technical solutions that allow for increasingly
complex digital searches, 327 many government entities at the state and local
level struggle with even straightforward requests for electronic records
such as e-mails or text messages. 328 In 2018, for example, when an activist
submitted a public records request to the Seattle mayor’s office requesting
a search of the mayor and his aides’ text messages, staff members placed
their phones on copy machines and produced photocopied images of
responsive messages. 329 This combination of reduced resources and
expertise serves as a functional barrier to disclosure at the state and local
level.
c. Lack of Meaningful Judicial Appeal
Litigating a public records request is expensive and time-consuming.
This is as true for FOIA as it is for state transparency statutes. But while
the average requester at any level of government has neither the skills nor
the resources necessary to file a lawsuit in court, repeat FOIA requesters
operating on a national scale are able to file a federal lawsuit relatively
quickly, efficiently, and inexpensively. Increasingly, a handful of lawyers
working on behalf of media and advocacy organizations are taking the lead
in enforcing the provisions of FOIA that are most relevant to the public.330
Fifty-six percent of all FOIA lawsuits filed in 2018 were filed by nonprofit

and trained employees to manage them. Many governments told us they do not have sufficient
resources to conduct these activities.”).
327
See, e.g., Identifying Efficiencies when Leveraging Digital Tools for FOIA Processing, OFFICE
OF INFO. POL’Y, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/identifyingefficiencies-when-leveraging-digital-tools-foia-processing [https://perma.cc/HSB6-9XSX] (describing
pilot program by the DOJ using new technology to improve FOIA search and response time).
328
See, e.g., Public Records Bill Must Remain Balanced and Affordable, supra note 181 (objecting
to broader affirmative disclosure requirements on the grounds that some local governments lack
broadband service); Interview with Wendy Houston Anderson, supra note 185 (explaining the time and
effort involved with learning to use software to conduct e-mail searches and redact records). A related
problem is that some state and local governments maintain records in hard-to-search forms. The North
Dakota state environmental agency, for example, maintains its public records request log by hand. See
Fink, supra note 17, at 102.
329
Maass et al., supra note 242.
330
See Christine Mehta, Annual Report: FOIA Lawsuits Reach Record Highs in FY 2018, FOIA
PROJECT (Nov. 12, 2018), http://foiaproject.org/2018/11/12/annual-report-foia-lawsuits-reach-recordhighs-in-fy-2018/ [https://perma.cc/UF8K-B7H3].

1519

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

advocacy groups. 331 And the New York Times alone filed seventeen FOIA
lawsuits in the first eighteen months of the Trump Administration.332
These decisions often have far-reaching effects. They set important
judicial precedents interpreting the scope and application of the law, and
they help enforce the law’s mandate across the federal government.333
Negotiated settlements of public records lawsuits also play a critical role in
holding agencies to account. This is especially true in the context of media
requests. At the federal level, reporters routinely agree to dismiss their
FOIA lawsuit in exchange for the records they requested. 334 Such litigation
allows the media to use the courts as a forcing mechanism to compel the
agency to respond, allowing reporters to cut the lengthy FOIA line. This is
not the most efficient way to ensure media access to records. But it does
ensure a timely response and make the prospect of judicial enforcement
real. 335
These national media outlets and advocacy organizations face higher
barriers to entry when litigating at the state level. Even an experienced
FOIA litigator will not have the requisite bar qualifications or the
knowledge of state law and practice required to litigate in most state courts.
And hiring local counsel to litigate usually costs between $20,000 and
$30,000 but can often cost far more. 336 As a result, national media outlets
331
FOIA Project Staff, FOIA Suits Filed by Nonprofit/Advocacy Groups Have Doubled Under
Trump, FOIA PROJECT (Oct. 18, 2018), http://foiaproject.org/2018/10/18/nonprofit-advocacy-groupsfoia-suits-double-under-trump/ [https://perma.cc/NM4L-L6ZY].
332
FOIA Project Staff, Media Lawsuits Seeking Government Records Jump Under Trump, FOIA
PROJECT (Aug. 2, 2018), http://foiaproject.org/2018/08/02/media-foia-lawsuits-jump-under-trump/
[https://perma.cc/6JEQ-UPDB].
333
See, e.g., David McCraw, Think FOIA Is a Paper Tiger? The New York Times Gives It Some
Bite, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/insider/foia-freedom-ofinformation-act-new-york-times.html [https://perma.cc/6V3H-42AA] (“By suing regularly, [the New
York Times] hope[s] to achieve two things. We put agencies on notice that we will take them to court if
our requests are not handled properly, and it gives us a shot at shaping the law through court
decisions.”).
334
See, e.g., Stipulation & Order of Settlement & Dismissal at 1, N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, No. 18-cv-2054 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018), ECF No. 16 (agreeing to a voluntary dismissal of a
FOIA complaint in exchange for the production of records); Stipulation & Order of Voluntary
Dismissal Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) at 2, N.Y. Times Co. v. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, No. 17-cv-2144 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2018), ECF No. 35 (same). The
author assisted with both of these cases while working as an attorney for the New York Times.
335
Scholars have previously characterized negotiated FOIA settlements without attorneys’ fees as a
loss to the requester—an indication that the lawsuit never had merit in the first place. See Paul R.
Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 713 n.152
(2002). To the contrary, such lawsuits can serve as an important transparency tool, particularly for
journalists. See sources cited supra note 334.
336
See E-mail from David McCraw, supra note 12.
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and other advocacy organizations rarely litigate state public records
requests. The organizations that lead the way in enforcing FOIA are
relatively powerless when it comes to state public records laws. 337
In theory, local media outlets could adopt a similar model. Larger
media and nonprofit organizations operating on a national scale could serve
as the public’s enforcer of the federal public records law, while local media
and advocacy organizations could enforce various state public records
laws. But the financial costs involved are often prohibitive for these local
organizations. Many outlets do not employ an in-house lawyer, but instead
rely on outside counsel to meet their legal needs.338 For these organizations,
public records lawsuits—which are expensive, time consuming, and
difficult to win—will rarely justify the costs required to fight.339
The consequences can be far-reaching. Most immediately, media and
advocacy organizations are unable to obtain the records required to report
on the government. But the absence of public records litigation also leads
to broader ambiguity in the law. Many state laws contain expansive or
vague provisions, 340 and without plaintiffs challenging government records
responses, large swaths of the public records laws are left undefined by the
courts. This makes it more difficult for requesters and government officials
alike to determine the scope and meaning of the law. This problem is
particularly acute when it comes to public records exemptions. In West
Virginia, for example, nearly half of the exemptions contained in the public
records act have never been interpreted by a state judge. 341 In contrast, there
are hundreds of federal court decisions addressing the meaning and scope

337
For a discussion of the structural barriers to civil society monitoring of state agencies generally,
see Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 109–10.
338
KNIGHT FOUND., IN DEFENSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
26 (2016),
https://knightfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/KF-editors-survey-final_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PWC3-9CP2] (survey on file with the Knight Foundation) (in a survey of newspaper
editors, 80% of respondents reported relying on outside counsel).
339
See id. at 9, 13 (65% of respondents believe that the news industry is less able today than it was
ten years ago to pursue legal action involving free expression; of that 65%, 89% attribute the decline to
financial restraints).
340
See discussion supra notes 263–264 (describing the vague language used in many public records
laws’ fee requirements).
341
Patrick C. McGinley & Suzanne M. Weise, West Virginia Open Government Guide, REPORTERS
COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/west-virginia
[https://perma.cc/H46K-EFZ9]. The large numbers of exemptions in some states, as well as the
frequency with which new exemptions are added, strongly suggests that this is an issue that plagues
other states’ public records laws as well. See, e.g., supra notes 249–250 (describing the large number of
exemptions in Florida, as well as the frequent enactment of new exemptions).
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of each FOIA exemption. 342 And without clear guidance from the courts,
state and local governments have latitude to impose very broad or contorted
definitions upon textually narrow exemptions.
The paucity of public records lawsuits at the state and local level may
also reduce agencies’ incentive to comply with the law. The chance that an
agency’s intransigence or delay will have real consequence is low, and
overworked state and local government employees likely have little
incentive to focus on public records compliance when they are faced with
other pressing concerns. This makes it more difficult for all requesters—not
just nonprofit and media requesters—to obtain public records. The absence
of a viable judicial remedy has the potential to render public records laws
ineffective.343 As one media editor noted, “Government agencies are well
aware that we do not have the money to fight. More and more, their first
response to our records request is ‘Sue us if you want to get the
records.’” 344
3. External Barriers to Disclosure
Pervasive weaknesses in public oversight operate as a third barrier to
public disclosure. The absence of a robust media and civil society at the
subfederal level leaves the public without access to the information
necessary to hold the government to account. These external factors form
the third category of obstacles to effective transparency mechanisms in
state and local government.
a. Decline of Local Media
Local media—especially local print media—has experienced a
precipitous decline over the past decade.345 Between 2004 and 2018,
roughly one in five local newspapers in the United States closed. 346 Today,
half of the counties in the United States have only one newspaper—
342
Court Decisions Overview, OFFICE OF INFO. POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/oip/court-decisions-overview [https://perma.cc/4X2D-K4V8] (“Each year the
federal courts issue hundreds of decisions in FOIA cases, addressing all aspects of the law.”).
343
See, e.g., Geraghty & Velez, supra note 17, at 461–62 (stating that the Alabama Department of
Corrections “ignores Open Records Act requests for months, producing public documents only after
repeated threats of litigation”).
344
KNIGHT FOUND., supra note 338, at 27; see also Timothy B. Wheeler, Hogan ‘Executive
Privilege’ Email Troubles Open-Government Advocates, BALT. SUN (Feb. 20, 2015),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-hogan-executive-privilege-20150220-story.html
[https://perma.cc/Q8HL-28QN] (Director of Maryland Press Association noted that after receiving a
public records denial, “[u]nless you’re willing to go to court, you’re over a barrel”).
345
This decline is generally attributed to the significant drop in advertising revenue as advertising
activity increasingly moves online. See PEN AM., supra note 94, at 24–31.
346
ABERNATHY, supra note 20, at 8.
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typically a small weekly—and around 200 counties have no newspaper at
all. 347 Moreover, the local newspapers that still exist have seen their
advertising and subscription revenue models collapse. Over the same
fifteen years, weekday print circulation has declined 40%, leading to
widespread layoffs and reduced local coverage.348 These reductions have
curtailed newspapers’ ability to oversee state and local government. The
number of statehouse reporters alone fell 35% between 2003 and 2014. 349
This decline has had a substantial effect on local governance. One
study found that in the wake of a local newspaper closure, the number of
government employees, tax revenue per capita, and cost of municipal
borrowing all increased. 350 The government wage ratio—or the ratio
between salaries at the top and bottom of an organization—also rose. The
authors concluded that local newspapers are especially critical in localities
that already suffer from “low quality governance.” 351 Other studies have
demonstrated that reduced local media coverage corresponds with less
informed voters, lower voter turnout, and reduced incentives for local
politicians to serve as effective advocates for their constituents. 352
The decline of local media has had an impact on the enforcement of
local transparency laws as well. Reporters rely heavily on public records
requests to inform their investigative reporting. The media’s use of these
statutes, in turn, improves the functioning of these public records laws. By
submitting requests, engaging in administrative-level conversations and
negotiations to expedite the requesting process, and challenging public
records delays and denials in court, journalists play an outsized role in
enforcing these transparency statutes. And the loss of local media
participation in the public records process—either because the outlet itself
347

Id.
Id. at 14.
349
Katerina Eva Matsa & Jan Lauren Boyles, America’s Shifting Statehouse Press, PEW RES. CTR.
(July
10,
2014),
https://www.journalism.org/2014/07/10/americas-shifting-statehouse-press/
[https://perma.cc/E38G-8WB4].
350
Pengjie Gao et al., Financing Dies in Darkness? The Impact of Newspaper Closures on Public
Finance 4–5 (Hutchins Ctr., Working Paper No. 44, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/WP44.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GLK-SH4C].
351
Id. at 4.
352
Id. at 2. These governance benefits must be considered, however, against the backdrop of a more
general decline in the public’s confidence in the media. See, e.g., GALLUP/KNIGHT FOUND.,
INDICATORS OF NEWS MEDIA TRUST 3 (2018) (69% of adults surveyed stated that their trust in the
media has declined in the past decade); Sabrina Tavernise & Aidan Gardiner, ‘No One Believes
Anything’: Voters Worn Out by a Fog of Political News, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/18/us/polls-media-fake-news.html
[https://perma.cc/2ZJJ-W8HZ]
(describing the public’s loss of faith in the media). Put another way, even the highest quality reporting
utilizing the most well-crafted transparency laws will be ineffective if the public has stopped listening.
348
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has folded or because it no longer has the resources to engage in
investigative reporting and mount legal challenges—reduces the quality of
compliance with transparency requirements more broadly.
Denver offers a useful case study. For more than a century, the city
was home to two competing daily newspapers: the Rocky Mountain News
and the Denver Post. 353 For decades, the two newspapers litigated landmark
public records lawsuits that ultimately helped define the scope of the state’s
public records law. Lawsuits filed by the two newspapers established
whether private companies are subject to the open records laws, 354 when emails sent by public officials are subject to disclosure, 355 and whether the
law requires a showing of special interest to access records. 356 But the
Rocky Mountain News closed in 2009 in the wake of declining revenue and
corporate mismanagement. 357 And in 2010, a hedge fund company assumed
control of the Denver Post’s management and operations. 358 The company
made drastic cuts to newsroom staff, reducing the number of employees
from a peak of 300 down to around 70. 359 Unsurprisingly, the paper has
also stopped investing in access litigation. According to a search of
Westlaw and Lexis, neither publication has filed a public records lawsuit
for nearly a decade. 360
The trend in Denver is emblematic of the state of local media in many
other towns and cities across the country. The company that owns the
Denver Post owns more than fifty other newspapers in the United States,

See
Statement
from
the
Companies,
DENVER
POST
(May
11,
2000),
https://extras.denverpost.com/business/statement0511.htm [https://perma.cc/7U39-CXNR].
354
See, e.g., Denver Post Corp. v. Stapleton Dev. Corp., 19 P.3d 36, 41 (Colo. App. 2000).
355
See, e.g., Denver Publ’g Co. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Cty. of Arapahoe, 121 P.3d 190, 203
(Colo. 2005).
356
See, e.g., Denver Publ’g Co. v. Dreyfus, 520 P.2d 104 (Colo. 1974).
357
See Bob Diddlebock, Who Really Killed the Rocky Mountain News?, TIME (Mar. 6, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1883345,00.html [https://perma.cc/7G8N-UY5F].
358
Pete Vernon, The Media Today: Denver Post Cuts Fit a Disturbing Pattern at Hedge-Fund
JOURNALISM
REV.
(Mar.
16,
2018),
Owned
Papers,
COLUM.
https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/denver-post-cuts-digital-first.php [https://perma.cc/PVW2-2Y4J];
Laurel Wamsley, ‘Denver Post’ Calls Out Its ‘Vulture’ Hedge Fund Owners in Searing Editorial,
PUB.
RADIO
(Apr.
9,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoNAT’L
way/2018/04/09/600831352/denver-post-calls-out-its-vulture-hedge-fund-owners-in-searing-editorials
[https://perma.cc/WX36-A6ZQ].
359
See Vernon, supra note 358.
360
The most recent lawsuit available on Westlaw or Lexis is Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d
1083 (Colo. 2011). It is possible that the Denver Post filed a lawsuit since then that settled without a
published decision.
353
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and it has made similar cuts to papers throughout the country. 361 But even
for newspapers that remain independently owned, the financial pressures
are intense. Many no longer have the luxury of engaging in access
litigation. In a Knight Foundation survey of media editors, 65% of
respondents believed that the industry is less able to pursue legal action
around First Amendment-related issues than it was ten years ago. 362
Local media plays a critical role in the transparency ecosystem
through the aggressive use and enforcement of state public records laws.
The collapse of local media has led to fewer investigative resources
devoted to covering state and local government, fewer public records
requests submitted from the media, and fewer public records challenges
pursued in court. While some major media and advocacy organizations are
still devoting resources to access litigation, those national organizations
face both financial and logistical barriers to litigating in state court. In this
way, the decline of the media as the public enforcer of public records laws
has had a significant negative impact on the broader local transparency
ecosystem.
b. Weaknesses in Civil Society
Civil society actors have long played a crucial role in government
oversight. This is particularly true for civil society groups that “pursu[e] the
interests of a diffuse public.” 363 These organizations are often focused on a
particular subset of government action or on trans-substantive government
issues, such as prison reform or enhanced protection for civil liberties. 364 At
the federal level, civil society oversight of the federal government
expanded dramatically between the 1950s and ’70s with the enactment of a
range of federal transparency laws and the rise of “monitory democracy,”
as well as with the increased power and influence of civil rights, antiwar,
and other activist and public interest groups. 365 Yet the largest and most
361
See Jack Shafer, This Is How a Newspaper Dies, POLITICO (May 13, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/05/13/denver-post-profits-newspaper-industry-218360
[https://perma.cc/C5UY-A3PL]; Wamsley, supra note 358.
362
KNIGHT FOUND., supra note 338, at 1; see also Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra
note 323, at 525 (“The media cannot report on what it cannot see, and state media groups may not have
sufficient resources or incentives to conduct extensive records requests.”).
363
Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 135.
364
See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515,
547–51 (2015).
365
MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE RISE OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW 233–37, 249–51 (2015). Many have
argued that civil society across the country is now on the decline. Scholars and journalists have ascribed
this decline to a variety of factors. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE
AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 235–36 (2000) (arguing that the rise of television strongly
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prominent civil society organizations have historically paid less attention to
state and local government, even as the size and power of these lower
levels of government have expanded in recent decades. 366
Smaller, more locally focused civil society actors have only partially
filled this gap. To be sure, there are countless organizations—ranging in
size and scope from state chapters of nationally recognized advocacy
groups to small neighborhood organizations—monitoring state and local
government and advocating for policy change. 367 But these state and local
public interest groups often operate at a significant financial disadvantage.
At the state level, lobbying activities are largely dominated by private
sector interests, even more so than at the federal level. Public interest
groups represented only 12.4% of lobbying activity at the state level in
2007, and 86% of state lobbying expenditures that year were incurred by
corporations and trade associations. 368
State-level public interest groups also have fewer resources than
similar organizations advocating on a national level, placing these statelevel public interest groups at a greater financial disadvantage in
comparison with the private interest groups lobbying against them. 369 This
imbalance makes it more difficult for state and local public interest groups
to engage in sustained government oversight. 370 A comparison of public
records lawsuits filed at the federal versus the state and local level
illustrates this dynamic. Lawsuits filed by national nonprofit organizations
like the ACLU comprised more than half of all FOIA lawsuits in 2018—
roughly 500 lawsuits in total.371 While comparative litigation data are not
contributed to a decline in civil society activities); Emma Green, What America Lost as Women Entered
(Sept.
19,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
the
Workforce,
ATLANTIC
archive/2016/09/what-women-lost/500537/ [https://perma.cc/FX2S-GSVK] (arguing that a partial
explanation for why civil society activity has declined is that women moved into the workforce and
replaced unpaid activism and volunteerism with paid work).
366
Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 130.
367
See, e.g., Christopher A. Cooper et al., Perceptions of Power: Interest Groups in Local Politics,
37 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 206 (2005).
368
Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 137–38. At the federal level, in contrast,
“business-oriented” lobbyists constituted an estimated 51.5% of all lobbyists in 2006. Id.
369
Id. at 138–39 (“In addition to being outnumbered and outspent on lobbying, public interestoriented groups in the states are also likely to be comparatively resource poor.”); see also Seifter,
Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 323, at 524 (noting a “probusiness skew among state
lobbyists”).
370
See Jiahuan Lu, Organizational Antecedents of Nonprofit Engagement in Policy Advocacy: A
Meta-Analytical Review, 47 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 177S, 186S–87S (noting that larger,
more professionalized, and better funded nonprofits are more likely to engage in policy advocacy
work).
371
FOIA Project Staff, supra note 331.
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collected at the state level, the dearth of state-level public records lawsuits
overall suggests that state and local public interest groups are not using the
courts to compel public records at these lower levels of government. 372
Moreover, while there is limited data on the percentage of state and local
public records requests submitted by nonprofit organizations, anecdotal
evidence suggests that interest groups submit fewer state and local public
records requests than they do FOIA requests. 373 This combination of
reduced media and civil society activity leaves large gaps in public
oversight in comparison with the federal transparency regime.
IV. TRANSPARENCY DESERTS
The example of state public records laws helps illuminate the various
factors that either advance or impede transparency efforts. Through this
analysis, three central features of a local transparency ecosystem emerge:
(1) the substance of transparency requirements binding the government; (2)
the resources, expertise, and attitudes of state and local government actors
tasked with implementing these laws; and (3) the robustness and health of
local media and civil society organizations. This Part examines localities in
which poor performance on all three factors have combined to create a
downward spiral of reduced disclosure and public oversight—what I refer
to as a transparency desert. 374
A. The Case of Kansas
Elucidating the concept of local transparency deserts presents
something of a paradox: a true transparency desert, by definition, will be
invisible. In localities that fail all three prongs of the transparency
ecosystem, there will be no journalists documenting the ways that
government officials have subverted transparency laws to hide government
malfeasance. Government attitudes towards transparency will be obscured
if there is no one to request information. A perfect transparency desert will
hide both the government’s failure to comply with transparency obligations
and any underlying corruption or wrongdoing.

See discussion supra note 88–90 and accompanying text.
Compare 2017 Vermont State Dataset, supra note 78 (roughly 1% of requests submitted to state
agencies were from identifiable nonprofit organizations), with Max Galka, Who Uses FOIA? – An
Analysis of 229,000 Requests to 85 Government Agencies, FOIA MAPPER (Mar. 13, 2017),
https://foiamapper.com/who-uses-foia/ [https://perma.cc/3R3A-5TR6] (analysis of 229,000 FOIA
requests submitted to eighty-five federal agencies found that roughly 7.5% of requests originated from
nonprofit entities).
374
This term borrows from the idea of a “news desert.” See discussion supra note 20.
372
373
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In light of these obstacles, this Section explores a somewhat imperfect
illustration of a transparency desert: the case of Kansas. 375 To begin, the
transparency regime binding state and local government in Kansas is
relatively ineffective. The state has a weak public records law. The statute
itself contains fifty-five exemptions, including a broad exemption for
nearly all “[c]orrespondence between a public agency and a private
individual,” 376 and there are 250 or so additional exemptions from
disclosure scattered throughout the state code. 377 The law does not contain a
fee waiver for requests submitted in the public interest, nor are there
meaningful limits on the amount that government entities may charge
requesters: they are free to impose a “‘reasonable’ fee,” which may include
the cost of time spent responding to the request. 378 Further, the law contains
no provisions providing a route for administrative appeal. 379 And while
legislative bodies are covered by the law, the records of individual
legislators are exempt, even those maintained in performance of their
official duties. 380
Although this Article focuses attention on a single category of
transparency statutes, the substance of other statutory transparency
requirements in the state affect the broader transparency ecosystem as well.
And in Kansas, these other transparency requirements are similarly flawed.
It is one of the few states that permits anonymous authors to sponsor
legislation, and in 2017, 94% of all laws enacted that year were sponsored
anonymously. 381 Kansas was the last state in the nation to permit the

375
I refer to this as an “imperfect” example because local news outlets have exposed governmental
deficiencies in the state. See infra note 399.
376
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-215 to -250 (2019).
377
Government Records, KAN. OPEN GOV’T, http://medialaw.ku.edu/opengovt/kansasstatutes.shtml
[https://perma.cc/RE84-W6U7].
378
Joe Stumpe, Kansas Gets F Grade in 2015 State Integrity Investigation, CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY (Nov. 9, 2015, updated Nov. 12, 2015), https://publicintegrity.org/accountability/kansasgets-f-grade-in-2015-state-integrity-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/JH5L-UGJY].
379
The attorney general’s office can receive complaints from the public about an agency’s failure to
comply with an open records request, but it does not operate as a formal and binding appeals body.
Koma-Kora Complaint Form, KAN. ATT’Y GEN., https://ag.ks.gov/complaint-center/koma-korainvestigation-request [https://perma.cc/NH5B-9HE4].
380
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-217(g)(3)(B).
381
Judy L. Thomas & Bryan Lowry, How Kansas Lawmakers Keep You from Finding Out What
CITY
STAR
(Nov.
12,
2017),
They’re
Doing—Until
It’s
Too
Late,
KAN.
https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article184176596.html [https://perma.cc/3FWSZNMW].
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unsealing of criminal affidavits, 382 and it has no open data law requiring
that the government affirmatively publish certain data online in an open
format. 383 In 2015, the Center for Public Integrity gave the state a failing
grade for transparency and accountability regarding public access to
information, electoral oversight, executive accountability, judicial
accountability, the state budget process, procurement, internal auditing,
lobbying disclosure, and ethics enforcement agencies. 384
These weaknesses in the state statutory regime are amplified by
certain structural features of state government in Kansas. Transparency
statutes operate in conjunction with other transparency mechanisms, such
as periodic elections and legislative oversight of the executive and judicial
branches. In Kansas, however, the state legislature is only part-time. It
meets in regular session for only ninety days every two years, 385 and
legislators are paid just $88.67 per day. 386 Moreover, some state legislators
employ relatively small staffs, further limiting their ability to engage in
time-consuming investigatory and oversight activity. 387
Second, government actors in Kansas have been notoriously wary of
transparency requirements, particularly during the eight-year reign of Sam
Brownback, 388 who served as governor of Kansas from 2011 to 2018. 389 In
2012, Brownback pushed massive tax cuts through the legislature,
commonly referred as the “Kansas experiment.” 390 The law eliminated state
income taxes for certain corporate entities and slashed individual income

Laura Bauer et al., When Cops Kill in Kansas, You Probably Won’t Hear Their Names or See
the Video, KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.kansascity.com/news/politicsgovernment/article184172776.html [https://perma.cc/VK92-S98W].
383
Stumpe, supra note 378.
384
Id.
385
Legislative Session Length, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 2, 2010),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/legislative-session-length.aspx
[https://perma.cc/QWP4-QTNB].
386
Johnny Kauffman, Low Pay in State Legislatures Means Some Can’t Afford the Job, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/01/09/508237086/low-pay-in-state-legislaturesmeans-some-cant-afford-the-job [https://perma.cc/CEA8-2QR5].
387
Full- and Part-Time Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 14, 2017),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx#gold
[https://perma.cc/AT4H-A48H].
388
See infra notes 395–399.
389
Sam Brownback (2011–2018), KAN. ST. LIBR., https://kslib.info/949/Sam-Brownback-20112018 [https://perma.cc/J3MN-7559].
390
Jeremy Hobson et al., As Trump Proposes Tax Cuts, Kansas Deals with Aftermath of
Experiment, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/25/560040131/as-trumpproposes-tax-cuts-kansas-deals-with-aftermath-of-experiment [https://perma.cc/MJ45-WXZ8].
382
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tax rates. 391 By 2016, the state had lost nearly $700 million in tax revenue
per year, 392 forcing schools to implement four-day weeks and consolidate
classes, 393 and causing the state’s bond rating to plummet. 394 Underfunded
state agencies and local governments had fewer resources to devote to
public records compliance as well.
As the financial situation worsened, Brownback’s administration
began to take a harder line on public records requests. For example, it took
the position that budget recommendations submitted by state agencies were
predecisional and therefore exempt from disclosure, even though the
agencies themselves asserted that the documents submitted to the Governor
were final. 395 The head of one advocacy organization in the state who
routinely relies on public records requests lamented the blanket of secrecy
that had settled over state government. “There’s something about once that
culture sets in,” he noted, “[i]t’s really difficult to move out of.” 396
This hostility toward disclosure requirements extended to state
agencies as well. In the wake of the deaths of children under its
supervision, for example, the Kansas Department for Children and Families
asked family members to sign gag orders promising not to talk about the
circumstances of the death or about the agency’s involvement. Former
agency officials reported receiving instructions not to document anything in
the wake of a child’s death and to shred any notes so that they could not be
produced in response to open records requests. 397 The agency also began
391
Jim Tankersley, Kansas Tried a Tax Plan Similar to Trump’s. It Failed., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/us/politics/kansas-tried-a-tax-plan-similar-to-trumps-itfailed.html [https://perma.cc/R3D4-TWGZ].
392
Id.
393
Emily Richmond, School Building Upkeep Left to Local Taxpayers in Kansas, so Sometimes Sun
Peers Through the Walls, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.kcur.org/post/schoolbuilding-upkeep-left-local-taxpayers-kansas-so-sometimes-sun-peers-through-walls#stream/0
[https://perma.cc/R7AS-NPKZ]; Suzanne Perez Tobias, Southeast Kansas District Implements Four(Apr.
19,
2016),
https://www.kansas.com/
Day
School
Week,
WICHITA EAGLE
news/local/education/article72631157.html [https://perma.cc/W5VR-YZEB].
394
Hobson, supra note 390.
395
Tim Carpenter, Brownback Administration Exempting Cabinet Budget Plans from KORA,
TOPEKA CAP.-J. (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.cjonline.com/news/2016-09-23/brownbackadministration-exempting-cabinet-budget-plans-kora [https://perma.cc/38AU-E2WC]; Bryan Lowry,
Brownback’s Office Won’t Release Budget Documents, WICHITA EAGLE (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www1.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article103744216.html# [https://perma.cc/LK4U-FEHY].
396
Laura Bauer et al., ‘One of the Most Secretive, Dark States’: What Is Kansas Trying to Hide?,
CITY
STAR
(Nov.
12,
2017),
https://www.kansascity.com/news/politicsKAN.
government/article184179651.html [https://perma.cc/2TPW-XQ8P].
397
Laura Bauer, Secrecy Inside Child Welfare System Can Kill: ‘God Help the Children of Kansas,’
CITY
STAR
(Nov.
12,
2017),
https://www.kansascity.com/news/politicsKAN.
government/article184177786.html [https://perma.cc/SL6P-ZJVK].

1530

114:1461 (2020)

Transparency Deserts

issuing high fee estimates, at one point charging nearly $3,000 for copies of
two days’ worth of e-mails for six employees. 398 It even ignored public
records’ requirements altogether. In one instance, a reporter submitted a
request for records relating to the death of a ten-year-old who had been
stabbed by his mother. The agency acknowledged that the records were
subject to disclosure but stated that it “didn’t have [the] staffing resources
[at that time] ‘due to its current workload of KORA requests.’” 399
Third, Kansas has been disproportionately affected by the crisis in
local media and civil society oversight. More than half of the counties in
the state—nearly the entire western half of Kansas—do not have a daily
newspaper. 400 Between 2004 and 2016, three newspapers in the state either
closed or merged, and another ten daily newspapers were converted into
weeklies. 401 The state is tied for the fifth highest number of newspaper
closures in the country, and it has the second highest number of closures
per capita in the nation. 402 Moreover, the newspapers that remain have
confronted severe reductions in newsroom staffing and declines in revenue.
Between the mid-1990s and 2018, print circulation for the Wichita Eagle,
the largest newspaper in Kansas, declined from 122,000 to 30,000. 403 The
newspaper was forced to cut newsroom staff down from more than 100
reporters to fewer than three dozen, and the newspaper is currently
distributed in just 10 of the state’s 105 counties, down from its peak
distribution of 73 counties. 404 The paper is now printed 200 miles away
from Wichita, forcing reporters to adhere to very early reporting deadlines
and reducing their ability to produce timely coverage of government
meetings and other nighttime events. 405
State Legal Costs Impede KORA, supra note 273.
Bauer et al., supra note 396. The newspaper that reported the story—the Kansas City Star—was
later named a Pulitzer Prize finalist for “expos[ing] a state government’s decades-long “obsession with
secrecy” and efforts to “suppress transparency and accountability in law enforcement agencies, child
welfare services and other sectors of the government.” The 2018 Pulitzer Prize Finalist in Public
Service: The Kansas City Star, PULITZER PRIZES, https://www.pulitzer.org/finalists/kansas-city-star
[https://perma.cc/XWG4-2VTX].
400
See Yemile Bucay et al., America’s Growing News Deserts, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (2017),
https://www.cjr.org/local_news/american-news-deserts-donuts-local.php
[https://perma.cc/F4CU4Z4G].
401
PENELOPE MUSE ABERNATHY, UNC SCH. MEDIA & JOURNALISM, THE RISE OF A NEW MEDIA
BARON
AND
THE
EMERGING
THREAT
OF
NEWS
DESERTS
app.
2
(2016),
http://newspaperownership.com/additional-material/closed-merged-newspapers-map/
[https://perma.cc/RM62-LTAL].
402
Id.
403
ABERNATHY, supra note 20, at 21–22.
404
Id.
405
Id. at 22.
398
399
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Civil society in the state also exhibits troubling weaknesses. Between
2013 and 2017, employment by social advocacy nonprofits in the state
decreased 60%. 406 Moreover, lobbyist spending has more than doubled in
Kansas over the last ten years. 407 And much of that money is unaccounted
for: in 2013, nearly three-quarters of lobbying money was categorized as
“unitemized,” meaning that expenditures were not linked to a specific
legislator or event. 408 While this lobbyist data is not broken down by
commercial versus noncommercial interests, the vast sums of money
flowing into the state lobbying apparatus and the lack of transparency as to
its origins and destination at least suggests that public interest groups in the
state are comparatively resource-poor in relation to their state-level
industry opponents. 409
In sum, Kansas measures poorly on all three central prongs of a local
transparency ecosystem: the robustness of state transparency laws, the
extent to which government actors effectively implement those laws, and
the strength of local media and civil society. This has combined to create a
downward transparency spiral in the state. Lack of media and civil society
oversight has facilitated the executive branch’s disregard of public records
requirements, allowed the legislature to enact new exemptions that reflect
concentrated special interests, and permitted corporate lobbyists to spend
ever-increasing funds in relative secrecy. These weaknesses in the public
records law’s text and implementation, in turn, have made it more difficult
for media and civil society actors to rely on state transparency laws to hold
government officials accountable.
B. Transparency Deserts and Federalism Theory
While this Article primarily identifies holes in the transparency
scholarship created by scholars’ neglect of the state and local transparency
Compare U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2017 Nonprofit
Establishment Employment & Wage Estimates, https://www.bls.gov/bdm/nonprofits/nonprofits.htm
[https://perma.cc/K9XX-7USQ] (911 people employed in social advocacy organizations in Kansas),
with U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2013 Nonprofit Establishment
Employment
&
Wage
Estimates,
https://www.bls.gov/bdm/nonprofits/nonprofits.htm
[https://perma.cc/K9XX-7USQ] (2,251 people employed in social advocacy organizations in Kansas).
407
Reid Wilson, Amid Gridlock in D.C., Influence Industry Expands Rapidly in the States, WASH.
POST (May 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/05/11/amid-gridlockin-d-c-influence-industry-expands-rapidly-in-the-states/?utm_term=.be927545cbcf
[https://perma.cc/BP36-V862].
408
Dion Lefler & Brent Wistrom, 74% of Lobbyist Spending on Kansas Lawmakers Unaccounted
For, KAN. CITY STAR (May 4, 2013), https://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article318681/74-oflobbyist-spending-on-Kansas-lawmakers-unaccounted-for.html [https://perma.cc/35BD-WFSB].
409
See Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 138.
406
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regime, the problem of transparency deserts has implications for a second
body of literature: federalism scholarship. A central normative claim of
federalism is that lower levels of government are both easier to monitor and
restrain 410 and more reflective of citizens’ preferences.411 This principle is
reflected in the oft-stated maxim that state governments will be “closer to
the people.” 412 Smaller and more local governments, the theory holds, allow
citizens more direct access to government officials and greater ease of
oversight. 413 Yet the state and local transparency pitfalls chronicled here
would suggest that the opposite is true. They suggest that a key component
of this modern accountability system—public records laws—is less
available to monitor state and local governments than it is to monitor the
federal government. The cumulative flaws in state transparency laws, in
both structure and implementation, expose the fallacy of enhanced public
oversight at smaller units of government.
Professor Miriam Seifter has chronicled the weaknesses of civil
society oversight of state agencies and concluded that “[f]ar from the
Antifederalist ideal of states as ‘well guarded,’ state administration today is
a largely unguarded giant.” 414 The shortcomings of the state transparency
regime identified here suggest that this thesis should sweep even more
broadly—that the accountability gaps Professor Seifter identifies at the
state administrative level may exist throughout all branches of state
government. But these implications also extend further. The theory that
410
See Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 49
(2016) (“As the influential Antifederalist Federal Farmer put it, state governments ought to be both
‘strong and well guarded.’” (quoting Letter XVII from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (Jan. 23,
1788), reprinted in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 350,
356 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1995))).
411
See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 312 (M. Farrand ed., 1911)
(Madison, J.) (arguing that federal elections should be regulated by the states because they were “best
acquainted with the situation of the people”); see also Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating
the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM:
THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)) (“The first, and most axiomatic, advantage of decentralized
government is that local laws can be adapted to local conditions and local tastes . . . .”).
412
See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 41 (2013) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“Because the States are closer to the people, the Framers thought that state regulation of
federal elections would ‘in ordinary cases . . . be both more convenient and more satisfactory.’”
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 363 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))). See
generally Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 146–48 (discussing how scholars are in
general agreement “that states are closer to the people,” but casting doubt on “claims that state
implementation offers the advantage of proximity to public eyes”).
413
Some federalism scholars have suggested that local government may offer a cure for the
problem of the democratic deficit in the United States in which remote bureaucrats remove important
decision-making processes from public view. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 147, at 393.
414
Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 128 (citation omitted).
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smaller levels of government are closer to the people would suggest that
local governments would be even more “well guarded” than the states.415
This review of public records laws suggests that the opposite is true—that
the smaller the government, the greater the breakdown in public
oversight. 416 It suggests that local governments have even fewer resources
to devote to complying with public records requirements, and that members
of the public face even steeper barriers to disclosure.
These pitfalls in the state public records regime also have implications
for the states-as-laboratories view of federalism. 417 For this theory to work,
the lessons learned from state experimentation must be disseminated—
there must be informational channels in place to transmit word of
experimental failures or successes to neighboring governments or to the
public. 418 The existence of transparency deserts calls this assumption into
question. The combination of poorly crafted transparency requirements,
inadequate media and civil society oversight, and hostile government actors
impedes the dissemination of information about state and local governance.
The existence of transparency deserts also implicates the “political
market” view of federalism, or the view that jurisdictions compete with one
another to present “the most appealing bundle of local laws, customs, and
attitudes.” 419 This view is often traced back to Professor Charles Tiebout’s
classic 1956 article A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, which argued
that “consumer-voters” may choose local governments based on individual
preferences. 420 The classic Tieboutian concept of local competition and
415
See Gerken, supra note 125, at 23–24 (summarizing the view among some federalism scholars
that “localities represent better sites for pursuing federalism’s values because they are closer to the
people, offer more realistic options for voting with one’s feet, and map more closely onto communities
of interest”).
416
This contradicts the assumption of some transparency theorists that transparency is greatest at
the local level. See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 14, at 934.
417
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(discussing the “happy incident[] of the federal system” where a “State may . . . serve as a laboratory”).
418
See Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1229, 1234 (1994) (describing the “laboratories” view of federalism as one in which “innovative
states can conduct controlled legislative ‘experiments’ whose results can be monitored” and “sound
policy conclusions derived and applied elsewhere, if appropriate”); Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatory
Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1692, 1694 (2014) (arguing that “[i]nformation is necessary for policy
experimentation because of the need for learning—jurisdictions must glean lessons from others,” and
that “[d]espite the importance of baseline policy information for quality experimentation . . . this data is
often unavailable, or available yet incomplete”).
419
Amar, supra note 418, at 1236–37.
420
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 417–18
(1956); see also Nestor M. Davidson & Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Case for Regionalism, 47 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 63, 65 (2013) (describing the Tieboutian model of federalism).
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mobility has been challenged on a number of grounds. 421 But this account
of transparency deserts bolsters a central critique: lack of knowledge.422
This view of federalism only works if a citizen has sufficient information to
know when to leave and where to go. 423
Further, the existence of transparency deserts may undermine the
federal government’s ability both to monitor state governments’
implementation of federal policies and to effectively serve as a check on
state government power. Under the cooperative federalism view of federal–
state relations, states serve as “servants and allies to the federal
government,” working to enact federal goals. 424 But the transparency
barriers described here may make it difficult for the federal government to
monitor whether state and local governments are, in fact, working to
implement federal policy. 425 Media and civil society actors may be unable
to alert the federal government to breakdowns in state and local
administration of federal policies and goals. 426
Additionally, absent adequate transparency measures, federal
congressional and executive actors may remain ignorant of broader state
and local governance failures. The Department of Justice, for example, will
be unable to investigate civil rights abuses by state and local law
enforcement agencies if it remains ignorant of such violations. 427 Congress
may not be alerted to governance failures in areas of civil rights, voting,
and utilities regulation at the state and local level without these
mechanisms of transparency. And at the state level, governors may not
know to step in to assume control of local government in times of crisis. 428
421
See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 346, 420–21 (1990) (outlining the social and economic costs that prevent people from moving
jurisdictions).
422
For critiques of Professor Tiebout’s assumption of perfect knowledge, see, for example, Nadav
Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323, 1355 & n.131 (2014).
423
See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (arguing that federalism “makes
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry”).
424
See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 23, at 1258.
425
Professors Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather K. Gerken have famously described states’ efforts
to resist federal mandates as “uncooperative federalism.” Id. at 1263.
426
Cf. Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 165–66 (describing the role of civil
society in alerting both the state and federal government to breakdowns in the safety and quality of
Section 8 housing).
427
See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012)
(authorizing DOJ investigations into local law enforcement violations of the Constitution and federal
statutory law); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d (same).
428
See,
e.g.,
Mo.
Exec.
Order
No.
14-09
(Aug.
18,
2014),
https://www.sos.mo.gov/library/reference/orders/2014/eo14_09
[https://perma.cc/7JDU-58N2]
(Missouri governor, following declaration of a state of emergency in the city of Ferguson, authorizing
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Transparency deserts may hinder federal and state governments’ ability to
effectively monitor lower levels of government. 429
V. REFORMING STATE AND LOCAL TRANSPARENCY ECOSYSTEMS
By chronicling a litany of flaws in the state and local transparency
regime, this Article begs the obvious question: what can and should be
done to improve these transparency ecosystems? This Part first addresses
the threshold question of whether public records laws are worth saving. It
teases out the central paradox of these laws: that although deeply flawed,
they are still better than the alternative. In doing so, it demonstrates that
unique features of state and local government increase the salience of
statutory transparency mechanisms. It then provides suggestions for
reform, proposing amendments to both the transparency statutes and to the
broader information ecosystems that surround them.
A. Are State Public Records Laws Worth Saving?
There is a robust strand of skepticism running throughout the federal
transparency literature today. Scholars have begun to ask whether the
transparency scale has tipped too far, emphasizing that transparency
excesses can lead to distinct governance failures.430 FOIA has become a
particular target of ire. Scholars have argued the law imposes costs that
grossly outweigh its benefits, and that there are viable alternative
transparency mechanisms that would adequately serve the needs of the
public without the enormous financial and resource burdens that the public
the state highway patrol to close streets and activating the state militia); see also Seifter, Gubernatorial
Administration, supra note 323, at 540 (“[G]overnors commonly use executive actions to take control
of local affairs in times of crisis.”).
429
Further, even when the federal government is alerted to a governance problem through
alternative channels—for example, an affected constituent reaches out to his or her senator or
congressional representative directly—these transparency deserts may impede the federal government’s
efforts to investigate and remedy the governance problem. To provide one illustration, a 2015
investigation into fatal police shootings by the Washington Post uncovered twice as many fatal police
shootings as the number reported by local police to the FBI. Kimberly Kindy et al., A Year of
Reckoning: Police Fatally Shoot Nearly 1,000, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/12/26/a-year-of-reckoning-police-fatally-shootnearly-1000/?utm_term=.e3deaf383cdb (last visited Mar. 29, 2020). FBI Director James Comey stated
that it was “unacceptable” that a media organization was able to gather more accurate crime statistics
than the agency could. Id.
430
See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT
SMALL 181–82 (2007) (outlining the costs of too much transparency, including silencing dissenters);
Fenster, supra note 14, at 902–03, 906–10 (describing the problems that can flow from “potential
excesses of disclosure requirements”); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 13–15 (arguing that the harms of
most “transparency inputs” can outweigh the benefits they provide).
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records statute imposes. 431 Academics such as Professor Pozen have
persuasively argued that while FOIA originated as a progressive tool to
promote good governance, it now largely functions as a regressive tool to
advance corporate interests. 432 Some have suggested it may be better to
scrap FOIA altogether. 433
In comparison with the federal law, state public records laws seem to
impose relatively greater burdens upon government and introduce
comparatively steeper barriers to disclosure. In other words, state public
records laws appear to be both more costly to the government and less
beneficial to the public than FOIA. 434 The case for replacing public records
laws with less onerous alternatives would therefore seem to be even
stronger at the subfederal level. And yet there are competing
considerations, specific to local transparency ecosystems, which caution
against the wholesale abandonment of state public records statutes.
Namely, unique features of the state and local governance landscape
increase the salience of public records laws in comparison with FOIA. Put
another way, although these state laws are deeply flawed, they are still
worth saving.
First, legal scholars have emphasized that there is such a thing as too
much transparency, and that over-accountability in government produces
its own pathologies.435 Assuming that this is a legitimate concern in the
federal context, it is still unlikely that we have reached this tipping point in
the state and local context. Along a variety of oversight measures—from
media coverage, to the attention of civil society actors, to the effectiveness
of intergovernmental checks and balances—state and local governments
See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 430, at 200–08 (arguing for increased opacity at the early
stages of the federal budgeting process and for delayed disclosure of certain aspects of the budgeting
process); Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at
1101 (arguing in favor of alternatives for executive branch transparency such as affirmative disclosure
requirements or denying legally binding effect to government policies and decisions that are not
publicized in a timely manner).
432
Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at 1111.
433
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 16, at 17; cf. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of
Information Act, supra note 15, at 1156 (“The most promising path forward . . . involves displacing
FOIA requests as the lynchpin of transparency policy and shoring up alternative strategies . . . .”).
434
See discussion supra Sections III.B–III.C.
435
See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and
Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1161 (2009) (noting that federal
agencies are “some of the most extensively monitored government actors in the world”); Jacob E.
Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 185, 186–87 (2014)
(noting that political economy scholarship has identified a “class of situations in which effective
accountability mechanisms can decrease, rather than increase, an agent’s likelihood of acting in her
principal’s interests” (emphases omitted)).
431
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suffer from too little accountability rather than too much. It is doubtful that
state and local governments in general are plagued by overattention from
the public. Wherever this line is drawn, it is unlikely that current levels of
public oversight of state and local governments have crossed it. 436
Second, the importance of government oversight increases with the
power and authority of the government entity that is being monitored. And
state and local governments’ influence over the everyday lives of citizens
has grown in recent years. State and local governments have grown larger:
while the number of federal employees has remained fairly steady over the
last half-century, the number of state government employees has increased
threefold. 437 They have also grown wealthier. Roughly two-thirds of local
governments’ operating budgets today derive from local sources of
revenue,
permitting
local
governments’
increased
economic
independence. 438 State spending has increased eightfold since 1960 after
accounting for inflation. 439 Many local governments now enjoy substantial
discretion over the allocation of local budgets, the setting of tax rates, and
the regulation of local land use. The amount of money in state and local
politics has also increased, and the majority of these lobbyists—roughly
70%—represent private sector interests. 440 This “bias towards business” is
even more pronounced at the state level than it is at the federal level. 441

See Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 169 (noting that while there can be too
much civil society oversight in theory, this critique is “not apt given conditions in the states today”).
Another potent critique of FOIA is that by concentrating public attention on the public sector while
casting little light on the private sector, it creates an “anti-public-sector bias.” See Pozen,
Transparency’s Ideological Drift, supra note 14, at 156–58. While this criticism applies in the state and
local context as well, reduced public oversight of state and local government more generally will
presumably lessen this attention imbalance.
437
Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 128–29. The state and local workforce is
roughly six times the size of the federal workforce. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 4.
438
Roughly two-thirds of local government revenue in 2016 derived from a combination of
property, sales, and other taxes and miscellaneous charges, such as fees for water collection and parking
meters. The remaining third derived from state and federal transfers. TAX POLICY CTR., URBAN INST. &
BROOKINGS
INST.,
THE
STATE
OF
STATE
(AND
LOCAL)
TAX
POLICY,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-sources-revenue-local-governments
[https://perma.cc/E4FF-JMY8].
439
Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 129; see also Stephen S. Jenks & Deil S.
Wright, An Agency-Level Approach to Change in the Administrative Functions of American State
Governments, 25 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 78, 80 (1993) (demonstrating the expansion over time of the
type of state administrative agencies).
440
Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 137. The number of registered lobbyists in
the states rose from 15,000 in 1980 to 47,000 in 2013. In the twenty-eight states that disclosed lobbying
data, $2.2 billion was spent on lobbying expenditures between 2013 and 2014. Id. at 135–36.
441
Id. at 137.
436
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This financial independence has allowed state and local governments
to expand into areas previously occupied by the federal government. They
often exercise control over land use, environmental regulation, public
health, civil rights, and the local economy. 442 They are also tasked with
implementing a large and growing array of federal programs and grants
today. 443 Governors have consolidated their authority and face few checks
to their power. 444 And local governments exert significant control and
discretion—delegated from the state government under “home rule” 445 and
delegated from the federal government under direct federal–local
cooperative efforts. 446 This increase in the size, role, and importance of
state and local governments has increased the need for effective
accountability mechanisms. Citizens must be able to access information
about the government entities that wield increasing power over their lives.
Third, distinctions in the federal, state, and local administrative regime
rob some of the criticisms of federal transparency law of their force. Most
notably, the absence of a national security apparatus at the state and local
level eliminates one of the most potent criticisms of FOIA: that it lacks
teeth to enforce oversight of the very agencies that require it most. 447 To be
sure, inadequate oversight of domestic law enforcement agencies remains a
problem in state and local government. 448 But there is no equivalent at the
state and local level to the trillions of pages classified by the federal
government, 449 nor are there gaping transparency holes such as those left by
federal agencies like the CIA, the NSA, the Office of the Director of
See Davidson, supra note 34, at 588–92.
Metzger, supra note 22, at 1853.
444
See Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 323, at 518–29. Governors can reorganize
the executive branch and disband agencies, and many have the authority to veto or rescind regulations.
Id. at 487–88.
445
Davidson, supra note 34, at 570–71. Local governments exercise power through zoning,
building and housing codes, wage rules, workplace conditions, environmental regulation, etc. Id. at 570.
446
See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an
Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 971–73 (2007) (providing examples of federal–local
collaboration in areas ranging from criminal justice to homeland security to education). State
legislatures and courts are often reluctant to interfere with this local autonomy. See Briffault, supra note
421, at 405–06.
447
See, e.g., Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note
15, at 1118–23.
448
See, e.g., BRIDGET DUPEY ET AL., UNIV. OF DENVER STURM COLL. OF LAW, ACCESS DENIED:
COLORADO LAW ENFORCEMENT REFUSES PUBLIC ACCESS TO RECORDS OF POLICE MISCONDUCT 5
(2018).
449
See PUB. INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BD., TRANSFORMING THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEM 5 (2012), https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/pidb/recommendations/transformingclassification.pdf [https://perma.cc//VX7A-YRPB].
442
443
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National Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence
offices of the various military branches. 450
Fourth, unique structural features of state and local government
increase the salience of these statutory transparency measures. At the
federal level, the system of checks and balances among the three branches
of government ensures some measure of accountability and transparency.
The Constitution permits Congress to check the President through
legislative investigations and oversight committees; the judiciary enables
public disclosure through its review of legislative and executive action; and
the public is empowered to express displeasure with the government’s lack
of transparency through periodic elections. 451
These accountability mechanisms are often weaker at the state level.
Many states have a plural executive 452—a form of government that has
been criticized for making it more difficult for the public to monitor and
hold to account. 453 Further, state legislative oversight is less robust than
congressional review. The legislature is a low-paying, part-time position in
forty states, 454 and state legislatures convene far less often than Congress. 455
State executive and legislative branches also tend to be controlled by the
same party, 456 further reducing the likelihood that partisan disputes will
bring governance failures to light. More robust congressional monitoring
has been posited as an alternative to FOIA. 457 But legislative oversight in
450
For discussions of the extent to which overclassification prevents the disclosure of records under
FOIA, see Fenster, supra note 14, at 922–24.
451
See FENSTER, supra note 67, at 61. Justice Scalia even questioned whether any transparency
measures at all are required outside “the institutionalized checks and balances within our system of
representative democracy.” Scalia, supra note 16, at 19.
452
See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 28.
453
See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2332 (2001)
(arguing that a benefit of the unitary executive is that it “simplif[ies] and personaliz[es] the processes of
bureaucratic governance,” making it easier for the public to hold the executive accountable for policy
choices); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 427, 430 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (arguing that a plural executive is more inclined to “conceal faults and destroy responsibility,” in
contrast with the more “narrowly watched and more readily suspected” unitary executive).
454
Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 323, at 519.
455
Compare Legislative Session Length, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 2, 2010),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/legislative-session-length.aspx
[https://perma.cc/RCN9-HQ6A] (showing that many state legislatures impose session limits of ninety
days or fewer), with Courtney Connley, Here’s How Many Days Congress Will Spend Away from the
Office in 2018, CNBC (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/29/heres-how-many-dayscongress-will-spend-away-from-the-office-in-2018.html [https://perma.cc/QT36-LVFJ] (noting that
Congress was in session 145 days in 2017).
456
Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 323, at 520.
457
Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at 1107,
1110.
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the states as it is constituted now is most likely too weak to serve as a
viable transparency replacement. 458
If these alternative mechanisms of government transparency and
accountability built into federal democratic systems are weaker at the state
level, they are virtually absent in the local context. One state supreme court
has claimed “that the separation of powers doctrine is a concept foreign to
municipal governance.” 459 Many local governments collapse legislative,
executive, and even judicial functions into a single governing body. 460 The
majority of local governments house the executive branch within the
legislative branch, and partisan competition at the local level is
comparatively low. 461 As a result, many of the accountability and
transparency benefits that flow from this interbranch system of checks and
balances are absent at the local level.
Moreover, periodic elections serve as a comparatively weak source of
government accountability in the local context. Many local governments
are dominated by a political machine, elections are often nonpartisan, and
turnout at local elections is generally much lower. 462 Further, government
power is often divorced from representation in local government. The
Supreme Court has applied the principle of one-person, one-vote to
general-purpose local government elections, such as a city or county
governing body. 463 Yet this rule does not extend to a variety of other forms
of local government. Some special purpose districts lack any direct
electoral accountability mechanism. 464 And even where there are elections,
courts have permitted special districts to allocate voting power by acreage
rather than population. 465 In addition, courts have authorized municipalities
to exert governmental authority over individuals who do not have the right
to vote in city elections, such as those living in adjacent unincorporated
communities but who are still subject to the city’s zoning, criminal

458
See Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 323, at 520 (“Scholars of legislative
oversight have theorized that legislators expend scarce resources on oversight only to the extent that it
is likely to enhance their political fortunes.”).
459
Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 579 (R.I. 2011).
460
See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 28; Davidson, supra note 34, at 571.
461
Davidson, supra note 34, at 602.
462
BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 28.
463
Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968).
464
Davidson, supra note 34, at 603–04.
465
Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981). Courts have also allowed business improvement
districts, which require real property owners to pay additional taxes to the municipality to allocate
voting authority in a way that privileges commercial over noncommercial property owners. See, e.g.,
Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 108 (2d Cir. 1998).
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enforcement, and health and safety regulations. 466 Public records laws offer
an alternative mechanism of accountability to these nonresidents deeply
affected by the actions of government.467
In other words, to the extent that we view transparency laws as part of
a continuum of democratic accountability—one of a set of choices citizens
have for holding their government accountable—then the absence of these
other democratic mechanisms at the local level increases the importance of
statutory alternatives.468 Statutory measures to promote government
transparency become increasingly critical to public oversight of the
government when democratic alternatives such as interbranch checks and
balances and periodic elections are weakened or wholly absent.
B. Proposals for Reform
Scholars’ neglect of state public records laws has normative
implications as well. The absence of descriptive accounts of these
subfederal laws—the costs these statutes impose upon government, the
identity and motivations of requesters, and the flaws in the laws’
structure—has skewed the policy debate around transparency in
government, making it more difficult for policymakers and advocates alike
to identify pervasive and persistent problems in the current regime. This
Section draws upon the lessons learned from these state public records laws
and offers suggestions for reform. While many of these proposals are
modest in scope, even incremental changes to the local transparency regime
have the potential to effect meaningful improvements in accountability and
governance.
1. Government Reform
The most obvious—and arguably the easiest—path toward improving
transparency in state and local government is reforming the statutes
themselves. Some of these changes are straightforward. Public records
exemptions that narrowly reflect the interests of powerful corporate actors,
for example, impose barriers to public disclosure without providing any

466
See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69–70 (1978). Courts have also
permitted municipalities to tax the wages of nonresidents who work within city limits. See, e.g., City of
Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 559 A.2d 513, 514, 516 (Pa. 1989).
467
The extent to which state judges serve as a more or less robust source of accountability than the
federal judiciary is a matter open to debate. For a summary of arguments on both sides of the issue, see
Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 323, at 523.
468
See Davidson, supra note 34, at 627 (noting that administrative processes may help compensate
for lack of representation).
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real benefits to the government at large. 469 Legislators could revise these
statutes to ensure that exemptions to disclosure are clearly stated, narrowly
tailored, and reflective of the public interest. More robust procedures to
notify the public and facilitate public debate prior to the enactment of new
exemptions could help constrain powerful interest groups’ ability to
weaken the laws’ effects. Tightening the regulations that govern asset
disclosures and conflicts of interest by members of state legislatures could
help expose links between legislators and special interest groups as well. 470
As scholars have discussed elsewhere, amending these statutes to
incentivize more robust affirmative disclosure of certain records may
further improve transparency outcomes. 471 This suggestion offers only a
partial solution: affirmative disclosure requirements cannot adequately
replace the individual right of request contained in the statutes. Yet
requiring proactive disclosure of certain categories of records routinely
generated, such as those containing budgetary information, could increase
transparency while reducing burdens on agencies. 472 Governments’ growing
ability to post large categories of records electronically presumably reduces
the costs associated with large-scale affirmative disclosure. And some
states have already begun to experiment with providing a centralized
database or website to host government financial data. Utah, for example,
posts state and local financial data on a centralized website that is designed
to allow citizens to conduct their own analysis of government spending. 473
More often, however, legislators will confront a trade-off: legislative
measures that reduce barriers to disclosure also increase costs to the
government. That being said, there are ways to strike a more effective
balance. One option is to craft fee schedules that distinguish between
commercial and noncommercial requesters. Governments could charge
See discussion supra notes 252–255 and accompanying text.
See Nicholas Kusnetz, Only Three States Score Higher than D+ in State Integrity Investigation;
11 Flunk, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 9, 2015, updated Nov. 23, 2015), https://publicintegrity.org/
accountability/only-three-states-score-higher-than-d-in-state-integrity-investigation-11-flunk
[https://perma.cc/KE2F-EDSX] (noting that only two states conduct independent and comprehensive
audits of legislators’ assets annually).
471
See Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at
1149–52 (suggesting more robust affirmative disclosure requirements as a partial fix for the problems
plaguing FOIA).
472
See, e.g., Soubhik Barari, Mapping Local Government Transparency in the U.S., MIT
GOV/LAB (July 2018), https://mitgovlab.org/updates/mapping-local-government-transparency-in-theus [https://perma.cc/9BVQ-7C59] (finding that more than half of local governments surveyed in a study
failed to post financial reports).
473
About Transparent Utah, TRANSPARENT UTAH, https://www.utah.gov/transparency/about.html
[https://perma.cc/29FY-55BM].
469
470
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commercial requesters a higher fee for records productions and charge
noncommercial requesters lower fees or even provide them with a fee
waiver. The federal government and many states already carve out special
treatment for requests in the public interest, so the definitional problem of
distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial requesters would
not be insurmountable. 474 These discrepancies in fee schedule could also be
tailored to allow local governments, which have fewer financial resources
at their disposal to respond to requests, to impose higher costs upon
commercial requesters than state agencies. 475
In other cases, the transparency benefits of a particular legislative
reform arguably outweigh the incremental increase in costs. Establishing an
independent administrative review process in those states that lack one, for
example, would impose an additional financial burden. But the independent
review of request decisions would provide at least some check against
agency determinations made in bad faith and act as a deterrent to
government efforts to distort the law to shield government misconduct.
Such reforms would better align these state statutes with both FOIA and
with public records statutes around the world, which increasingly
emphasize the importance of cost-effective administrative-level appeals
processes. 476 Given the high barriers to judicial review of public records
denials, such administrative review would allow for a meaningful appellate
check on agency discretion. It is likely worth the costs involved.
The executive and judicial branches could take steps to improve the
transparency regime as well. Simply collecting state-level data about the
474
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (2012) (distinguishing between requests in the public interest and
all other requests); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10(d)(iv) (2017) (same). Some members of the media
have argued that these fee waivers have been interpreted too narrowly. See, e.g., Shawn Musgrave, For
Some Agencies, Online Media Doesn’t Count as Media at All, MUCKROCK (July 26, 2013),
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2013/jul/26/navy-news-media-limited-publishers-andbroadcaster [https://perma.cc/4YKD-BW8M] (critiquing federal and state public records laws for
excluding nontraditional journalists from fee waivers). And some have raised the inverse argument—
that commercial requesters are improperly granted public interest status. See, e.g., Kwoka, FOIA, Inc.,
supra note 15, at 1382–83 (describing a repeat requestor for SEC data that has likely been wrongly
categorized as a media requester). Remedies discussed elsewhere in this Part—such as improved
administrative appeals processes—may help ease such flaws in the application of such statutory
distinctions between commercial and public interest requesters.
475
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10(d)(ii)–(iii) (2017) (allowing local agencies to charge
requesters after the first two hours of labor but allowing state agencies to charge only after the first four
hours).
476
See DAVID BANISAR, PRIVACY INT’L, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AROUND THE WORLD 23
(2006), www.freedominfo.org/documents/global_survey2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7JD-NMEX]
(noting that twenty-two countries have created independent information commissions to handle
appeals).
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public records process—how many requests agencies receive, how quickly
they are fulfilled, and how much money it costs to respond to them—would
allow legislators to make more informed decisions about how best to
structure these laws. 477 And judges could ensure that doctrines developed in
the context of federal law are not inappropriately incorporated into the state
legal context. 478 Such reforms only scratch the surface. There are myriad
ways that these statutes could be amended to give real effect to the
underlying goals of their drafters. Even the modest solutions proposed here,
however, illustrate that relatively small-scale changes in the laws could
elicit real improvements in local transparency ecosystems.
2. Media and Civil Society Reform
The decline in both local media and in resource-intensive investigative
reporting diminishes public oversight of state and local governments. In the
public records context, reduced media use of these laws creates a
downward transparency spiral, making it easier for the government to both
ignore the requirements of the law and to enact changes to the law that
further reduce its force. Reversing this decline is a massive undertaking,
one that far exceeds the bounds of this Article. But journalists, scholars,
and legislators have explored a variety of potential solutions in recent
years, from enhancing government funding for local journalism 479—similar
to the mixed private–public media models pursued in many other Western
democracies 480—to encouraging social media companies like Facebook to
feature local news content more prominently in news feeds.481
477
See Fink, supra note 17, at 111–12 (recommending that states collect more comprehensive
public records data).
478
For example, the Court of Appeals in New York recently permitted state and local agencies to
invoke the “Glomar response,” or a refusal to acknowledge the existence or nonexistence of records,
despite the fact this response was developed to protect national security interests. See Abdur-Rashid v.
N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 100 N.E.3d 799, 801 (N.Y. 2018).
479
See, e.g., Rick Rojas, News from Your Neighborhood, Brought to You by the State of New
Jersey, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/30/nyregion/nj-legislaturecommunity-journalism.html [https://perma.cc/QU5R-SGAJ]; John Temple, My Newspaper Died 10
Years Ago. I’m Worried the Worst Is Yet to Come, ATLANTIC (Feb. 27, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/02/who-is-going-to-save-local-news/583696
[https://perma.cc/6WDH-V3Z7].
480
See, e.g., RODNEY BENSON & MATTHEW POWERS, FREE PRESS, PUBLIC MEDIA AND POLITICAL
INDEPENDENCE: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF JOURNALISM FROM AROUND THE WORLD 8 (2011),
https://www.issuelab.org/resources/13259/13259.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LXY-5KZ6] (“In contrast to
the highly fragmented and mostly commercial American media, the media in virtually every other
western democratic nation-state are a mix of private and public.”).
481
See, e.g., Christine Schmidt, Facebook Is Committing $300 Million to Support News, with an
Emphasis on Local, NIEMANLAB (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.niemanlab.org/2019/01/facebook-iscommitting-300-million-to-support-news-with-an-emphasis-on-local [https://perma.cc/H8TZ-Y9NE].
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Increased nonprofit funding for journalism could also help. Smaller
nonprofit upstarts such as the Montpelier-based Vermont Digger are trying
to fill the oversight gaps left by the decline of traditional print-based
outlets. 482 These efforts often involve a commitment to pursuing longer
term investigative reporting on state and local government. The Digger, for
example, submitted over 200 public records requests to state agencies
between January 2013 and July 2018—more than any other news outlet,
including the state’s flagship newspaper, the Burlington Free Press. 483
Other nonprofit media organizations dedicated to a particular substantive
area, such as the Trace, which reports on guns in America, and the
Marshall Project, which reports on the criminal justice system, are also
helping fill these oversight gaps. 484 Nonprofit funding of local journalism
will not replace the loss of thousands of daily newspapers across the
country. But it may offer a partial solution in some localities and some
subject areas.
The narrower problem of declining access litigation might also be
addressed in a variety of ways. One solution may be to provide public
records litigants access to government funding, similar to a government
program in Canada that secures government financing on behalf of private
citizens who commit to litigating “test cases of national significance.” 485
Nonprofit organizations could also help address the narrower problem of
declining access litigation by newspapers. Law school clinics like the
Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic at Yale Law School
represent reporters in FOIA and state public records litigation without
charge. 486 And a group of First Amendment clinics and advocacy
organizations are now creating a national network of organizations engaged
in pro bono transparency litigation. 487 A standalone nonprofit law firm
committed to First Amendment and right of access work for local media
outlets might also offer at least a partial solution to falling rates of access
See About VTDigger, VTDIGGER, https://vtdigger.org/about-vtdigger [https://perma.cc/P48PNGSZ].
483
2013–2018 Vermont State Dataset, supra note 131.
484
See About The Trace, TRACE, https://www.thetrace.org/about-the-trace [https://perma.cc/AS6LPROJECT,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/about
LMYL];
About
Us,
MARSHALL
[https://perma.cc/EH32-N3TR].
485
See Court Challenges Program, GOV’T CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/canadianheritage/services/funding/court-challenges-program/backgrounder.html
[https://perma.cc/WPQ9JHEE].
486
See About, MEDIA FREEDOM & INFO. ACCESS CLINIC, https://law.yale.edu/mfia/about
[https://perma.cc/WPQ9-JHEE].
487
About FELN, FREE EXPRESSION LEGAL NETWORK, https://freeexpression.law/about-feln
[https://perma.cc/AKX9-53NK].
482
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litigation. Again, these pro bono legal services cannot wholly fill the gap
left by local media’s collapse. But they could help chip away at the edges
of the problem and breathe new life into access litigation efforts at the state
and local level.
CONCLUSION
Public records statutes are situated at the heart of the local
transparency regime. These laws provide the public a direct pipeline to
government and offer citizens a tool for holding government to account.
They serve as a check on state and local governments, which have grown in
power, size, and influence in recent decades, and they allow the media to
perform its function as the government’s watchdog. Despite the importance
of both these transparency laws and the governments they monitor,
however, scholars have largely ignored transparency issues at the
subfederal level. This Article takes initial steps to illustrate why this
matters. It is not intended to provide a comprehensive review of the local
transparency landscape, but rather, to tee up a variety of issues that merit
further exploration.
In doing so, it demonstrates that many of the problems that plague
FOIA are made worse in the state and local context. And it identifies the
problem of transparency deserts, or discrete geographic areas in which a
confluence of factors—including poorly written transparency laws,
deficiencies in the application of these laws, and weak civil society
organizations—impedes effective government oversight. At the same time,
a close analysis of these laws in conjunction with the structure and nature
of state and local government reveals that these transparency statutes,
although flawed, play an even more critical role at lower levels of
government than they do in the federal context, where there is a wealth of
statutory and constitutional alternatives to FOIA to check government
power. In sum, these laws are both more important and more flawed than
the legal scholarship has previously recognized. This makes it all the more
urgent that legislators and policymakers take steps toward reform.
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